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For two decades after the end of the Second World War, Australia actively 
sought to ensure its security through the deployment of its forces at home 
and abroad. While the Australian military had drastically shrunk in size 
after 1945, during the 1950s and 1960s it was persistently engaged in 
conflict, while simultaneously preparing for the possibility of a broader 
world conflagration. Indeed, there was no time in the two decades after 
the Second World War in which Australian forces were not deployed 
overseas. After contributing to the occupation of Japan from 1945, 
only five years after the Second World War Australia was again engaged 
in conflict, in support of its allies in Korea and in the form of aircraft in 
support of Commonwealth operations in the Malayan Emergency. 
In 1955, Australia committed ground forces to the Emergency to form 
a part of the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) alongside Britain and New 
Zealand. It was from the forces serving with FESR that Australia deployed 
to a third conflict against Indonesia in Borneo. While these three conflicts 
marked the clearest examples of Australia’s efforts to maintain its security 
during the early Cold War, between these deployments the country also 
prepared to fight wider conflicts and maintained vigilance at home against 
internal threats. These preparations were not trivial commitments: they 
dominated the allocation of resources, shaped training and framed force 
structure. Moreover, the threats for which Australian prepared during 
this period were not abstract ones but were instead considered likely and 
highly dangerous.
While Australia fought in four conflicts during the Cold War, and 
prepared for others, the history of this period is dominated by the war in 
Vietnam, on which so much of the public memory focuses. That war 
is at the forefront of public imagining of the period after the Second 
World War, and was the catalyst and symbol for many social, political 
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and strategic shifts of that era. The strong focus on Vietnam relative to 
other Cold War conflicts is reflected in the wealth of histories on that 
war compared with others, and the consistent use of the Vietnam War 
to periodise Australia’s military history. The 1950s and early 1960s are 
often seen as the lead-up to the Australian deployment of troops to 
Vietnam, whereas 1975 is firmly perceived as the end of an era for the 
Australian military. Yet this focus belies the fact that for the 20 years prior 
to the deployment of Australian combat troops to Vietnam, Australia 
was actively engaged in conflicts with their own contexts, during which 
the Australian military grew and developed in response to the demands 
placed on it by a changing strategic environment. During this time, the 
Australian armed forces underwent significant expansion and, in the case 
of the army in particular, professionalisation. Much of the equipment, 
tactics and doctrine developed during the 20 years after the Second World 
War remained in place until the 1990s; it was also these first conflicts 
of the Cold War that shaped how Australia fought in Vietnam. Equally, 
contrary to a popular imagination that often foregrounds Curtin’s 1942 
‘turn to America’, Australian forces spent the two decades after the 
Second World War closely integrated with the British and the wider 
Commonwealth, marking them out from the ‘norm’ of working closely 
alongside the United States in Vietnam, which is so powerfully embedded 
into the public consciousness.
The period between the Second World War and the Vietnam War features 
only briefly in Australia’s military history.1 Within the popular imagining, 
as Australia’s largest and most controversial post–Second World War 
conflict, Vietnam has attracted the lion’s share of historical writing, 
overshadowing the years that preceded it. The Korean War is perhaps the 
best studied, with its own official history and a body of memoirs and 
studies.2 This was a conventional conflict, with Australia participating 
in a handful of hard-fought battles, around which a narrative could be 
established. Later conflicts are less well served by histories, scholarly 
or otherwise.
1  Jeffrey Grey, A military history of Australia, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 317.
2  Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, vol. 1, Strategy and diplomacy (Canberra: 
Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981). For the most 
recent discussion of the Korean War in the Australian context, see John Blaxland, Michael Kelly and 




Beyond a small handful of memoirs and narrative histories, a notable feature 
of the writing on the conflicts in Malaya and Borneo and the preparations 
for war in Southeast Asia is the interconnected nature of the history. The 
structure of the official histories, which examine conflicts and crises in 
Southeast Asia rather than treating the conflicts as individual events, is 
the clearest example of the way that these conflicts should be understood 
as part of one overall effort by Australia to ensure its own security through 
collective defence in the region. Each commitment, therefore, is treated 
as one part of a broader strategic aim by the Official Historian, Peter 
Edwards.3 That some of the most useful military histories of this period 
are biographies, following key officers across multiple deployments and 
through the period’s major changes within the military, is a further 
indicator of the way in which this early period can be viewed as a whole, 
and as important in and of itself. This is notable in the biographies of key 
military figures during this period, such as David Horner’s biography of 
Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General John Wilton, and Jeffrey Grey’s 
of Lieutenant General Thomas Daly, Wilton’s successor.4
There are significant gaps in the historical understanding of this period, 
however, once one ventures beyond the official histories and the general 
histories of Australia’s military past. The wars themselves, and the 
preparations for conflicts not fought, have attracted little in the way of 
Australian historical writing compared with, for instance, the campaigns 
of the First World War. Discounting contemporary accounts or memoirs, 
only Korea sees a handful of studies on the conflict.5 There are no 
Australian-focused histories of either Malaya or Confrontation. Similarly, 
the non-operational aspects of this period in Australia’s military past are 
often ill-studied. This time period could be a rich vein for historians, with 
significant institutional changes within an Australian military adapting to 
3  Edwards’s two studies of the strategic and diplomatic contexts reflect the interrelated nature 
of the conflicts in Southeast Asia. However, the 10 volumes of the Official history of Australia’s 
involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts, 1948–1975 are dominated by Vietnam, while the Malayan 
Emergency and Borneo conflicts share one book.
4  DM Horner, Strategic command: General Sir John Wilton and Australia’s Asian wars (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Jeffrey Grey, A soldier’s soldier: A biography of Lieutenant General 
Sir Thomas Daly (Cambridge; Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2012), doi.org/ 
10.1017/ cbo9781107294240. Memoirs of other officers follow this trend. See for instance Brian 
W McFarlane, We band of brothers: A true Australian adventure story (Bowral: BW McFarlane, 2000); 
Pat Beale, Operation orders: The experiences of an infantry officer (Loftus: Australian Military History 
Publications, 2003).
5  For a literature review of the Korean War from the Australian perspective, see Blaxland, Kelly 
and Higgins, In from the cold, 6–12.
FIGHTING AUSTRALIA’S COLD WAR
4
new technological conditions, social and racial change at home, profound 
strategic shifts and the need, for the first time, to maintain forces overseas 
for decades at a time.6 Yet there is nothing in Australian literature that 
examines the services during the crucial, fast-changing period of the 1950s 
and 1960s, in the style of, for instance, Brian McAlister Linn’s Elvis’s army, 
which explores the social, technological and institutional changes with the 
US Army.7
More broadly, the gaps in the literature that this book seeks to address 
reflect some of the broader problems in Australian military history. 
The body of literature is small and is focused on a handful of notable 
conflicts, rather than the broad sweep of military (rather than war) 
history. Australian historians, whether they define themselves as military 
historians or not, overwhelmingly focus on the First World War, and to 
a lesser extent the Second World War and Vietnam War. Discussions of 
well-known campaigns or battles dominate military historians’ attentions, 
while social histories dominate the interests of Australian scholars 
examining Australia’s military past.
Undoubtedly, this is the product of a small number of historians working 
on Australian military history topics; the number of Australian historians 
more broadly is similarly small compared with the United Kingdom 
or United States. Who is doing military history in Australia is also an 
issue that warrants ongoing discussion. The average Australian military 
historian is a man, of European descent and based in Canberra, either 
at The Australian National University, the Australian War Memorial 
or the University of New South Wales Canberra; this collection, as the 
editors acknowledge, is no exception. The absence of women and people 
from diverse backgrounds, including those who speak languages other 
than English and who approach military history from different cultural 
6  There have been a handful of excellent studies on some of these topics in the last decade. 
See for instance Christina Twomey, ‘Bring the family: Australian overseas military communities 
and regional engagement, 1945–1988’, in Beyond combat: Australian military activity away from the 
battlefield, ed. Tristan Moss and Tom Richardson (Sydney: NewSouth Books, 2018), 10–28; Mathew 
Radcliffe, ‘In defence of White Australia: Discouraging “Asian marriage” in post war South-East Asia’, 
Australian Historical Studies 45, no. 2 (2014): 184–201, doi.org/10.1080/1031461x.2014.911761; 
Noah Riseman, Shirleene Robinson and Graham Willett, Serving in silence? (Sydney: NewSouth 
Books, 2018); Noah Riseman, ‘Racism, Indigenous people and the Australian armed forces in the 
post-Second World War era’, History Australia 10, no. 2 (2013): 159–79, doi.org/10.1080/1449085
4.2013.11668466.
7  Brian McAllister Linn, Elvis’s army: Cold War GIs and the atomic battlefield, illustrated ed. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016), doi.org/10.4159/9780674973732.
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perspectives, represents a significant gap in Australian military history. 
The data shows that, depending on level of appointment, there is rough 
parity between men and women in Australian history faculties across the 
country.8 Anecdotally, this is not the case in military history, particularly 
at more senior levels. Historians across the discipline should ask why, and 
how to change this. One feature of this discussion is the reticence of many 
to define themselves as military historians or to encourage others to do 
so, which is a symptom of the sometimes poor reputation that military 
history has in Australia as conservative and theory-averse; not all of this 
reputation is ill-deserved. Equally, there is a tendency to judge military 
history by its weakest examples, including popular histories not written 
by academics. While there are excellent military historians working on 
issues such as race, gender and military cultures, to name a few, one result 
of the narrowness of the field and those in it can be a skewing of historical 
work towards Australia’s major and most publicly recognised conflicts, 
and away from other themes, military activities and historical periods.
This book seeks to address one such understudied period by bringing 
together Australia’s Cold War military history prior to Vietnam in one 
coherent narrative. Crucially, it does not focus on the conflicts of Korea, 
Malaya and Borneo alone. To do so would be to ignore the broader context 
in which these occurred and the intense Australian focus on defending 
itself through collective security, comprehensive planning for possible 
wars, and the fight against threats at home. At the heart of this book is 
an examination of the way in which Australian strategy was translated 
into action ‘on the ground’, not just through combat, but through the 
commitment of armed forces throughout the region to deter conflict while 
preparing for it to break out. This is a classic strategic studies approach 
focused on the use of armed force in international affairs.
The book is divided into two main content parts and a concluding 
third part. The first examines the strategic shifts facing Australia in 
the immediate postwar period, and the way in which the military was 
structured to meet them. The first 20 years of Australia’s Cold War were 
characterised by a series of strategic challenges, marked as much by their 
significant threat to Australia’s security as their changing nature. In the 
first chapter, Stephan Frühling shows that there were few certainties for 
8  See Martin Crotty and Paul Sendziuk, ‘The numbers game: History staffing in Australian and 
New Zealand universities’, Australian Historical Studies 50, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 365–69, doi.org/ 
10.1080/1031461X.2019.1601750.
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Australia during this period, as the nation dealt with decolonisation, the 
shift of Australian defence focus to Asia from the Middle East, the threats 
of nationalism and communism in the region and the need to manage 
collective security arrangements with allies and regional partners.
Frühling’s insight at the strategic policy level is buttressed by John 
Blaxland’s assessment of the effects of Australia’s largest ever conflict, the 
Second World War, on Australia’s military forces in the early Cold War 
period. This chapter is critical in setting up the legacies of this conflict, 
its impact on a radically reduced military force in Australia and the 
interaction between the United States and the United Kingdom, which 
dominate Australia’s strategic relations in Asia during this period. The next 
chapter focuses on an aspect rarely integrated into military history: 
internal security. The Cold War was not seen by Australia as merely 
a military conflict; it was also a war of ideas, of culture, of economic 
structures and methods of government. The Cold War was also fought at 
home, albeit far less violently than in the jungles of Southeast Asia. David 
Horner examines the role played by the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation, newly created after the Second World War, in defending 
Australia from foreign and domestic threats.
Often termed the ‘Forgotten War’, Australia’s participation in the Korean 
War sat directly between two different periods of the early Cold War. 
Largely fought with Second World War equipment and tactics, the war 
more resembled those conflicts that went before it than those that came 
after. However, in the clear linking of Australia’s strategic interests with 
the judicious deployment of a small number of troops in support of allies, 
the Korean War had the hallmarks of later Cold War conflicts. Militarily, 
as Thomas Richardson shows in Chapter 4, Australia was keenly aware 
of the way in which the commitment of forces to the Korean peninsula 
might help secure not only that country from communism, but also 
ensure a security arrangement with the United States. Yet, in order to 
do this, the Australian Government recognised that its soldiers, sailors 
and airmen had to make a meaningful contribution to the war; for the 
Australian forces deployed, therefore, the war was an intense one.
The second part of the book focuses on the shift of Australia’s armed forces 
from fighting and preparing for conventional war to counterinsurgency 
warfighting after 1955. During this period, Australian forces were 
integrated with British Commonwealth organisations under the FESR, 
based in Malaya and Singapore, which is explored by Tristan Moss in 
7
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Chapter 5. The deployment of a battalion of Australian infantry in 1955 
reflected Australia’s commitment to collective defence with the British 
Commonwealth in the face of the threat of another global war. As part 
of 28 Commonwealth Brigade, in the British Far East Air Forces and as a 
significant part of the British-led naval presence in the region, Australian 
forces made a substantial contribution to the Commonwealth’s first 
response should war have broken out, while Australia was also closely 
involved in planning and training for these possible wars.
While ostensibly based in Malaysia as part of the FESR, Australian 
forces, particularly those from the army, spent a great deal of their time 
fighting insurgents during the Malayan Emergency. Richardson details 
this frustrating war, in which Australian ground forces rarely saw the 
enemy. The formation of Malaysia in 1957 led to Australia’s third Cold 
War conflict, against Indonesian Confrontation. Lachlan Grant and 
Michael Kelly’s chapter on operations in Borneo details how, even before 
the deployment to Vietnam, Australian forces had gained significant 
experience in jungle warfare, working alongside British forces to defeat 
the policy of Indonesian Confrontation.
At the same time, Australia’s Papua New Guinea–based force – the Pacific 
Islands Regiment – prepared to defend the Australian territory of Papua 
New Guinea (PNG). Rather than an overlooked outpost of the Australian 
Army, PNG was an important part of Australia’s defence. Given the tensions 
with Indonesia elsewhere – which erupted into a low-level conflict in 
Borneo – Australian planners worried that the war would reach Australian 
territory. In Chapter 8, Moss explores how the Australian Army’s series of 
deep patrols on the border complemented broader Commonwealth plans 
to defeat Indonesia in the case of conventional war.
The period 1945–66 was one of change, in which Australia reorientated 
its defence forces and strategic outlook to address a threat arising in its 
region in the context of the Cold War. It was this period that laid the 
foundations for the military that would go to war in Vietnam. Peter Dean’s 
final chapter, and the concluding part of the book, draws together the 
strategic, doctrinal and tactical influences on the Australian armed forces 
preparation and conduct of its roles in Southeast Asia, asking how the 
strategy evolved, the military adapted and to what extent these changes 
were reflective of an ‘Australian way of war’.

Part 1. Strategy 





Australian strategic policy 
in the global context of the 
Cold War, 1945–65
Stephan Frühling
It is difficult to understate the strategic challenges that Australian 
governments were confronted with in the two decades after the Second 
World War. The period from 1945 to 1965 includes the ‘first Cold War’, 
in which the Western and communist blocs were locked in an existential 
strategic competition that was as yet unmitigated by any notion of 
détente. Moreover, for Australia this era of the ‘Cold War’ was very much 
a hot one, as its forces were continuously engaged in combat operations in 
different parts of Asia from 1950 to 1971. The interplay of decolonisation 
in Australia’s neighbourhood, of threats of nationalism and communism, 
of the conditional nature of allies’ commitment to Australia’s security, and 
even of the revolutionary change in weapons technology, made the two 
decades after the Second World War a period where few certainties seemed 
to exist as Australia navigated its own particular version of the Cold War.
In the midst of global and regional turmoil and conflict, Australia had 
again to solve the basic problem of Australia’s defence policy: how to 
defend a thinly populated continent, off the archipelago of Southeast Asia 
and far removed from its allied great powers, whose strategic interests and 
priorities by necessity lay elsewhere. The quest to solve this problem led 
Australia to seek close cooperation and even integration with the defence 
planning and posture of both Britain and the United States in Southeast 
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Asia, and to play its role in the global fight against communism. At the 
same time, however, the consequences of decolonisation and nationalism 
in Indonesia presented particular challenges for Australia’s strategic policy, 
exactly because its allies were primarily focused on the communist threat, 
and the centre of gravity of the global Cold War lay elsewhere.
Australia’s (and New Zealand’s) Cold War operations in Southeast Asia 
focused on a region where the Cold War was ‘hot’ for longest, but which 
was nonetheless only of third-rate importance for Australia’s allies. With 
the notable exception of the Vietnam War, US engagement in Southeast 
Asia was always framed within a global strategy focused on conflict with 
the Soviet Union. In the 1950s in particular, the near-singular US focus 
on the strategic nuclear offensive as the basis of Western security was 
a  particularly poor fit for Australia’s regionally focused defence policy. 
By  the end of the period under examination in this collection, the 
Kennedy Administration’s new strategy of ‘flexible response’ proved more 
amenable to address Australia’s concerns – and would set both countries 
on the fateful road to escalation in Vietnam.
The origins of the Cold War
The Cold War, between the Soviet Union and its vassal states on the 
one side and the free world united in a series of alliances and led by the 
United States on the other, began to divide the victorious coalition of 
the Second World War within months of the end of that momentous 
conflict. Demobilisation by the United States had left the Soviet Army as 
the dominant military power in Europe. In 1946, former British prime 
minister Winston Churchill warned the United States of an ‘iron curtain’ 
that had descended through the middle of Europe,1 as non-communist 
parties were persecuted in Poland and elsewhere in the Soviet sphere of 
influence. The same year, George Kennan sent his ‘long telegram’ from 
Moscow, warning of the existential and implacable threat that Soviet 
expansion posed for the free world.2
1  John Ramsden, ‘Mr Churchill goes to Fulton’, in Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech fifty years later, 
ed. James Muller (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 15.
2  Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall (the ‘Long Telegram’), 22  February 1946, 
Truman Library, Harry Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers, www.trumanlibraryinstitute.org/
this-day-in-history-2/ (accessed November 2021).
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In 1947, the United Kingdom and France renewed their alliance in the 
Dunkirk Treaty, and the Truman Administration replaced Britain as 
the sponsor of anti-communist forces in Greece and Turkey. The threat 
was not confined to the Atlantic area, as communist movements also 
took up arms in China, Tonkin, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. But 
what really focused the minds of governments in London, Paris and the 
Hague was the impending danger to their homelands in Europe. The year 
1948 saw the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and the conclusion 
of the Brussels Pact between France, Britain and the Benelux countries. 
Even together, however, these five countries had little hope of resisting a 
Soviet invasion on their own. Their defence cooperation was an invitation 
(and plea) for the United States to overturn its adherence to George 
Washington’s old exhortation to ‘to steer clear of permanent Alliances, 
with any portion of the foreign World’,3 and to commit its economic 
and military resources to the defence of Western Europe.4 The same 
year, the United States committed the US Air Force to defy the Soviet 
blockade of Berlin. One year later, it then finally pledged itself in the 
1949 Washington Treaty to the defence of the members of the Brussels 
Pact, of Italy (as the key to the Mediterranean) and of the ‘stepping stone 
countries’ of Norway, Denmark and Portugal, which controlled vital 
islands in the North Atlantic: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) was born.
America’s new political commitments were translated into national 
defence mobilisation in 1950. In September, the Truman Administration 
endorsed NSC-68, which was in a sense the founding document of 
US and NATO strategy for the conflict with global communism. To 
win the Cold War, the United States would have to build up sufficient 
conventional and nuclear military capabilities to deter, and if necessary to 
defeat, Soviet attacks against the main population and industrial centres 
of Western Europe and East Asia. Moreover, it would need to maintain 
this unprecedented peacetime effort indefinitely, until the Soviet political 
system would eventually collapse under the weight of  its internal 
contradictions.5
3  George Washington, ‘Friends & fellow citizens’, farewell address, United States, 19 September 
1796. Transcript: gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents_gw/farewell/transcript.html (accessed April 2018), 
p. 27.
4  David Millar, The Cold War: A military history (London: John Murray, 1997), 10–13, 16–24.
5  ‘A report to the National Security Council – NSC 68’, 12 April 1950, Truman Library, Truman 
Papers, www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/report-national-security-council-nsc-68? document 
id= NA& page number=1 (accessed November 2021).
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During the final days of deliberation of NSC-68, North Korea attacked 
and nearly defeated the forces defending the Republic of Korea, including 
a small and ill-equipped US constabulary force. The Cold War had 
become hot, as the Korean War seemed a likely feint before the onset 
of global war. The United States declared a state of national emergency 
to assist defence mobilisation in December 1950. Even as it fought in 
Korea, it undertook a rapid and massive effort to create the alliance forces, 
standing commands, logistics and supply infrastructure that would be 
required for NATO to fight off the Soviet Army in Europe.6
For the following four decades, the United States would lead – and in 
many ways create and shape – the free world through the concerted 
military, economic and ideological efforts through which the Cold War 
was fought. The early Cold War gave rise not only to military alliances 
across the globe that persist to this day, including the ANZUS alliance 
between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, but also to 
the institutional underpinnings of what is today called the ‘global 
rules-based order’: the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (today’s World Bank), the International Monetary Fund, 
the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which became the World 
Trade Organization) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development that emerged from the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation to administer the US and Canadian Marshall 
Plan aid to Europe.7 But as these new global institutions took shape in 
the North Atlantic area, Britain’s faraway, antipodean dominions had to 
navigate their own particular challenges of the Cold War.
6  Terrance J Gough, U.S. Army mobilization and logistics in the Korean War: A research approach 
(Washington DC: Centre of Military History, United States Army, 1987), 10; Dieter Krüger, 
‘Institutionalizing NATO’s military bureaucracy: The making of an integrated chain of command’, 
in NATO’s post–Cold War politics: The changing provision of security, ed. Sebastian Mayer (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 55.
7  While some of these institutions date to the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, they became key 
elements of the economic organisation of the free world. For a discussion of the interplay of economic 
and military institutions in US grand strategy during the Cold War see Richard Betts, ‘U.S. national 
security strategy: Lenses and landmarks’ (paper presented for the launch conference of the Princeton 
Project: Toward a New National Security Strategy, November 2004).
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Australian strategic policy between 
Commonwealth defence and the 
US alliance
As the confusing aftermath of the Second World War settled into the 
Cold War conflict in the northern hemisphere, Australia too was faced 
with disorder and uncertainty about its own security. Until the mid-
1950s, its main strategic challenge in this new environment was how to 
reconcile four different, sometimes conflicting and sometimes reinforcing, 
considerations: its desire for defence relations with Britain and with the 
United States, and whether to determine the geographic focus of its 
defence priorities from considerations at the global or the regional level. 
None of these considerations arose from a direct communist threat to 
Australia itself, but the way Australia responded to them would shape the 
way it engaged (and fought) in the Cold War during the 1950s and into 
the 1960s.
Before the Second World War, Australia had rested its defence on Britain’s 
promise to send the Royal Navy to Asia in wartime. The abject failure of 
this ‘Singapore strategy’ in 1942 had demonstrated the inability of Britain 
to guarantee the security of Australia. But in the immediate aftermath of 
the war, the United States only kept a token military presence in Europe 
as well as Asia. While it had returned to the Philippines, Washington left 
the reimposition of order in the rest of Southeast Asia to the exhausted 
colonial powers of Britain, France and the Netherlands.8 In 1946 the 
Chifley Government attempted to leverage the US’ interest in its wartime 
base on Manus Island. Australia tried, with only little chance of success, 
to broker a deal for ongoing use of this base on the north coast of New 
Guinea in return for an enduring US defence commitment to Australia. 
The United States preferred to divest itself of the base, rather than remain 
bound to a wartime coalition partner whose main asset – its geographic 
importance after the 1942 retreat from the Philippines – had only been of 
temporary relevance.9
8  Peter Dennis, ‘Major and minor: The defense of Southeast Asia and the Cold War’, in The Cold 
War and defense, ed. K Neilson and R Haycock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 138–40.
9  Roger Bell, ‘Australian–American discord: Negotiations for post-war bases and security 
arrangements in the Pacific 1944–1946’, Australian Outlook 27, no. 1 (2008): 12–33, doi.org/10.1080/ 
103577173 08444457.
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In the immediate aftermath of the war, there was thus little else to fall 
back on for Australia’s strategic policy other than to look, once more, to 
concerted efforts of Britain and its dominions in preparing for the common 
defence. The 1946 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference decided 
that the dominions should take greater responsibility for the defence of 
areas of strategic importance in their respective regions. The Australian 
Chiefs of Staff Committee proposed, in its 1947 Appreciation of the 
strategical position of Australia, to define Australia’s region by the areas that 
would allow an enemy to mount air attacks against the country, which led 
to a focus on defending the two major access routes into Southeast Asia 
that the Japanese had also taken in 1942: the Philippines, to whose defence 
the United States remained committed, and the Malay Peninsula.10
However, the Chifley Government was far more reluctant than its 
military advisers to adopt Britain’s threat assessments as its own – or to 
accept that Australia’s area of strategic responsibility should be conceived 
of as part of the overall defence of the Empire (and hence potentially 
of lesser importance than the Middle East), rather than as an expression 
of Australia’s own priorities. Britain’s main possession in Southeast Asia, 
the Malay Peninsula, mattered for Australia primarily because of its 
strategic location in wartime. To Britain, however, it was the (peacetime) 
dollar revenues of Malaya’s tin and rubber exports that made it of prime 
importance. London was thus careful to curtail Australia’s leadership in 
regional security planning to the defence of sea lines of communication11 – 
an issue whose importance had, however, also been reinforced to Australia 
by its recent wartime experience.
In 1948, Australia’s Council of Defence, which comprised relevant 
members of the Cabinet as well as their main advisers, remarked that 
‘the designation of a potential enemy at this stage is not consistent with’ 
government policy, and noted that ‘political agreement between members 
of the British Commonwealth on joint strategic plans is impossible of 
attainment at the present time’.12 Chifley decided against Britain’s requests 
to reinforce its forces in Hong Kong, which was threatened by communist 
10  Chiefs of Staff Committee, Appreciation of the strategical position of Australia (28 October 1947). 
Unless referenced to the National Archives of Australia, all strategic guidance documents by the 
Chiefs of Staff and Defence Committees cited in this chapter are reproduced in Stephan Frühling 
(ed.), A history of Australian strategic policy since 1945 (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2009).
11  Dennis, ‘Major and minor’, 140, 145.
12  Conclusions of the Council of Defence, 20 April 1948, National Archives of Australia (NAA): 
A816, 14/301/321.
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armies in the Chinese Civil War, or in Malaya where the ‘Emergency’ 
of communist insurrection had started the same year. Australia likewise 
remained very cool about Britain’s request for a commitment to the 
defence of the Middle East.13
In December 1949, Robert Menzies returned to the prime ministership, 
heading a Coalition Government whose views on global security were 
more sympathetic with those of Britain. The Council of Defence decided 
that Australia was now:
to join with the other Commonwealth countries, the United 
States and the countries of Western Europe in organising essential 
deterrent forces, in building up effective defences and in working 
out the necessary plans, preferably on a regional basis … [and] to 
resist the spread of communism by all means short of war.14
Australia should take responsibility for its home defence, for ‘the overall 
direction and control of operations’ for the defence of the ANZAM 
(Australia, New Zealand and Malaya) region in Southeast Asia, but its 
effort should conform with overall Commonwealth strategy. Hence, the 
government left open whether Australian forces would first be sent to 
the Middle East or to Southeast Asia.15
At the outbreak of the Korean War, Australia initially followed Britain’s 
lead and did not commit forces to the conflict, but also saw an opportunity 
once again to seek a direct US commitment to the defence of Australia. 
Australia thus decided to join the war once Britain did, but exploited time 
zone differences to announce its decision to the United States before the 
government in London. The Korean War made it more urgent to settle the 
US–Japanese relationship through a formal peace treaty; Australia made 
clear the price for its agreement would be a formal US security guarantee; 
and hence the ANZUS Treaty was concluded in September 1951 between 
Washington, Canberra and Wellington – alas, with a much vaguer mutual 
assistance commitment than that of the Washington Treaty that had 
created NATO, and with little interest on the part of the United States 
to establish any of the joint planning or command arrangements that 
13  Dennis, ‘Major and minor’, 144–45.
14  Defence Committee, The basic objectives of British Commonwealth defence policy and general 
strategy, Minute No. 86/1950, 15 June 1950, para 7.
15  Defence Committee, A suitable basis for the distribution of strategic responsibility and war effort, 
Minute No. 89/150, 15 June 1950, paras 8, 16.
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then developed in that alliance.16 While the State Department convinced 
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to agree to staff talks, Chairman of 
the JCS General Omar Bradley suggested that these be held in Hawai‘i, 
expressing the hope that the Australians ‘will get tired of hanging around 
with nothing to do’.17
Somewhat ironically, the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty thus 
actually reinforced Australia’s focus on the defence of and through the 
British Commonwealth. Tensions between London, Washington and 
Canberra over the possibility of a US treaty with Britain’s antipodean 
dominions that would not involve Britain itself had been ameliorated by 
Australia’s decision in 1950 to send Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 
aircraft to Malaya to support British forces in the ‘Emergency’ there.18 
The 1951 Radford–Collins agreement between the US and Australian 
navies formalised the geographic and organisational separation of 
peacetime surveillance and wartime protection of shipping between the 
Commonwealth’s ANZAM area on the one hand, and the US national 
effort in the Pacific on the other.19 Australia sought joint planning with 
the United States in ANZUS, but since that was not on offer, it continued 
its close relationship with Britain in the hope that the United States could 
be brought, formally or informally, to that table.
In 1951, London also brought up again the question of an Australian 
commitment to the defence of the Middle East. The Menzies Cabinet 
decided that in wartime Australia would send the first Army and Air 
Force units ready for deployment to that region, and also agreed to send 
two understrength squadrons and ground crews to Malta in early 1952. 
Britain’s interest in having Australian forces in the Mediterranean occurred 
in the context of another diplomatic tug-of-war between London and 
Washington: both Britain and the United States sought leadership of 
a new major command on NATO’s southern flank, and their arguments 
rested on the relative size of the forces they could contribute to the region. 
When the RAAF units arrived in Malta, London had already accepted 
16  Dennis, ‘Major and minor’, 144–45.
17  Henry Brands Jr, ‘From ANZUS to SEATO: United States strategic policy towards Australia 
and New Zealand, 1952–1954’, The International History Review 9, no. 2 (May 1987): 254, doi.org/ 
10.1080/ 07075332.1987.9640442.
18  Dennis, ‘Major and minor’, 145.
19  Andrew Brown, ‘The history of the Radford-Collins Agreement’, Royal Australian Navy, Sea 
Power Centre, www.navy.gov.au/history/feature-histories/history-radford-collins-agreement (accessed 
2018).
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that NATO’s new Mediterranean Command would be headed by a US 
officer.20 The Australians thus served for two years as part of NATO’s force 
structure dedicated to the defence of Europe, and notably participated in 
the massive 1953 air exercise ‘Coronet’, during which they flew from an 
Australian-manned improvised airfield outside Cologne.21
This was not exactly what Australia had in mind for its limited available 
forces. In particular, the government was conscious of the long-term 
strategic consequences for Australia of sacrificing the defence of the Malay 
Peninsula in wartime.22 Hence, Menzies asked for plans to be drawn up 
to send troops to Southeast Asia rather than the Middle East as early as 
July 1952, and for the Defence Committee to examine commitments to 
both regions in its first Strategic basis of Australian defence policy paper 
of 1953. Ultimately, the question of where to place Australia’s priority 
rested on judgements about the likelihood of global war – in which 
the Middle East would have been more important than Malaya from a 
global perspective – and about the long-term cost for Australia of possibly 
losing Malaya to communism. The government accepted the committee’s 
recommendation to give priority to ongoing ‘Cold War’ commitments in 
Southeast Asia in Australia’s defence program over preparations for the 
possibility of global war. Moreover, Australia from now made the case to 
Britain for the importance of defending Malaya even in global war.23
From 1953, it was thus decided that a Third World War would not see 
a  third Australian Imperial Force go off to fight in the Middle East. 
Instead, Australia sought to commit Britain and the United States to fend 
off a communist invasion in Southeast Asia, even in global war. Alas, 
here again Australia was confronted with the difficulty of managing 
different US and British expectations. In general, Britain was reluctant 
to commit to direct action against China, for fear of overcommitting 
Western forces and because of the vulnerability of Hong Kong. It 
20  Dionysios Chourchoulis, ‘High hopes, bold aims, limited results: Britain and the establishment 
of the NATO Mediterranean Command, 1950–1953’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 20, no.  3 (2009): 
434–52, doi.org/10.1080/09592290903293779.
21  Air Power Development Centre, ‘The RAAF’s Malta deployment 1952–1954’, Pathfinder 192 
(January 2013), reproduced in Pathfinder collection  6 (2014): 105–8, at: airpower.airforce.gov.au/
sites/default/files/2021-03/PFV06-Pathfinder-Collection-Volume-6.pdf; ‘R.A.A.F. wing in arduous, 
revealing Ruhr exercises’, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 August 1953, 2.
22  Letter, McBride to Prime Minister, 6 June 1952, NAA: A816, 14/301/447.
23  Defence Committee, Strategic basis of Australian defence policy, 8 January 1953, paras 16, 20, 51; 
David Horner, Defence supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the making of Australian defence policy 
(St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 311–414.
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preferred to find accommodation with Peking over East Asian security, 
and refused to support joint action with the United States to support 
the French in Indochina. The same French difficulties did, however, also 
raise British concerns about the security of the Malay Peninsula. Britain 
did not have available in global war the three divisions that were seen 
as sufficient for a defence of Malaya against a full-scale invasion. But in 
any case, the ability to quickly occupy a defensive position at the narrow 
isthmus of Songkhla in southern Thailand was seen as necessary for any 
successful defence of the peninsula. For this task, forces had to be available 
in Malaya. Hence, in 1953, Australia, New Zealand and Britain agreed 
in principle to deploy forces from all three countries and services to form 
the permanent Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya.24
In contrast, the US JCS were loath to commit to the defence of any 
particular area in the region, preferring instead to respond to Chinese 
aggression with mobile air and naval forces and strikes on the Chinese 
mainland – and also to encourage its allies into joint action to help the 
French in their fight against the communist Viet Minh in Indochina, so 
as to prevent British pressures for assistance in the defence of Malaya later 
on. Hence, although the ‘Five Power’ talks that started in 1952 between 
the United States, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand could not 
agree on a basic strategy for the defence of Southeast Asia, they all were 
interested for different reasons in a defensive arrangement for the region. 
The capitulation of French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 made such an 
arrangement much less useful militarily than originally intended. But the 
idea retained political utility for the United States, since it would include 
regional countries and give Washington political cover both domestically 
and internationally to respond to communist aggression in the way it saw 
fit. Hence, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and France agreed to join 
the United States, Pakistan (which then included today’s Bangladesh), 
Thailand and the Philippines as members of the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) in 1954, and agreed in a protocol to also consider 
the formally neutral countries of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam as 
relevant to their treaty commitment.25
24  David Lee, ‘Australia and allied strategy in the Far East, 1952–1957’, Journal of Strategic Studies 16, 
no. 4 (2008): 514–16.
25  Lee, ‘Australia and allied strategy in the Far East’, 516–22.
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Within just four years, Australia had thus become part of three formal 
alliance arrangements with Britain and the United States – ANZAM, 
ANZUS and SEATO – as well as the Five Power talks. None of them, 
however, achieved what it really sought: a US commitment to the defence 
of Southeast Asia that was underpinned by joint planning and actual force 
allocation. To Australia’s dismay, the United States refused to use SEATO 
to develop the permanent alliance commands, infrastructure and plans it 
was creating in NATO for the defence of Europe. Moreover, Australia’s 
commitments under SEATO were even more extensive than those of the 
United States, which had limited its obligations to the defence against 
communist threats alone.26 The only framework that resulted in genuine 
planning and preparations for the defence of the region remained ANZAM, 
but lack of US support for those arrangements would shortly cause 
significant embarrassment for the Australian Government. Ultimately, 
Australia’s strategic problem was that the US defence commitment to 
Southeast Asia that it so much desired ran counter to the overall US 
strategy for the Cold War as a whole.
Australian strategic policy and the 
Eisenhower ‘New Look’ strategy
When the Eisenhower Administration assumed office in 1953, it was very 
concerned about the economic cost of the US defence effort in Europe 
and Korea. NATO had set itself significant conventional force-level goals 
at the Lisbon summit in 1952, which also proved beyond the means of 
Europe’s still recovering economies. The Cold War was a global challenge, 
but the Soviet Union was the main adversary, and Eisenhower was looking 
for a better way to meet the Soviet threat that would not reduce deterrence 
in the short term, nor bankrupt the United States in the long term.
In a rather fortuitous coincidence, the solution to this challenge also 
appeared at the same time: rapid advances in almost all aspects of nuclear 
weapons technology. In the late 1940s, nuclear weapons had still been scarce, 
expensive and bulky, and the expectation was that the battles of the Third 
World War would be not too different from those of the second one, with 
atomic munitions merely providing a somewhat faster and more efficient 
way of conducting the strategic bomber offensive. This changed, however, 
26  Dennis, ‘Major and minor’, 148.
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as the cost of fissile material dropped with new gaseous diffusion plants for 
uranium enrichment and plutonium production reactors; breakthroughs in 
miniaturisation made it possible to shrink nuclear warheads from the size 
of a small car to that of an artillery shell; and Edward Teller and Stanislaw 
Ulam conceived of radiation pressure as the key to engineering a nuclear 
weapon primarily based on nuclear fusion, not fission: the ‘thermonuclear’ 
or ‘hydrogen’ bomb, first tested in 1952, opened up an age of nuclear plenty 
in munition numbers, warhead yields and engineering opportunities. 
In strategic terms, it was the early 1950s rather than the Second World War’s 
Manhattan project that really brought about revolutionary change through 
nuclear weapons,27 and Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ strategy embraced them 
fully to fight the Cold War.
The long-range heavy bombers of the US Air Force’s Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) became the main Western deterrence and warfighting 
instrument: a large-scale thermonuclear attack would destroy the Soviet 
Union as a functioning society within the first days of a new conflict.28 
SAC bomber bases began to ring the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc from 
Greenland, over the British Isles and French Morocco, to the Eastern 
Mediterranean. But whereas SAC’s base demands significantly expanded 
the geographic areas of military interest to the United States on the Soviet 
Union’s Arctic and south-western flanks, SAC’s presence in Asia was 
concentrated between Alaska and Guam,29 and Southeast Asia was of little 
relevance to the strategic bomber force.
The defence of Western Europe posed a separate problem. Thermonuclear 
destruction of the Soviet Union itself would not necessarily stem an attack 
by the Soviet Army into West Germany and beyond, and Washington had 
already committed to a NATO strategy of ‘forward defence’ as close to 
the Iron Curtain as possible. The solution to this particular challenge was 
to embrace cheap, ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons as a substitute for expensive, 
conventional manoeuvre forces. The US Army reorganised itself based on 
the ‘Pentomic division’, a structure thought to be best suited to employ 
nuclear weapons, and to survive on the atomic battlefield.30 Support 
27  Colin Gray, Strategy for chaos: Revolutions in military affairs and the evidence of history (London: 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 222–69.
28  Edward Kaplan, To kill nations: American strategy in the air-atomic age and the rise of mutually assured 
destruction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9780801452482.003.0006.
29  Kurt Wayne Schake, ‘Strategic frontier: American bomber bases overseas, 1950–1960’ 
(PhD dissertation, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 1998).
30  Richard W Kedzior, Evolution and endurance: The U.S. Army division in the twentieth century 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 25.
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to NATO regional commanders’ atomic strike plans assumed a higher 
priority for NATO air forces than defence of allied territory.31 The first 
nuclear-armed US Army units appeared in Germany in 1954, and 
nuclear cannon and missile artillery, gravity bombs, air defence missiles 
and landmines quickly spread throughout the force. In 1957, the United 
States argued for a ‘nuclear stockpile’ approach where US nuclear weapons 
would be made available to all NATO allies, so that their artillery and air 
defence forces could be structured for the use of nuclear firepower as well. 
Given US preponderance in military and political terms in the alliance at 
the time, NATO agreed to embrace nuclear weapons as a substitute for 
conventional forces.32 Hold-outs such as Norway and Denmark, which 
refused to allow basing of nuclear warheads on their territory in peacetime, 
remained under considerable US pressure for refusing to ‘modernize’ their 
forces with nuclear weapons until the early 1960s.33
In contrast, US military strategy in Asia was a derivative of its global posture. 
The defence of South Korea was a commitment that the United States had 
assumed almost by accident, and US ground forces there received tactical 
nuclear weapons from 1958, largely consisting of older systems that were 
being phased out in Europe.34 But in general there were no positions in 
Asia that were both as important and as immediately vulnerable as Europe 
was to communist invasion, before the strategic nuclear offensive would 
have broken the Soviet Union’s back.35 The ability to inflict devastating 
nuclear punishment even on a country as large as China – thus negating 
its traditional reliance on geographic and demographic depth against 
external threat – was sufficient in US eyes to manage regional threats in 
Asia, and Washington would issue thinly veiled nuclear threats to manage 
the end of the Korean War, as well as the crises over Quemoy and Matsu 
in 1955.36 Given this global US strategy, it is no surprise that in the 1950s 
the United States looked upon planning for the local defence of the Malay 
31  The so-called SNOWCAT (Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics) 
missions.
32  Simon J Moody, ‘Enhancing political cohesion in NATO during the 1950s or: How it learned 
to stop worrying and love the (tactical) bomb’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 6 (2015): 817–38, 
doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1035434.
33  Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the high north (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 
1991), 164.
34  Lee Jae-Bong, ‘US deployment of nuclear weapons in 1950s South Korea & North Korea’s 
nuclear development’, The Asia-Pacific Journal 7, issue 8, no. 3 (2009): 1–17.
35  A not completely inappropriate metaphor as ‘broken-backed warfare’ became the term 
commonly used in the late 1950s for a possible phase of sporadic warfare after both Western and 
Communist forces would have received devastating damage from widespread use of nuclear weapons.
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Peninsula, especially if it was to only employ conventionally armed forces, 
as something that would be of little relevance for global war, and should not 
distract US or allied forces from higher priorities.
In 1953, the ANZAM powers had agreed in principle on the deployment 
of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, but detailed planning still 
required knowledge of US atomic strike plans. These the United States 
would not provide, neither directly nor through SEATO. Prime Minister 
Menzies, however, was reluctant to announce the peacetime commitment 
of ground forces to the defence of Malaya without US agreement to 
publicly link the deployment to SEATO, and a private commitment of 
US military support. At a visit to the White House in March 1955, he 
thought he had obtained both, and soon thereafter made public Australia’s 
commitment to the Strategic Reserve. In July 1955, however, the US chair 
of the JCS, Admiral Radford, provided a reply to the ANZAM plans that 
caused significant consternation among the Australian Government, as he 
reiterated that the United States would not commit specific forces to the 
region, that Indochina and Thailand rather than Malaya should be the 
first line of defence, that the United States would not exclude SEATO’s 
Asian members from regional planning with Australia and Britain, and 
that given US nuclear preponderance, subversion and insurrection, rather 
than outright invasion, would be more likely threats in Southeast Asia.37 
In effect, the United States told Australia it was preparing for the wrong 
war, in the wrong place and through the wrong arrangements.
Trying to use SEATO to link the United States to the ANZAM framework 
had failed. But although US commitment to SEATO was primarily 
political rather than military, the United States around the same time grew 
increasingly concerned about the view of the alliance’s Asian members 
that they were being shut out from actual planning by the Anglo-Saxon 
powers. From late 1955, the United States thus started to share more 
information on its nuclear strike plans within the organisation, and agreed 
to increased SEATO planning activities.38 This was of course welcome to 
Australia, which decided to shift its focus from ANZAM and informal 
four-power planning to the SEATO framework, and informed Britain 
that it would no longer commit its forces in Malaya to the defence of the 
Songkhla position.39
37  Lee, ‘Australia and allied strategy in the Far East’, 526–27; Mathew Jones, ‘The Radford bombshell: 
Anglo–Australian–US relations, nuclear weapons and the defence of South East Asia, 1954–57’, Journal 
of Strategic Studies 27, no. 4 (2004): 642–49, doi.org/10.1080/1362369042000314547.
38  Jones, ‘The Radford bombshell’, 639–42, 650–52.
39  Lee, ‘Australia and allied strategy in the Far East’, 527–28.
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Britain also started to have second thoughts. As the British nuclear 
weapons program began to deliver operational capability, London also 
looked to use nuclear weapons to make economic savings in its overall 
defence effort. Australian planners acknowledged the usefulness of nuclear 
weapons for interdiction and long-range bombing, but were less convinced 
that they could directly substitute for conventional forces in Southeast 
Asia’s geographic context. Nonetheless, the British 1957 Defence White 
Paper cut the UK military presence in Malaya by half, while promising 
to deploy three squadrons of nuclear-capable V bombers in times of crisis 
instead – a posture whose strong parallels to the failed Singapore strategy 
of the interwar years was not lost on the Australians.40
When Australia rethought its defence strategy in 1956, it thus did so in 
the context of the US reliance on the strategic nuclear offensive to deter 
global war, increased US willingness to engage in some forms of SEATO 
planning, the reduction of British forces in the Far East and increased allied 
reliance on nuclear weapons for doubtful tactical economies. Menzies 
travelled to London and Washington to discuss global and regional 
defence strategy, and the Defence Committee argued in a new Strategic 
basis paper that thermonuclear deterrence had increased the likelihood of 
limited war, especially involving client states such as could be found in 
Southeast Asia. Hence, Australia decided to adopt a ‘fire brigade’ posture 
of strategic mobility that would be able to cover its SEATO commitments 
beyond Malaya, shorter timelines for the mobilisation of forces for limited 
war and greater commonality of equipment through purchases with the 
United States, rather than Britain.41
The Strategic basis paper argued:
If  …  adequate conventional forces are not maintained by the 
Western Powers to meet the requirements of cold and limited war, 
it may be possible for the Communist powers to achieve their aims 
despite the maintenance by the Western Powers of the thermo-
nuclear deterrent.42
Australia’s main contribution to the global defence effort would thus be 
in the form of conventional forces, but in classified guidance and public 
statements, the government continued to hold on to the possibility 
40  Jones, ‘The Radford bombshell’, 653–56.
41  Lee, ‘Australia and allied strategy in the Far East’, 529; Jones, ‘The Radford bombshell’, 645–58.
42  Defence Committee, Strategic basis of Australian defence policy, 11 October 1956.
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of acquiring nuclear weapons from Australia’s allies. Australia’s Canberra 
bombers in Malaya could have deployed the new British atomic bombs. 
But Britain’s nuclear strategy was becoming more firmly embedded 
in the political context of NATO and, at the 1957 Bermuda summit, in 
its ‘special relationship’ with the United States. The United States had 
adopted legislation to make available nuclear warheads to NATO, but 
Australia remained a fourth-tier ally insofar as US nuclear cooperation was 
concerned: after Britain, NATO members ‘sharing’ US warheads, and the 
rest of that alliance. The prospect of obtaining British or US commitments 
to provide Australia with nuclear charges was thus slipping even as their 
role increased in UK and SEATO planning for Southeast Asia,43 and 
in announcing the changed posture, Menzies told parliament that ‘the 
chances are that jungle fighting will be involved’.44 National service was 
suspended in 1959 to release active duty personnel for deployment of 
the Army’s new ‘Pentropic’ division concept – a scheme modelled on the 
US ‘Pentomic’ organisation that mostly served to provide independent 
confirmation of the US conclusion that this was indeed an idea more 
convincing in theory than in practice.45
Australia had thus settled on a defence posture that it thought more 
relevant to likely threats and to US policy. What remained was to pay 
for it. Australia’s defence expenditure continued to decline as a share of 
GDP as the government prioritised national economic development, and 
the Citizen Military Forces consumed significant resources even though 
they were not eligible to serve beyond Australian territory. A high-ranking 
delegation led by the Defence Minister travelled to Washington in 1957 
to request US defence assistance and industrial support. Alas, at a time 
when the US treasury was covering a substantial part of NATO and other 
allies’ equipment purchases, the US National Security Council declined 
to do the same for Australia, as it was not seen as necessary for US global 
strategy to develop Australian defence or industrial capability.46
43  Wayne Reynolds, ‘The wars that were planned: Australia’s forward defence posture in Asia and 
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Time, however, was on Australia’s side. By accident more than by design, 
Australia had settled on a strategic posture that was a congruent fit with 
the emphasis on conventional forces that began to be advocated in the 
United States by General Maxwell Taylor and others, and would become 
an integral part of the new strategy of ‘flexible response’ under the new 
Kennedy Administration in 1961. What remained to be seen, however, 
was whether the increased US engagement in Southeast Asia that Australia 
promoted, prepared for and would soon see develop would really bring 
about the enduring and broad US commitment to the security of Australia 
and its region that it ultimately sought. In 1957, Menzies had confidently 
stated that ‘in time of war it is quite certain that SEATO will establish 
overall commands and that our forces, by suitable arrangements, will be 
under them’.47 But as one prescient observer cautioned a year later:
SEATO’s potential military strength depends almost wholly on 
American policy in a given situation, and it is difficult to see how 
the existence of SEATO can have material influence on that policy.48
Conventional escalation: Australian 
strategic policy between the Communist 
and Indonesian threats
In the second half of the 1950s, the main challenge for Australia’s strategic 
policy had thus been the distance between its own concerns and US global 
strategy. The Malayan ‘Emergency’ was the only real operation, however, 
and Australia’s defence preparations focused on limited and global wars 
that never happened. Writing in 1962, one particularly acerbic writer 
observed that Australia’s defence effort was characterised by its ‘sheer 
lack of dimension’ at the global scale, ‘high enough to be a burden on 
the economy but not high enough to provide a worthwhile defense at 
all’.49 By  that time, however, the strategic demands on Australia had 
changed quite substantially compared to 1957. Conflict with Indonesia 
had become an urgent concern, and the limits of direct support from the 
47  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 September 1957, para 8 
(Robert Menzies).
48  W Macmahon Ball, ‘A political re-examination of SEATO’, International Organization 12, no. 1 
(1958): 21.
49  BB Schaffer, ‘Policy and system in defense: The Australian case’, World Politics 15, no. 2 (January 
1963): 237, 239.
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United States were made distressingly explicit, even as both Britain and 
the Americans looked to greater Australian contributions to security in 
Southeast Asia.
The first major reckoning for government of the weaknesses in the new 
defence posture came only two years later, when the Defence Committee 
submitted its 1959 version of the Strategic basis. In the intervening years, 
the United States had seemingly ruthlessly refused to support its close allies 
Britain and France in the Suez Crisis, and the Eisenhower Administration’s 
lack of genuine military (as opposed to political) commitment to SEATO 
had become increasingly apparent. Both developments were particularly 
ominous in light of Indonesia’s political–military pressure to gain 
control of Dutch West Papua, which still provided a geographic buffer 
to Australia’s New Guinea territory. Jakarta skilfully toyed with Chinese 
and Soviet alignment, and Australia found little support from its allies 
as it attempted to support the Dutch.50 The Defence Committee thus 
recommended that Australia ‘should be prepared to act independently at 
least for a time’ in limited war against Indonesia or following global war,51 
and that ‘our forces … should be designed primarily with the ability to 
act independently of allies’.52 For the first time, it included a statement 
of specifically Australian ‘National Policy Objectives’.53
This was a radical shift. Since the Second World War – indeed, since 
Federation – it had been Australia’s aim to maximise its allies’ commitment 
of forces to Australia’s region, but this was always conceived of as a problem 
of how to best distribute limited resources in a global conflict – be it hot 
or cold. Now Canberra had to face the prospect of being in a significant 
conflict all alone. How difficult this was to contemplate can be gleaned 
from the Cabinet’s repeated deliberations on the 1959 Strategic basis, in 
which the government could not bring itself to endorse the paper, even as 
it ultimately accepted its substantive conclusions.54
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51  Defence Committee, Strategic basis of Australian defence policy, 12 January 1959, para 43.
52  Ibid., para 44.
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As it turned out, Australia’s allies substantially increased their engagement 
in the region in the 1960s. Alas, the reasons for their engagement, and 
their expectations of Australian support, made Australia’s challenges even 
more acute. The new Kennedy Administration had radically different 
ideas about global strategy than its predecessor. In a situation of mutually 
assured destruction, immediate and massive nuclear escalation ceased to 
be a viable approach to global war. Under the strategy of ‘flexible response’, 
Washington now sought to build up conventional forces to avoid nuclear 
escalation, and to keep global as well as limited war below the ‘nuclear 
threshold’ as long as possible. Moreover, communist expansion had shifted 
to encompass much of the developing world, including the Caribbean and 
Southeast Asia, and the Kennedy Administration was determined to stem 
this trend, including through the use of force.55 Echoing Australia’s 1957 
‘fire brigade’ posture, the Pentagon stood up a new ‘Strike Command’ in 
1961 to provide conventional forces based in North America to regional 
commanders for limited war scenarios,56 and the central reserve as well 
as sea and airlift capabilities for rapid deployment were increased in 
US conventional force planning.57
Finally, Australia thus had a US Administration willing to commit forces 
to Southeast Asia, but this brought with it US demands to make good 
on Canberra’s commitments under SEATO. In 1959, the communist 
Pathet Lao had taken up arms in Laos, and North Vietnam began its fight 
against the South. As SEATO discussed intervention in Laos during the 
first half of 1961, the Menzies Government decided on several occasions 
that Australia would in principle contribute forces to such an operation. 
By late 1961, the United States had deployed several thousand advisers to 
South Vietnam.58 Australia’s own military involvement in the Indochina 
conflict began the following year, as it deployed the first advisers to 
Vietnam, and a squadron of Sabre fighters to its SEATO ally Thailand 
to deter North Vietnamese attack.59
55  Gaddis, Strategies of containment, 198–236.
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Defense University Press, 1988), 75–101.
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That same year, the West Papua crisis escalated with significant loss 
of life in skirmishes between Dutch and Indonesian forces. By 1962, 
Indonesia had become the largest non-communist recipient of Soviet 
arms. From Russian sources available since the end of the Cold War, it 
has now become apparent that the Soviet Union sent Soviet submarines 
and TU-16 bomber crews to participate in a large assault on the Dutch in 
West Papua, and to help with the planning of that operation.60 Lacking 
international support, the Dutch caved before this could happen, and 
Indonesia took control of the territory in 1963 – the same year that it 
began cross-border raids onto the Malay Peninsula as part of its campaign 
of ‘Confrontation’ against the creation of Malaysia.
Britain was understandably eager to employ the Commonwealth 
Strategic  Reserve in Malaya against this threat. While Australia agreed 
that its forces could contribute to the defence of the Malay Peninsula 
against open, external attack, it also feared direct conflict with Indonesia 
on New Guinea, and was reluctant to expand its involvement in 
‘Confrontation’. The old question of whether the United States would be 
willing to militarily support Australia’s ANZAM defence efforts, and how 
it would interpret its commitments under ANZUS, thus reappeared in 
a more urgent and immediate form. After repeated enquiries by Australia, 
President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk clarified in late 
1963 that the ANZUS Treaty would apply in case of open aggression 
by Indonesia against Australian forces in Malaysia, but that US military 
support would even then not necessarily be forthcoming and that it 
would, in any case, be limited to sea and air forces and logistic support. 
In addition, the United States expected Australia to consult before any 
Australian commitment of forces, and to avoid any measures that could 
be perceived as provocative.61
Faced with the need to potentially fight on three fronts – alongside Britain 
in ‘Confrontation’, to defend New Guinea against Indonesian attack, 
and alongside the United States in Vietnam – the limits of Australia’s 
defence effort became painfully obvious. As early as January 1962, the 
Defence Committee’s new Strategic basis advised the government that 
direct intervention in Indochina alone might require a deployment larger 
60  David Easter, ‘Active Soviet military support for Indonesia during the 1962 West New Guinea 
crisis’, Cold War History 15, no. 2 (2015): 202.
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than could be sustained from Australia’s regular forces.62 By September, 
the government asked for a reconsideration in light of the deteriorating 
strategic situation. A key issue was the relationship between the ‘forward 
defence’ commitment against communist expansion in Southeast Asia, 
which still centred on the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya, and 
the possibility of conflict with Indonesia. In the 1963 paper on Australia’s 
strategic position, the Defence Committee advised that the commitment 
to the former would increase the risk of the latter,63 but at the same time 
‘the degree of obligation which America feels to Australia under ANZUS 
could be influenced by the contributions which Australia makes to the 
common defence’.64
Hence, Australia’s defence integration through ANZAM was a main 
reason for conflict with Indonesia; Australia’s hope for US support based 
on the ANZUS Treaty rested on its willingness to support SEATO; to 
which Australia’s ANZAM commitment was still its most important 
contribution. Australian strategic policy was caught in a dilemma from 
which there seemed to be no obvious way out. Cabinet thus confirmed that
Australia’s military strategy is based on the maintenance of 
a forward position in South-East Asia … and [decided] to accept 
the risk that thereby we may cause tension in our relations with 
Indonesia.65
As a consequence, it
agreed that there should be an increase in the present scale of 
defence programming … not only to ensure the security of the 
Australian mainland and East New Guinea, but also to enable us 
to make an effective and sustained contribution in South-East 
Asia and to present a deterrent to possible activities by Indonesia 
inimical to our strategic interests.66
Military expenditure was increased, the strength of the Army was 
raised, Australia purchased additional helicopters and transport aircraft, 
40 additional Mirage fighters, and ordered 24 F-111 to replace the ageing 
62  Defence Committee, Strategic basis of Australian defence policy, 25 January 1962, paras 22, 54.
63  Defence Committee, Australia’s strategic position, 4 February 1963, paras 17, 18, 30.
64  Ibid., para 25.
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66  Ibid.
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Canberra bombers.67 It also ordered a third guided missile destroyer which 
the new US Administration now agreed to subsidise with interest-free 
loans, as it had done with the previous two ships in 1961.68
The next Strategic basis paper of October 1964 followed more substantial 
Indonesian landings in Malaya, as well as the Gulf of Tonkin incident. 
It foreshadowed commitments in Vietnam ‘on a scale which could 
approach the proportions of a limited war’, concomitant with the need 
to potentially fight and deter Indonesia in Malaysia as well as in New 
Guinea, and recommended further increases in the size and capability 
of the defence force.69 Decades later, then Secretary of the Department 
of External Affairs Sir Arthur Tange would recall the pressures facing 
Australia’s ministers at the time:
I retained a memory of the blunt warning that I heard [US Secretary 
of State] Dean Rusk give to [Foreign Minister] Hasluck in 1964. 
During the discussion of worsening relations between Malaysia 
and Indonesia, Hasluck volunteered to inform the Americans 
before committing Australian forces in support of Malaysia. 
Responding to the inherent assumption that such a deployment 
would trigger an expectation of American military support, Rusk 
pointedly said that the United States would expect that Australia 
would have introduced conscription and full mobilisation, and 
added ‘there is no residuum of responsibility falling on the United 
States that is reached at a certain point’.70
Within weeks of considering the 1964 Strategic basis, the government 
reintroduced conscription, for the second time since the Second World 
War. In January 1965, it deployed one battalion to counter Indonesian 
incursions in Borneo and, in June 1965, the first battalion went into 
Vietnam. Australia’s Cold War had well and truly become a hot one.
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Conclusion
In 1965, the heaviest fighting and most Australian casualties in Vietnam 
had yet to occur. And yet, the replacement of Indonesia’s President 
Sukarno by General Suharto late that year meant that the nightmares 
of a three-front conflict, which had occupied Australia’s government and 
senior defence advisers in the early 1960s, did not come to pass. The end 
of ‘Confrontation’ also spelled the end of Britain’s military commitment to 
Southeast Asia, which the conflict with Indonesia had given an unexpected 
but temporary reprieve. The logic of Australia’s ‘forward defence’ now 
solely rested on the policy of the United States, but Washington’s decision 
not to burden itself with the SEATO framework in Vietnam made clear 
that Australia’s hope for an enduring US commitment to the region was 
as misplaced as before.
As early as November 1966, the Defence Committee endorsed the view 
that Southeast Asia would not quickly fall to communism, that there 
would be warning time available of a significant threat, and that within a 
force structure designed for limited war a ‘potential for expansion’ should 
now also be provided.71 In 1968, a new Strategic basis paper broke with 
the ‘domino theory’ that the fall of one country to communism would 
inexorably bring the communist threat to Australia’s doorstep, and started 
to make numerous references to the ‘defence of Australia’ as a future 
consideration. As the spectre of the communist threat receded, so did 
the need for, and viability of, Australia’s posture of ‘forward defence’. 
What remained was to prepare for the possibility of future conflict with 
Indonesia, which would become the main preoccupation for Australian 
defence policy in the era of ‘self-reliance’ after Vietnam. Australia 
continued to support its allies politically in the Cold War, through the 
Joint Facilities, and through maritime surveillance in the Indian Ocean, 
South Pacific and Southeast Asia; but as the central focus of strategic 
policy, Australia’s Cold War ended with the war in Vietnam.
When the Menzies Government committed to the forward defence policy 
in the 1950s, it was not doing the bidding of its ‘great and powerful 
friends’. Indeed, Britain had good reason to gripe about the limitations 
and conditions that Australia placed on its commitment to the defence 
71  Defence Committee, Interim review of the Strategic basis of Australian defence policy, 24 November 
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of Malaya at Sogkhla in the 1950s, and against Indonesia in the 1960s. 
Until the commitment of major Australian forces to Vietnam, the way in 
which Australia went about trying to prepare for the defence of Southeast 
Asia, politically as well as militarily in the ANZAM and SEATO 
frameworks, also never aligned with US preferences and perspectives. 
Australia sought a US strategic commitment to the region that was 
institutionally embedded and enduring, as well as politically significant 
and militarily meaningful. In the 1950s it achieved the former but not the 
latter, in Vietnam the latter but not the former. Was Australia’s strategic 
policy between 1945 and 1965 an abject failure?
It is not difficult, but also ultimately irrelevant, to poke holes in the 
perception by Australian leaders of the time that Southeast Asia was in 
direct and immediate danger of falling to communism through outright 
invasion, or through an inexorable fall of the ‘dominos’ to communist 
insurrection. What matters is that this perception was real, and that the 
British and US priority on Europe and Northeast Asia meant that 
Australia was faced, throughout this time, with a strategic problem to 
which there were no good solutions. Some aspects of Australia’s attempts 
to bind Britain and the United States to the defence of Southeast Asia 
seem almost quixotic when placed in the global context of their time. But 
the Australians of the 1950s and early 1960s were battling not just the 
threat of contemporary communism, but also the spectre of 1942 and 
the fall of Singapore. The war in Vietnam would vanquish both, through 
its regional–strategic as well as domestic–political consequences. In that 
sense, for Australia’s strategic policy the year of 1965 marked not just the 




Australia’s military after the 
Second World War: Legacies 
and challenges
John Blaxland
This chapter provides a brief overview of the challenges faced by the 
Australian armed services as they emerged from the Second World War. 
It  looks at how they adjusted to the changed regional dynamics after 
the war, the massive shrinkages in size, the new missions that emerged 
including the provision of occupation forces in Japan and rehabilitation at 
home, and the fluid security dynamics as the postwar order settled into the 
confrontation of the Cold War. The legacies of war for the armed services 
and the veterans themselves are also considered. The chapter illustrates 
that while the United States had played an enormous role in helping to 
defend Australia during the Second World War, the Australian armed 
forces retained their distinctive British-derived practices, procedures, 
equipment and orientation. This legacy would endure for decades.
The Second World War left an indelible impression on Australia’s 
military. The three armed services, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), 
the  Australian Military Forces (now known as the Australian Army) 
and  the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), were transformed into 
professional, proven and well-equipped defenders of Australia and 
contributors to allied military operations abroad. Australians had fought 
across the globe alongside other British Empire forces in the European 
and  Mediterranean theatres as well as the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 
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They  had also fought alongside US forces, notably in the South West 
Pacific Area under the command of US General Douglas MacArthur, 
while retaining British-derived equipment and practices.
The British influence would prove remarkably resilient in terms of policy 
orientation, military doctrine, procedures, equipment and uniforms. 
Rank insignia, for instance, remained distinctly British, albeit with some 
noticeable local variants, and RAAF and RAN contingents evinced few 
distinctive features in their uniforms, apart from the iconic slouch hat. For 
the RAN, practices and standards remained closely UK-aligned. The same 
was the case for the RAAF, even though increasingly US-sourced aircraft 
were in use. During the war the Army had published and promulgated 
training bulletins reflecting both home-grown tactical innovations and 
shared notes and lessons learned from other parts of the British Empire.
Along the way, the three armed services had grown almost exponentially 
to meet the wartime demand for specialisations inherent in self-reliant 
armed forces. Schools, for instance, proliferated to cover a wide range of 
military specialisations, including engineering and military intelligence, 
and a wide range of combat-related skills. A unique Australian military 
identity, metaphorically born in 1915, developed and matured to become 
more capable and more reliant on its own capabilities, albeit within 
the context of a grand alliance encompassing the United States and 
Britain’s empire.
In essence, the Australian armed services at the end of the war were 
world-class and among the largest in the world. The RAAF briefly was 
the world’s fourth largest air force.1 Australia’s land forces ranked about 
16th in the world at their peak, with a force of 464,000 troops.2 The RAN, 
with about 680 ships in 1945, was still enormous, but it was dwarfed 
1  At the end of the Second World War, the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain were the 
three major air powers in the world. At its peak in 1944, the Royal Canadian Air Force provided the 
fourth largest allied air force, but after Germany’s defeat it began a process of rapid reduction. On Japan’s 
surrender, the RAAF stood as the fourth largest air force in the world, but did not remain so for long. 
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Volume-4.pdf.
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by the 6,768-ship US Navy.3 With the euphoria of the war’s end and 
the demand for labour to be made available to redevelop the economy, 
however, they dramatically shrank back close to their prewar levels in 
a remarkably short time frame, mostly over the course of 1945 and 1946.
With much of the force raised specifically for wartime and with 
demobilisation tied to the end of the war, an interim arrangement to 
maintain forces was devised in early 1945. The interim arrangements 
were necessary to enable the initial postwar requirements to be met – 
including the occupation of Japan, repatriation of prisoners of war and 
internees, maintenance of order until restoration of civil rule in occupied 
territories and the removal and disposal of large quantities of surplus 
military supplies and equipment. By February 1946, the Interim Army 
would come to include those members of the Australian Military Forces 
who were on continuous full-time duty on 1 October 1945 and personnel 
who joined after that date.4
Postwar repatriation and peacekeeping 
challenges
The task of repatriating over 150,000 soldiers back home, including 
20,000 former prisoners of war in parts of Southeast Asia and Japan, 
presented the Australian forces and the Commonwealth Government 
with major logistical challenges. Shipping tonnage was at a premium and 
much work was required for moving people, as well as facilitating the 
return of the former colonial authorities and assisting with reconstruction. 
Japanese forces in much of the eastern end of the Netherlands East Indies, 
now Indonesia, surrendered to Australian forces. Administering this 
force of more than 300,000 military personnel while working to arrange 
a handover of authority to the postwar rulers proved challenging. With 
Indonesia’s independence leaders having declared independence as Japan 
surrendered, there was considerable conjecture over to whom Australian 
forces should ultimately hand over authority.
3  ‘US ship force levels 1866–present’, Naval History and Heritage Command, at: www.history.
navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html (accessed 18 September 2020).
4  Palazzo, The Australian Army, 197.
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The Australian Government under Ben Chifley played an advocacy 
role on behalf of the Indonesians. Mindful of Australia’s sympathetic 
position towards the Indonesians, Australian advocacy was welcomed by 
the Indonesian independence leaders. Eager to play a constructive role, 
Australia volunteered to send peacekeepers. In the end, Dutch authorities 
resumed their place as colonial masters – at least on an interim basis – 
and their rule was resisted by the newly declared Republic of Indonesia. 
Australia followed Britain’s lead and complied with Dutch demands, but 
this was a fraught enterprise. By August 1947 Australian staff were seconded 
to the UN  Good Offices Committee for Indonesia, including four 
Australian military observers – the world’s first UN peacekeepers. These 
were Australian Army Brigadier LGH Dyke and Major DL Campbell, 
Commander HS Chesterman (RAN), and Squadron Leader DT Spence 
(RAAF). Ongoing fighting occurred through to the Dutch withdrawal 
from Indonesia in 1949, but by then Australian troops were well and truly 
out of the picture.5
Prior to that, however, many of the Japanese captives were subject to 
war crimes trials that endured for many months after the war. Australian 
lawyers, interpreters, guards and support staff played a critical role 
in prosecuting war criminals. Australian forces were also instrumental in 
facilitating the repatriation of tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers back 
to Japan. In fact, with competing pressures to repatriate and demobilise 
Australian soldiers, while handing over governance arrangements to Dutch 
authorities, these tasks proved increasingly challenging as the months 
passed after the cessation of hostilities and the number of Australians 
remaining in uniform dwindled.
Postwar security concerns
While only a fraction of the force would be maintained after the war, 
that which was retained reflected a broad range of capabilities that had 
been developed in the intervening years of war. This was largely because 
the postwar Australian armed forces that emerged by the late 1940s 
were not just a repeat of those that remained after demobilisation in 
the aftermath of the First World War. The RAAF, for instance, had not 
5  ‘United Nations Good Offices Committee Indonesia (UNGOC) 1947–1951’, Australian War 
Memorial, at: www.awm.gov.au/collection/CN500115 (accessed 18 September 2020).
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existed in 1918 and the range and sophistication of aircraft types and 
the accompanying support requirements to maintain them had grown 
exponentially in the intervening years. Naval platforms had evolved 
considerably as well, with entire new classes of vessels, equipped with 
previously unheard-of technologies (including radar and eavesdropping 
equipment), incorporated or soon to be incorporated into the fleet 
(notably aircraft carriers).
Land forces had gone through a similar transformation. The Australian 
Military Forces of the interwar years had been based on militia units 
with a preponderance of infantry, supported by a modicum of artillery, 
engineers and cavalry units. The interwar militia largely ignored logistics 
(along with much else). Back then, though, the expectation remained 
that much of the logistical and technical backup for high-end warfighting 
would come from Britain. Yet given the focus on continental defence, 
how Britain might be of much help for supplies and technical matters 
seems to have been questionable at best. Finances were the key constraint 
in the interwar period and would be so again after the war.6 By 1945, 
however, the  Australian Army maintained relatively sophisticated 
capabilities ranging across the armoured, airborne, jungle, amphibious 
and special operations domains. What’s more, many of these capabilities 
were supported by home-grown logistical and administrative support 
arrangements and training schools as well as Australian industry.7 
Admittedly, many of the weapons and equipment types remained licensed 
copies of British origin.
At first, Australia’s postwar security concerns revolved around ensuring 
the former enemy states, notably Japan, were disarmed and their arsenal 
disabled. This was seen as fundamentally important in order to prevent 
them from being able to stage a repeat of their wartime actions. It soon 
become evident, however, that Japan and Germany were unlikely to 
present a significant threat in the foreseeable future. At first, there was 
a degree of optimism in the Chifley Government about the postwar order. 
Australia played a prominent role in establishing the United Nations, in 
part reflecting this optimism. Indeed, Australia’s external affairs minister, 
6  Palazzo, The Australian Army, 98.
7  See AT Ross, Armed and ready: The industrial development and defence of Australia 1900–1945 
(Wahroonga: Turton & Armstrong, 1995).
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Herbert ‘Doc’ Evatt, was appointed President of the United Nations in 
1948 in large part as recognition of Australia’s enthusiasm for the United 
Nations as the mechanism for managing the postwar world order.
As it happens, the Chifley Government’s benign view soon stood at odds 
with the views developing in London, Washington and Ottawa. Erstwhile 
wartime ally the Soviet Union soon emerged as the principal adversary 
of the United States and Britain. On 5 September 1945, three days after 
the signifying of the surrender on USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, a cipher 
clerk from the Soviet embassy in Canada, Igor Gouzenko, defected to the 
West with revelations of large-scale Soviet espionage in North America. 
Indeed, Gouzenko’s defection reverberated around the world, including in 
Australia, where the Soviet Union had been engaged in espionage during 
the war – this continued apace after the cessation of hostilities.8
In addition to emerging Cold War tensions, Australia emerged from the 
Second World War with a different mindset towards United Kingdom 
authorities. While there remained a strong sense of still being British, there 
was a marked distinction between the British of the United Kingdom and 
of self-governing and now more independent dominions like Australia. 
No longer would Australian leaders feel compelled to fall into line with 
directives from London-based prime ministers. Never again, for instance, 
would the melancholy duty of a war declaration be an automatic 
invocation, as had been the case when Robert Menzies was prime minister 
in September 1939. The appropriation of the Statute of Westminster as an 
Act of the Australian Commonwealth Parliament in October 1942 put an 
end to that. Thereafter, the relationship would remain cordial and close, 
but with a much sharper focus on the distinction between the national 
interests of the United Kingdom in contrast to those of Australia.9
At the same time as a closeness was re-emerging in the ties between 
Australia and the United Kingdom, the relationship with the United 
States appeared to drift as US interests and focus shifted elsewhere. While 
Australia had been America’s wartime ally, the United States was initially 
not interested in extending a security guarantee to Australia after the war. 
The Americans understood that, despite the setbacks of 1942 with the fall 
of Singapore, Australia remained in Britain’s orbit and as Britain returned 
8  This is covered in some detail in David Horner, The spy catchers: The official history of ASIO, 
vol. 1, 1949–1963 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2014).
9  John Blaxland, Strategic cousins: Australian and Canadian expeditionary forces and the British and 
American empires (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2006), 52.
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to govern its territories in the ‘Far East’, Australian ties with Britain would 
be reinforced. Notably, Australia also remained a member of the British 
pound sterling economic area (made up of most British Commonwealth 
countries, excluding Canada), whereby Australia’s currency remained fixed 
in value to Britain’s. Britain also remained Australia’s principal trading 
partner through the immediate postwar decade, with much of Australia’s 
trade transiting through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea, 
where Britain remained influential. Australia’s armed forces, therefore, 
maintained their wartime disposition to remain orientated towards 
British models, standards and equipment types, even if sometimes locally 
manufactured or assembled.
The ramifications of the emerging Cold War between the Soviet Union 
and the United States (and their respective security partners or allies) were 
not immediately clear at war’s end. It would take some time, including 
a growing number of signs of Soviet–US confrontation, before American 
resolve to form a network of alliances crystallised in response. Australia 
would not sign the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) 
Treaty with the United States and New Zealand until after the onset of the 
Korean War. Nonetheless, in the meantime, Australia remained a security 
partner of the United States in the occupation of Japan from 1946 to 
1951, alongside other participating British Commonwealth nations.
Australia was eager to participate in the occupation of Japan as one of 
the victors. While eager to prevent resurgent Japanese militarism, the 
Australian Government demonstrated an overwhelming sense of security 
at the end of the Second World War. This is most evidently manifested in 
the pace and scale of demobilisation.
The existential fears of 1942 effectively vaporised in August 1945. It 
is in this context that the three services demobilised the overwhelming 
majority of the more than 600,000 personnel still serving in uniform at 
war’s end. The government faced a gargantuan task, sending hundreds of 
thousands of their soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen back to their 
homes to return to their families, readjust, find work and get on with their 
lives after six years of war. Indeed, the armed services had reached nearly 
1 million members at the height of the expansion by late 1942. As the tide 
of war turned, however, and as demands for labour in support of domestic 
industry and agriculture grew to meet the demands of the war itself, from 
as early as 1943 the government of prime minister John Curtin had set 
about demobilising those deemed surplus to requirements, particularly 
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land forces. In response, each of the three armed services faced similar but 
distinct circumstances and challenges as they sought to demobilise and 
adjust to the postwar circumstances.
Postwar plans
A few months after the end of the war, in March 1946, the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee considered an ‘Appreciation of the strategical position 
of Australia’. It saw Australia as protected by its geographic position and 
the collective security system of the United Nations, but beyond that, 
Australia was ‘unable to defend herself unaided against a major power’. 
The only viable contender for the title was the Soviet Union.10 Australian 
forces, the paper argued, should be organised to fulfil the following 
requirements:
a. A Naval Mobile Task Unit consisting of aircraft carriers with 
their escorts, capable of forming part of an Empire Task Force 
and cooperating with the United States Navy;
b. A Fleet Train for the maintenance of a Mobile Task Unit;
c. A Sea Frontier Force consisting of escorts for shipping, and for 
the seaward defence of bases;
d. Amphibious craft for combined operations;
e. Standard Army formations designed for operations on 
normal terrain, and for amphibious operations but capable 
of conversion to meet the conditions of jungle warfare;
f. Army Garrison forces for the protection of bases against sea 
and air raids and for internal security;
g. Adequate maintenance provision for the Forces under (e) and 
(f );
h. An Air Mobile Task Force, including units for long range 
missions and transportation, ready to move wherever required 
for strategic purposes or in support of the other Services; and
i. Air units for the protection of bases and focal areas against 
sporadic raids.11
10  Stephan Frühling, A history of Australian strategic policy since 1945 (Canberra: Defence Publishing 
Service, 2009), 11.
11  ‘An appreciation of the strategical position of Australia (February 1946)’, in Frühling, A history 
of Australian strategic policy since 1945, 61–62.
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Over 18  months later, reflecting the heightened concerns about the 
emerging Cold War, the updated ‘Appreciation of the strategical position 
of Australia’ in 1947 also added the requirement for a training and 
maintenance organisation for the support of the forces ‘and for expansion 
in war’.12 In practice, not everything on this list would be achieved in the 
immediate postwar years, but this guidance provided the framework that 
set the parameters in the early postwar years for the three armed services: 
the Air Force, the Army and the Navy.
The Royal Australian Navy
The RAN had grown from a strength of 5,010 personnel in 1939 to 
nearly 40,000 personnel at its height, operating on more than 300 vessels, 
consisting of dozens of warships including corvettes, frigates, destroyers 
and cruisers.13 The RAN did not operate aircraft carriers or submarines 
during the war, but aircraft carriers would come to be acquired shortly 
thereafter, although submarines were not included until the late 1960s. 
While the fleet shrank dramatically after the cessation of hostilities, many 
of its duties endured, including participating in the British Commonwealth 
Occupation Force (BCOF) in Japan and in conducting minesweeping 
operations in and around the South Pacific, clearing mines laid during 
the war from the harbours and waterways to enable commercial and naval 
traffic to pass unhindered. This meant that there remained considerable 
scope for naval personnel to serve after the war if they wished to do so.
The RAN had been well represented at the surrender signing ceremony 
in Tokyo Bay, with 10 Australian warships present. Two would remain on 
station as part of BCOF, although that force slowly shrank as its postwar 
occupation obligations wound up. Still, the presence with BCOF left the 
RAN, along with its RAAF and army counterparts, with readily available 
forces that would come to be deployed following the outbreak of the 
Korean War in mid-1950.
12  ‘An appreciation of the strategical position of Australia (September 1947)’, in Frühling, A history 
of Australian strategic policy since 1945, 131.
13  David Stevens, ‘The RAN: A brief history’, Navy.gov.au, at: www.navy.gov.au/history/feature-
histories/ran-brief-history (accessed 4 January 2019).
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The postwar RAN was, in a number of respects, a more sophisticated 
force, having recognised the challenges of coalition warfighting, and 
witnessed the transformation of naval warfare generated as a result of 
the air war at sea and other advances in naval technology. It was with 
this in mind that the RAN acquired two aircraft carriers from Britain in 
1947. HMAS Sydney and HMAS Melbourne were acquired in succession, 
with HMAS  Sydney ready for tasking by the time of the Korean War 
in late 1950.14 For an island continent, naval forces would always play 
a prominent role in the nation’s defence strategy. The wartime role for 
land forces would similarly be self-evident to many, but after the war, the 
fate of land forces would be subject to greater questioning.
The Australian Army
At its peak in late 1942 and early 1943, the Australian Military Forces, 
or  what we now call the Australian Army, consisted of a force that 
included 14 divisions. This force included the infantry divisions of the 
militia, namely the 1 through 5, and 11 and 12, Australian divisions. 
It also included the infantry divisions of the Second Australian Imperial 
Force (2 AIF), namely 6, 7 and 9 Divisions, noting that 8 Division was 
in captivity. In addition, there were three mechanised divisions, namely 
1 Armoured Division and 1 and 2 Australian Motor Divisions (later 2 and 
3 Armoured Divisions).15 The ‘War establishment’ (that is, the personnel 
planning number for the Australian Army) in September 1943 was for 
an organisation employing 370,300 troops.16 Out of a population of just 
over 7 million people, the force that expanded dramatically from 1939 
to 1942 shrank at an equally dramatic and accelerating pace as the war’s 
end approached.
Despite the surprising scope and breadth of the Army’s capabilities, 
it  had emerged in a disparate manner that compounded the postwar 
arrangements. By 1945 there were three separate enlistment organisations 
grouped under the banner of the Australian Military Forces. These included 
the Permanent Military Force (PMF), the Citizen Military Force (CMF) 
14  See Anthony Wright, Australian carrier decisions: The acquisition of HMA Ships Albatross, Sydney 
and Melbourne, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No.  4 (Canberra: Royal Australian Navy 
Maritime Studies Program, 1998), 57.
15  Chart: ‘Distribution of the Australian Army, May 1942’, National Archives of Australia (NAA) 
(Vic): MP729/6, 37/401/759, cited in Palazzo, The Australian Army, 170–71.
16  Palazzo, The Australian Army, 175.
45
2. AUSTRALIA’S MILITARY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR
and the all-volunteer Australian Imperial Force (AIF), which had been 
raised specifically for expeditionary use during the war. The disbandment 
and repatriation of the AIF and the CMF was a priority.17
Table 2.1: Australian Military Forces divisions in 1943
Division designation Higher formation Comments
1 Australian Division 2 Australian Army Militia
2 Australian Division 2 Australian Army Militia
3 Australian Division (Jungle) New Guinea Force Militia
4 Australian Division Disbanded early 1943 –
5 Australian Division (Jungle) New Guinea Force Militia
6 Australian Division (Jungle) New Guinea Force 2 AIF
7 Australian Division (Jungle) New Guinea Force 2 AIF
8 Australian Division In captivity 2 AIF
9 Australian Division (Jungle) New Guinea Force 2 AIF
11 Australian Division (Jungle) New Guinea Force Militia
12 Australian Division Northern Territory Force Militia
1 Australian Armoured Division HQ Reserve Militia
2 Australian Armoured Division Disbanded early 1943 Former 2 Australian 
Motor Division
3 Australian Armoured Division – Formerly 1 Australian 
Motor Division
2 Australian Corps & assorted 
brigade formations
1 Australian Army NE Reinforcement 
Training Centre
Source: Drawn from Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army: A history of its organisation, 
1901–2001 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 176–79.
The ‘Army Post War Plan’ of 1946 provided for the establishment over 
five years of two brigade groups and an armoured regiment as part of 
the PMF, with a strength of 11,880 personnel. This was to be the first 
peacetime regular operational army for Australia. In addition, two 
divisions and an armoured brigade would be retained as the CMF, with 
43,423 personnel as well as headquarters and fixed establishments of 
another 20,759, making a total of 76,062, including 33,641 personnel in 
17  D  Maclean, ‘The development of the Australian Army: A study in policy and capabilities’ 
(BA(Hons) thesis, University of New South Wales Canberra), 3.
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the PMF.18 In the end, these numbers were aspirational and never quite 
realised, but most of the forces that were maintained as part of the PMF 
would be retained overseas as part of BCOF in Japan.
Australia’s land force contributions to BCOF formed the basis for 
the Australian Regular Army that emerged from the 1947 ‘Army Post 
War Plan’.19 Notably, this included the conversion of the 65, 66 and 
67 Australian Infantry Battalions, which had been raised at the end of 
the war for special service with BCOF, into the 1, 2 and 3  Battalions 
of the Royal Australian Regiment (otherwise known as 1RAR, 2RAR and 
3RAR).20 British-pattern equipment, insignia and procedures endured, 
with many conscious of their status as members of a force nominally 
identified as British as much as it was, in practice, substantively Australian.
The Royal Australian Air Force
The RAAF would face a similar pressure to demobilise. Over 200,000 
Australians had served in the RAAF during the war, operating over 
70  squadrons of aircraft including bomber, fighter, reconnaissance and 
amphibian squadrons. Australians had also made a significant contribution 
to Britain’s defence through the Empire Air Training Scheme, having 
been placed in RAAF and Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons. Many of the 
Australians who signed up for the Empire Air Training Scheme ended up 
participating in the European and Mediterranean campaigns, including 
the Normandy invasion and the advance into Germany.21
The 1946 plan for the postwar RAAF proposed a force of 19,483 personnel 
with the overwhelming majority in the permanent force. They would 
operate a mobile task force, including three long-range/ground attack 
18  Defence Committee Minutes 460/1946, 19 November and 19 December 1946, Appendix B, cited 
in Wright, Australian carrier decisions, 140; Maclean, ‘The development of the Australian Army’, 4.
19  ‘Army Post War Plan’, March 1947, Australian War Memorial (AWM): AWM 123, Box 95/4.
20  David Chinn, ‘Raising a regular infantry force’ in Duty first: A history of the Royal Australian 
Regiment, ed. David Horner and Jean Bou, 2nd ed. (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2008), 1.
21  See John McCarthy, A last call of empire: Australian aircrew, Britain and the Empire Air Training 
Scheme (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1988); ‘Empire Air Training Scheme’, Australian War 
Memorial, at: www.awm.gov.au/articles/encyclopedia/raaf/eats (accessed 17 January 2019).
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fighter, three heavy bomber and two transport squadrons, and static units 
including four interceptor squadrons and mixed heavy bomber/ground 
reconnaissance squadrons.22
The jet age had yet to reach the RAAF and the fleet of aircraft the nation 
retained at the end of the war remained exclusively propeller-driven. They 
would be employed in support of BCOF in Japan, with three fighter 
squadrons deploying there in 1946, although this force was gradually 
reduced to one (77) squadron by 1948.23
The decision was made in 1946 to acquire and then produce under licence 
the RAAF’s first jet engine aircraft, the British De Havilland Vampire. 
The first three Vampires were built in the United Kingdom. Thereafter, 
80 were built by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) in 
Melbourne with the first one flying in June 1949. Additional Vampire 
training aircraft were also built. The Vampire-equipped RAAF 78 Wing, 
incorporating 75 and 76 Squadrons, would deploy to Malta in support of 
Britain’s NATO commitments commencing in 1952.24
In the meantime, when the Soviet Union imposed a land blockade on 
Berlin, the RAAF contributed a dozen sets of aircrew to operate RAF 
Dakota transport aircraft in support of the relief efforts.25 Interoperability 
with the British was a given. The relatively seamless integration of the 
Australian aircrew into British operations reflected the enduring legacy of 
the wartime Empire Air Training Scheme.
Meanwhile, demands for working alongside US counterparts would 
increase from mid-1950. RAAF 77 Squadron, still based at Iwakuni with 
its propeller-driven Mustang fighter aircraft, was conveniently placed 
to assist US-led efforts to counter the North Korean invasion of South 
Korea in mid-1950. Elements of RAAF 77  Squadron were promptly 
deployed, flying ground attack missions and bomber escort missions in 
support of US forces. The squadron soon relocated to Korea, supporting 
ground forces from a range of airfields. With the early introduction of 
Soviet-sourced MiG jet aircraft in support of the North Korean forces, the 
22  Defence Committee Minutes 460/1946, 19 November and 19 December 1946, Appendix C, 
cited in Wright, Australian carrier decisions, 141.
23  Royal Australian Air Force: A snapshot history 1921–2015 (Canberra: Air Power Development 
Centre, 2015), 124.
24  ‘A79 DHA Vampire’, RAAF Museum Point Cook, at: www.airforce.gov.au/sites/default/files/
minisite/static/7522/RAAFmuseum/research/aircraft/series2/A79.htm (accessed 30 September 2020).
25  Royal Australian Air Force, 131.
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Mustangs proved obsolete. In time, the Mustang would be replaced by the 
Meteor – a British-sourced, twin-engine jet aircraft with considerably 
greater power but less manoeuvrability than the Soviet MiGs or American 
F86 Sabre aircraft used by the US Air Force. With Sabres in short supply 
and Meteors the only viable option, the RAAF subsequently had to adjust 
the spectrum of missions it could viably undertake. CAC-built Sabres 
would become the mainstay of the RAAF’s fighter aircraft fleet once they 
became available after the Korean War.26
British precedents
As we have observed, despite having worked closely with the US armed 
forces since 1942, the Australian armed services still operated largely 
on British lines, following British-derived procedures and, principally, 
British-pattern military equipment. For both world wars, Britain had 
managed to secure the commitment of large dominion and Indian armies 
that could plan, fight, shoot, communicate and sustain themselves, 
in concert with the British Army and with each other, during the era 
of the two world wars.27 While Britain’s power was waning, the legacy of 
the investment in equipment, doctrine and procedures, and the shared 
experiences of the British and Australian military forces, combined to 
generate a lasting effect. The RAN, for instance, remained closely tied 
to British procedures, customs, traditions, uniforms and equipment, while 
becoming increasingly familiar with US Navy protocols. The Australian 
Army, similarly, remained closely modelled on British moderated patterns 
of organisation. With so much invested in terms of military hardware, 
there was little incentive to do other than retain British-pattern weapons, 
procedures, communications technology and uniforms.
In the latter stages of the war, plans were afoot to re-equip Australian 
forces with American kit in order to contribute to the planned Allied 
invasion of Japan. The Canadian Army, facing similar pressures to conform 
to American patterns in order to remain involved, had already begun 
converting forces from British patterns to American patterns. Canadian 
26  See Richard Hallion, ‘The air war in Korea: Coalition air power in the context of limited war’, 
in In from the cold: Reflections on Australia’s Korean War, ed. John Blaxland, Michael Kelly and Liam 
Brewin Higgins (Canberra: ANU Press, 2020), 121–42, doi.org/10.22459/iftc.2019.06.
27  See Douglas E Delaney, The Imperial Army project: Britain and the land forces of the dominions 
and India, 1902–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
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forces invaded Kiska Island in the Aleutians, for instance, alongside 
American troops in August 1943, employing American equipment and 
procedures.28 But with the main invasion averted by the early surrender of 
Japan, the impetus for these changes in Australia dissipated.
Increasingly independent, Australia was a latecomer to the Statute of 
Westminster – an act of Britain’s parliament in Westminster in 1931 that 
removed nearly all of Britain’s authority to legislate for the dominions 
such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This had the effect of 
making them fully sovereign nations in their own right. Canada acted on 
it quickly, but it only came into effect in Australia following its passage 
through parliament in Canberra after the fall of Singapore in 1942. 
Despite this devolved authority, Australia remained eager to maintain 
and reinforce its ties with Britain. Reflecting this mindset, in mid-1943 
the Curtin Government had decided that the key to Australia’s postwar 
defence lay in participating in collective security arrangements.29
The Australian Army ‘Post War Plan’ of 1947 reflected the prevailing 
economic, strategic and military orientation of the nation towards 
Britain and empire.30 This pattern of conformity with Britain applied 
particularly to the RAN and the Australian Army, and to a lesser extent to 
the RAAF, its inventory having become populated with some American 
aircraft. Indeed, with Britain’s return in 1945 to Malaya and Singapore, 
Australia would look to continue coordinating its defence policy with the 
United Kingdom.
Without a strong incentive to change models, there remained compelling 
reasons for Australia to maintain, for instance, the British-derived 
wireless signals communications standards and equipment. This enabled 
Australia to maintain its links with Britain’s global communications 
network but also helped ensure interoperability of its land, naval and air 
forces.31 The efficiencies of scale, the economy of effort and the benefits 
of interoperability would endure for the better part of the following 
two decades.
28  Desmond Morton, A military history of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo, 4th ed. (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1999), 189.
29  ‘Post War Defence Policy’, Minute, 7 February 1944, NAA: A816/1, 14/301/275, cited in Palazzo, 
The Australian Army, 193.
30  ‘Army Post War Plan’, March 1947, AWM: AWM 123, Box 95/4, 1–4.
31  See John Blaxland, Signals, swift and sure: A history of the Royal Australian Corps of Signals 1947–
1972 (Melbourne: R.A. Signals Corps, 1998), 1–10.
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In the absence of any particular appetite from the United States for formal 
ties with Australia beyond the war, Australia’s arrangements centred 
around engagement with Britain. As the armed forces demobilised and 
began planning for the postwar period, endeavours to standardise the 
training and organisation of the Australian forces meant the links would 
continue. Such links included personnel exchanges and joint weapons 
and equipment research and development, not to mention the similarities 
in workaday mutual understandings.
This was the case with contributions Australia would make as part of 
BCOF in Japan from 1946 to 1950. Australia played a leading role in 
BCOF, but the very title of the organisation pointed to the enduring 
significance of the connections with Britain. This high degree of 
interoperability between the forces of the British Empire would also help 
facilitate a close coordination of effort by British Commonwealth forces 
at the outset of the Korean War in 1950.
Other legacies
Surprisingly enough, the wartime experience of the Australian armed 
forces did not lead to a great sense of shared purpose, organisationally. 
After all, to a large extent, the RAAF had operated as part of a British-led 
force in the Mediterranean and Europe, and as part of a US-led force 
in the Pacific campaigns. Similarly, Australia’s land forces were more 
closely aligned with their British counterparts while operating in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East and then with their US counterparts 
when fighting in the Pacific. The RAN likewise had aligned itself with 
its British and American counterparts to contribute to a wartime strategy 
formulated mostly in London and Washington. Australia’s experience in 
leading BCOF in Japan arguably could have helped develop a level of 
inter-service collaboration between the three armed services, but with the 
operational tempo rapidly diminished and the force largely withdrawn in 
a short time frame, there was little prospect of that level of inter-service 
interaction ensuing. As a result, what came to be known in the 1980s 
as the Australian Defence Force remained a disparate group of separate 
armed forces, with their own government departments and ministers for 
navy, army and air.
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For the nation, the legacy of war was felt widely, far beyond the realm of 
the armed forces themselves. With hundreds of thousands of returned 
veterans, the Returned Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen Imperial League of 
Australia (what is now known as the Returned and Services League, or 
RSL) proved to be an influential body with considerable social and political 
clout. In the meantime, the Repatriation Department (the precursor to 
the modern-day Department of Veterans Affairs) oversaw the support 
provided for disabled military veterans, and widows of military personnel 
as well as their dependents. Arguably, however, considerable trauma lay 
unaddressed, beyond the reach of these organisations. What had been 
called ‘shell shock’ or ‘combat neurosis’ would reverberate for the Second 
World War generation as well. The extent of the damage on society is hard 
to measure, but is widely considered to have had a devastating knock-
on effect on postwar society. Joan Beaumont’s Broken nation addresses 
this tragedy with respect of the legacy of the First World War, but the 
issue recurs.32
Reflections
In conclusion, Australia’s military went through a dramatic transformation 
after the Second World War. Having expanded rapidly, the three armed 
services quickly returned almost to their prewar state and size. Technology 
and experience drove some changes, notably the establishment of a postwar 
regular or permanent military land force.
The lingering legacy of British-derived technology and operating concepts 
developed and practised during the two world wars was profound and 
would have a lasting effect, not least because there was little spent on 
replacing wartime equipment in the immediate postwar years. While the 
Australian armed forces had operated closely with their US counterparts 
in wartime, there had been little imperative during the Pacific War to 
bolster interoperability by adopting US-derived procedures, practice 
and equipment. Even when based in Australia from early 1942, General 
MacArthur had operated his headquarters as an American organisation, 
not a particularly closely integrated one. Australian forces, with their 
considerable operational experience predating American entry into the 
war, retained the British-derived approach to warfare. That approach 
32  Joan Beaumont, Broken nation: Australians in the Great War (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2013).
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would linger after the war – a phenomenon reinforced by the evident US 
disinterest in providing any immediate security guarantees to Australia 
once the war ended.
While only a small residual force was available to be contributed to the 
Korean War in 1950, what was available drew on the legacy of the Second 
World War, with British-derived practices, procedures and equipment, 
albeit with an increasingly distinctive Australian flavour. As it happens, the 
postwar plans for the armed services came to reflect a pattern of organisation 
that would change incrementally over time. This would notably include 
a shift towards US-sourced and NATO-standard equipment and practices. 
But momentum for this reform was still several years away and would have 
to wait until after the eclipse of Britain’s imperial ambitions following 
the Suez Crisis of 1956. That process would commence with the 1957 
defence review and some interesting experimentation with US-derived 
pentagonal organisational structures.33 Still, military practitioners in the 
early twenty-first century would recognise many of the hallmarks of their 
modern Australian Defence Force in the plans that were laid out in 1946 
and 1947. Even through to the early twentieth century, UK ties and 
shared practices would permeate Australian practices, even as ties with the 
United States deepened.34
33  See John Blaxland, Organising an Army: The Australian experience, 1957–1965 (Canberra: Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, 1989).
34  This issue is explored in John Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard (Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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The ‘fourth arm’ of 
Australia’s defence: ASIO 
and the early Cold War
David Horner
The Cold War, as experienced by Australia in the late 1940s and the 1950s, 
saw the involvement of a new entity in Australian defence: the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).1 Indeed the Australian prime 
minister, Robert Menzies, described ASIO as the ‘fourth arm’ of Australian 
defence, after the Navy, Army and Air Force. This was a  remarkable 
statement about an organisation that only came into existence in 1949, 
but it indicated a major change to the concept of national security.
By contrast with the Australian armed forces that fought overseas in the 
South African War, the two world wars, the Korean War, the Malayan 
Emergency, Confrontation and the Vietnam War, in the Cold War ASIO 
fought its war at home against espionage, subversion and sabotage, and 
for the first time this theatre of conflict was seen as almost as important as 
those overseas. It is true that Australia had internal security concerns in the 
two world wars, but none of the security organisations in those conflicts 
saw themselves as involved in their own war in the way ASIO did in the 
early 1950s. It might seem extreme to describe ASIO as fighting a war, 
1  This chapter is based on the author’s book The spy catchers: The official history of ASIO, vol. 1, 
1949–1963 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2014). The author had privileged access to ASIO records, and 
where these are still held by ASIO they are identified simply as ASIO records. Further references to 
the events described in this chapter can be found in the book.
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and certainly the ‘war’ did not involve weapons or physical casualties. But 
ASIO officers certainly felt they were in a conflict in which the security 
of Australia was at stake. This chapter seeks to explain why ASIO was 
formed, what role it played in the early Cold War, why its activities 
formed part of the Cold War, and whether it was effective in achieving its 
aims. But first we need a little background.
Internal security before the Cold War
From the beginning of the First World War, internal security formed 
a  component of Australian defence. The initial concern was the threat 
of espionage and sabotage, particularly by enemy nationals living in 
Australia. As a result, foreign nationals, mainly Germans, were rounded 
up and placed in internment camps. Responsibility for dealing with 
espionage fell to the Army’s Directorate of Intelligence, generally known 
as Military Intelligence. Navy Intelligence was focused more narrowly on 
preventing sabotage and the leakage of information about ship movements. 
In late 1915, at the request of Britain, Australia established a  small 
civilian counterespionage bureau, later called the Special Intelligence 
Bureau (SIB).
The security agencies became increasingly involved in countering 
subversion, or what the historian Frank Cain has called ‘political 
surveillance’.2 Concerned about possible subversive organisations such 
as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), which was opposed to 
the war, in July 1917 the Federal Government made membership of the 
IWW illegal. As the largest security agency, Military Intelligence took the 
lead in watching the expanding number of bodies that seemed to have 
a connection with socialism or bolshevism. Prime Minister WM Hughes 
ruthlessly used the power of the War Precautions Act 1914 (Cth) and the 
efforts of Military Intelligence to stifle any activity that seemed to threaten 
the war effort. The SIB also kept watch over other allegedly subversive 
bodies, such as trade unions and returned soldiers’ organisations, hence 
Cain’s claim about political surveillance.
In December 1917 the government established another body, the 
Commonwealth Police, to investigate matters concerning Commonwealth 
property and facilities, but after the war the Commonwealth Police was 
2  See Frank Cain, The origins of political surveillance (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1983).
55
3. THE ‘FOURTH ARM’ OF AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE
abolished and the SIB became the Commonwealth Investigation Branch 
(CIB), with responsibilities for investigating administrative offences 
against the Commonwealth, as well as espionage and subversion. The CIB 
was relatively small, and many counterespionage and countersubversion 
tasks were taken over by Military Intelligence.
On the outbreak of the Second World War, the requirements of the First 
World War – internment of aliens, censorship, protection against sabotage, 
and counterespionage – still remained, and again foreign nationals were 
rounded up and placed in internment camps. The most pressing internal 
security concern was the activities of the Communist Party of Australia 
(CPA). In August 1939 the Soviet Union had signed a non-aggression pact 
with Hitler’s Germany, and the CPA told Australian communists to keep 
out of the Army and to boycott the export of war materials. On 15 June 
1940 the government declared the CPA to be an illegal organisation.
The multiplying threats brought home the need to coordinate the work of 
the various security agencies. In February 1941 Australia established a small 
security service, but it was hampered by bureaucratic infighting. In March 
1942, three months after the outbreak of war with Japan, the  Labor 
Government established a new expanded security service named the 
Commonwealth Security Service, although the CIB still remained active.
By this time, General Douglas MacArthur had arrived in Australia to 
command the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). Within the SWPA there 
was a plethora of intelligence organisations. Each of the Australian and 
American services had their own security or counterintelligence staffs, 
responsible for their own internal security. While thousands of personnel 
were working in a score of different intelligence agencies, the crucial 
intelligence was provided by the interception and decryption of enemy 
radio traffic.
In December 1942 the government lifted the ban on the CPA and its 
membership grew, reaching a peak strength of about 23,000 by late 1944. 
According to its historian, Alastair Davidson, by 1945 the party controlled 
275,000 out of 1.2  million trade unionists, and its supporters might 
have numbered 480,000, or 40 per cent of Australian trade unionists.3 
The CIB continued to issue fortnightly reports on communism, based 
3  Alastair Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia: A short history (Stanford, California: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1969), 82–83.
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on information provided by its agents.4 Undoubtedly internal security 
was important, but the security services were fragmented. There was little 
enemy espionage and the internment of aliens reduced the possibility 
of fifth column activity.
Beginning of the Cold War
At the end of the war it seemed that the need for an internal security 
organisation had declined considerably. The Commonwealth Security 
Service was disbanded and its functions were taken over by a small section 
within the CIB. But it was soon clear that the postwar world posed 
new challenges to Australian internal security. The first was the threat 
of espionage.
On 5  September 1945, just three days after the Japanese formally 
surrendered, thus ending the Second World War, Igor Gouzenko, 
a 26-year-old cipher clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, defected to the 
West. Gouzenko revealed that the Soviets had set up a spy ring in Canada. 
Indeed, Dr Alan Nunn May, a British scientist working in Canada on 
atomic research, had passed information about the project to the Soviet 
Union. Further, Gouzenko revealed that the Soviets had inserted long-
term undercover agents known as ‘illegals’ in Western countries.
At first the Australian Labor Government, led by Ben Chifley, was 
unconcerned by the Gouzenko revelations; but soon the opposition used 
them to question the government’s handling of security. In response, in 
February 1947 the government formed a new body, the Commonwealth 
Investigation Service (CIS) out of the CIB, and provided 20 additional 
staff. But the government still did not take the threat of espionage 
seriously enough.
By 1947 Britain and Australia had established the Long Range Weapons 
Establishment at Salisbury, South Australia, and a rocket range at Woomera. 
In parliament on 7 March 1947 a Country Party member, Joe Abbott, 
spoke of the need to ensure ‘that there shall be no leakage of information 
concerning these experiments’, and urged the government to ascertain 
whether there was evidence of a spy ring operating in collaboration with 
4  Communist Reports  18 and 19, National Archives of Australia (NAA): A9108, Roll  9, 
11392043.
57
3. THE ‘FOURTH ARM’ OF AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE
officials of the Soviet embassy. The Attorney-General, HV Evatt, agreed 
with the necessity to take ‘adequate precautions against the leakage 
of secret information’ and said the CIS would be given additional staff.5
Already the possibility of leakages of information was causing problems 
for Australia’s relations with Britain and the United States. On 14 January 
1947 Norman Makin, the Australian ambassador in Washington, advised 
that the United States was considering formal arrangements under which 
information could be released. Four months later a senior British official 
warned that the United States ‘was worried about the possibility of leakage 
of secret information from Australia’.6
The second challenge to internal security came from the renamed 
Australian Communist Party (ACP). In September 1947, in response 
to the US-led Marshall Plan to provide large-scale economic aid to the 
countries of Western Europe, the Soviet Union formed the Communist 
Information Bureau (Cominform) to coordinate the actions of 
10  European communist parties under Soviet direction. Although not 
a member of Cominform, the ACP chose to follow its direction, and 
in the first half of 1948 the ACP’s Central Committee decided to go on 
the offensive, believing the time was right to seize control of the Labour 
movement. The government was coming to realise that it was in a fight 
with the Communist Party, but it was not yet willing to employ measures 
that might seem to infringe civil liberties.
Formation of ASIO
The formation of ASIO in March 1949 relates directly to the signals 
intelligence operation later known as Venona. Under the Venona program, 
American and British cryptanalysts had decrypted a small number of 
telegrams of the Soviet intelligence organisation, later known as the KGB, 
including communications between KGB headquarters in Moscow and 
the KGB resident in the Soviet embassy in Canberra. These intercepts, 
which began in 1943 and continued through to 1948, showed that about 
a dozen Australians, many identified only by cover names, had provided 
5  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 7 March 1947, 484–90.
6  Jacqueline Templeton, ‘Australian Intelligence/Security Services’, vol. 2, 298, 253. This report 
forms volume 1 of the Seventh report of the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, and is found 
in NAA: A8908, 7A.
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information to the Soviet embassy. The Venona program was highly 
secret, because the Americans and British did not want to alert the Soviets 
to their success; the Australian Government was unaware of the program.
As the Venona program seemed to reveal the existence of Soviet spies in 
Australia, and as Australia was being given access to secret information 
about the joint British–Australian rocket project, the British Government 
was anxious to alert the Australians to the apparent lapses in their security. 
Hence, in February 1948 Sir Percy Sillitoe, director general of Britain’s 
security service, MI5, visited Australia to warn Chifley, although he 
could not reveal the true source of his information. Sillitoe, and Roger 
Hollis, a senior MI5 officer accompanying him, tried, without success, to 
persuade Chifley to set up a new security organisation to replace the CIS, 
which was ineffective and lacked the skills to deal with this new threat.
Meanwhile, the United States cut off Australia’s access to classified 
information. Realising he needed to do more to persuade Chifley, in June 
Sillitoe obtained approval to inform Chifley of the origin of the intelligence 
about the security breaches. Next month Chifley visited London to discuss 
economic matters. The British prime minister, Clement Attlee, then told 
Chifley that the source of information ‘was intercepted telegrams from 
the Soviet Legation in Canberra … the authenticity of which has been 
fully verified beyond question’.7 Chifley agreed that Hollis, and another 
MI5 officer, Robert Hemblys-Scales, could visit Australia to assist in the 
investigation of the leakages.
Hollis and Hemblys-Scales arrived in Australia in late July and began 
a round of meetings with key ministers and officials, although they could 
not tell the true source of their intelligence. The problem with the Venona 
decrypts was that they were often just incomplete telegrams, and the use 
of cover names meant that many individuals could not be identified. 
One who could be identified was Ian Milner, a former Department of 
External Affairs officer, then working for the United Nations in New 
York. The  breakthrough came in August when the Venona decrypts 
revealed that Francis Bernie, who had worked as a secretary/typist in 
the office of the Attorney-General, Evatt, between 1944 and 1946, had 
given information to an ACP member, cover name KLOD, who had then 
passed it to the Soviet embassy.
7  Final brief for PM for his conversation with Mr Chifley, prepared by Sir Orme Sargent, 6 July 
1948, UK National Archives (TNA): KV 4/451.
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Persuaded by this evidence, on 20 September 1948 Chifley agreed to set 
up an Australian security organisation ‘similar to MI5’.8 But he delayed 
establishing the new organisation, partly because Evatt was overseas, and 
also because he wanted to make one final appeal to the Americans to 
release classified information. When the Americans rebuffed this effort, 
Chifley knew he had to proceed.
The foundations for the establishment of ASIO were laid at a secret 
meeting in Canberra on 7 February 1949 attended by Chifley, three key 
ministers and several officials, including three MI5 officers. They agreed 
that an Australian security intelligence service should be set up along 
the lines of MI5, that it should come under the Attorney-General, but 
the service’s director-general should have the right of direct access to the 
prime minister.9
Justice Geoffrey Reed from the Supreme Court of South Australia 
accepted the appointment as the first head of the security service, which 
he later named the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, for 
one year, while he was on leave from the court. Finally, on 2  March, 
Chifley informed parliament that ‘a great increase in Australian security 
tasks and responsibilities has made it necessary to re-establish a separate 
security service’ and that Justice Reed had been appointed to ‘establish 
and organise an Australian Security Service’.10 Reed’s charter stated that 
the security service was part of the Attorney-General’s Department, but it 
was also:
part of the Defence Forces of the Commonwealth, and save as 
herein expressed has no concern with the enforcement of criminal 
law. Its task is the defence of the Commonwealth from external and 
internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage, 
or from actions of persons and organisations, whether directed 
from within or without the country, which may be judged to be 
subversive of the security of the Commonwealth.11
8  Shedden, ‘Notes of Discussions with Ministers in Canberra on 20th September 1938’, 
20 September 1948, NAA: A5954, 849/A.
9  Minute, ‘Conclusions of meeting held on 8th February 1942 at Canberra’, NAA: A5954, 849/A; 
and letter, Hollis to Sillitoe, 8 February 1949, TNA: KV 4/458. The Hollis letter and Shedden’s 
appointment diary confirm the meeting was held on 7 February.
10  Public Statement Chifley, 2 March 1949, in Digest of decisions and announcements and important 
speeches by the Prime Minister, the Right Hon. J. B. Chifley, No. 142 (24 January 1949 to 6 March 1949).
11  ‘Prime Minister’s memorandum to the Director-General of Security’, 16 March 1949, NAA: 
A7452, A48.
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ASIO: The first year
The new security service was formed as the Cold War was increasing 
in intensity. In January 1949, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
captured Beijing and on 1 October the communist leader, Mao Zedong, 
proclaimed the People’s Republic of China. The Berlin blockade continued 
in Germany until May, when the Soviet Union relented in the face of the 
successful Allied airlift. But for the West, this was only a tactical victory in 
what was shaping up to be a long conflict. In August the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) was established, and the Greek civil war 
ended, but also that month the Soviet Union successfully tested its first 
atomic bomb. In Malaya, the Communist Terrorists (as they were known) 
were stepping up their offensive. Everywhere, it seemed, the communists 
were on the march.
As the new Director-General of Security, Geoffrey Reed had three 
important tasks: to build his new organisation; to identify the spies 
as revealed in the Venona intercepts (known as ‘the case’); and to deal 
with communist subversion. Although important to the story of ASIO, 
discussion of the first two tasks is beyond the scope of this chapter. In brief, 
Reed staffed ASIO by drawing on the CIS, state police special branches, 
and former and serving members of the armed forces. By 1 July 1949, 
ASIO had 94 officers; by June 1950, 141.12 ASIO’s counterespionage 
work focused on trying to solve ‘the case’, and in this respect ASIO had 
limited success. KLOD was identified as an ACP official, Walter Clayton. 
Another suspect, cover name TOURIST, was identified as an External 
Affairs officer, Jim Hill. The ASIO counterespionage effort reached its 
ultimate success with the defection of the KGB officer, Vladimir Petrov, 
in April 1954.
With regard to subversion, the Chifley Government was already taking 
action. In March 1949, at about the time he announced the formation 
of ASIO, Chifley directed the CIS to investigate whether a statement by 
the secretary of the ACP, Lance Sharkey, was treasonable or seditious. 
Sharkey allegedly had said that if Soviet forces entered Australia in pursuit 
of aggressors, Australian workers would welcome them.13 In July 1949, 
Sharkey was sentenced to three years jail, later reduced to 18  months. 
12  Letter, Reed to Menzies, 27 June 1950, NAA: A7452, A48.
13  ‘Sharkey statement to be examined’, Mercury, 9 March 1949, 7.
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Earlier, in January 1949, Cecil Sharpley, a leading ACP member in 
Victoria, had defected, and in a series of newspaper articles, and in a Royal 
Commission set up in Victoria in April, he exposed the ACP’s apparent 
efforts to take over the trade unions.
Then, on 27 June 1949, communist-led unions began a seven-week strike 
in the Hunter Valley coalfields in NSW. In July the CIS, with police 
assistance, raided the ACP headquarters in Sydney, and other communist 
establishments, seizing documents. In a dramatic and unprecedented 
step, the Chifley Government moved troops into the open-cut coalfields 
to begin mining and distributing coal, and hence to break the strike.
The coal strike was taken as evidence by the government that the ACP 
was mounting a campaign against it. For its part, the ACP realised that 
the formation of ASIO presented it with a new and dangerous opponent. 
For example, on 11 March 1949, just nine days after Chifley announced 
the formation of ASIO, the Guardian, the communist newspaper 
in Victoria, branded the new organisation as a ‘super-secret gestapo to 
spy on the Australian worker’. Further declarations followed a similar 
pattern, emphasising that ASIO was a ‘danger’ to trade unions, the ‘peace’ 
movement, people’s ‘democratic rights’ and ‘civil liberties’.14
As noted earlier, among his duties, Reed was directed to defend the 
Commonwealth against ‘actions of persons and organisations, whether 
directed from within or without the country, which may be judged to 
be subversive of the security of the Commonwealth’.15 He interpreted 
this to mean that he needed to gain a deep insight into the activities 
of the ACP, and this task involved developing sources within the ACP or 
communist-controlled unions.
The election of the Liberal-County Party Coalition, led by Robert Menzies, 
in December 1949 brought new emphasis to the countersubversion 
role. The government came to power with a different world view to its 
predecessor. It was more inclined to see the Cold War as a coordinated 
communist assault on the West, in which the ACP was playing its part. 
On 3 January 1950 Reed indoctrinated Menzies into the Venona program 
and told him about the source of the information on espionage.16 
14  Bruce Campbell, ‘History of ASIO’, ASIO records, f 60.
15  ‘Prime Minister’s memorandum to the Director-General of Security’, 16 March 1948, NAA: 
A7452, A48.
16  Telegram, Young to Sillitoe, 9 January 1950, TNA: KV 4/452.
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Throughout 1949, while in opposition, Menzies had made numerous 
speeches in which he had argued that the ACP needed to be banned. 
In one speech he asked rhetorically:
Does anyone believe that if we are forced into war by the Soviet 
Union there will be no fifth column here and in every other 
Western democracy? I say that within 48 hours of war we would 
have an active fifth column of Communists in this country.17
Now he had concrete evidence that some communists had indeed been 
conducting espionage in Australia on behalf of the Soviet Union.
While the Australian Government understood the imperative to solve 
‘the case’, its attention was focused more broadly on the problem of 
communism, and ASIO was to play a major role in the government’s 
campaign. On 9 January 1950, ASIO circulated an 11-page secret report 
on the ACP, which covered membership, finances, trade union activity, 
the party’s connections with overseas communist organisations, the role 
of the Australian Peace Council as a communist ‘front’ organisation, 
the organisations controlled by the ACP and its preparations for ‘illegal 
work’.18 Another report on the ACP claimed that:
undercover … reliable sources indicated that: expenses incurred 
in fighting the Government’s proposed ban on the ACP would 
be met by the Russian Embassy, [and] Communist union officials 
will organise continuous sectional strikes.19
A prime example of communist activity seemed to be a series of ‘rolling 
strikes’ on the Brisbane waterfront. On 23 March 1950, the government 
invoked the Crimes Act 1941 (Cth), which meant that striking watersiders 
could be liable for jail for up to 12 months. When the waterside workers 
voted to take their claims to arbitration, however, the government did not 
follow through with its threat.
This was just an early shot in the war. In his speech when opening parliament 
on 22 February, Governor-General Sir William McKell foreshadowed that 
the government would be introducing legislation to ban the Communist 
Party. The government would be given the power to imprison ‘declared’ 
communists and to remove them from trade union offices and from the 
17  Quoted in AW Martin, ‘Mr Menzies’ anticommunism’, Quadrant 40, no. 65 (May 1996): 52.
18  Report, ‘Australian Communist Party, Bulletin No 1, January 1950’, 9 January 1950, National 
Library of Australia (NLA): MS 4936/20/436/3.
19  Report, ‘Australian Communist Party: Review from 15 Jan to 15 Feb 50’, ASIO records.
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Commonwealth Public Service. ASIO was closely involved in drafting the 
preamble to the proposed Bill. When Menzies presented the Communist 
Party Dissolution Bill to the House of Representatives on 27  April he 
justified the decision, saying that earlier he had:
resisted the idea of a Communist ban, on the ground that, 
in time of peace, doubts ought to be resolved in favour of free 
speech … But events have moved. We are not, except in a technical 
sense, at peace. The Soviet Union has perfected the technique of 
the ‘cold war’, has accompanied it by the organisation of peace 
demonstrations designed not to promote true peace, but to prevent 
or impair defence preparations in the democracies … The real and 
active Communists in Australia present us with our immediate 
problem. But our choice is clear. We can attack them frontally, 
or we can adopt inaction.20
The Melbourne Argus put the Bill in stark terms when it stated that Menzies 
had ‘declared ruthless war on Australian Communists’.21 Predictably, the 
trade unions were already mobilising to oppose the Bill, and ASIO was 
busy trying to keep tabs on the delegations that were arriving in Canberra. 
The Bill passed the House of Representatives on 23 May, but after it was 
delayed in the Senate, on 23  June Menzies had it put aside; he would 
reintroduce it later in the year.
The Cold War intensifies
ASIO’s campaign against the communists during the early 1950s must be 
understood in the context of the Cold War. For ordinary Australian citizens, 
it was a time of uncertainty and concern. ASIO’s officers, however, were not 
just concerned. They saw themselves as frontline warriors (even if they did 
not use that term) in a war against a twofold enemy – the Soviet Union and 
the ACP. Forty-five years later, Michael Thwaites, who had been ASIO’s 
head of counterespionage, was quick to remind people that:
there was a real fear which I don’t think people understand today, 
that we were going to have a world clash … the Cold War was not 
an illusion. It had to be won.22
20  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 April 1950, 1996–97.
21  ‘Reds “outlawed” in new bill’, The Argus (Melbourne), 28 April 1950, 1.
22  Transcript, ABC TV program, ‘Time Frame, War on Dissent’, 27 March 1997, at: w.w.w.abc.
net.au/time/episodes/ep8a.htm (accessed 5 July 2013, site now discontinued).
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While internationally the Soviet Union, supported by its allies, was locked 
in a bitter contest with the West with actual conflict in areas such as 
Korea, Malaya and Vietnam, within Australia this threat was embodied 
in the Soviet embassy, which was seeking access to Australia’s secret 
political, military and scientific information. ASIO therefore had a major 
counterespionage role. Further, ASIO expected the Soviet Union to seek 
the assistance of ACP members (as Venona had highlighted), so the 
government believed that they and the party’s sympathisers needed to be 
kept out of positions where they might have access to secret information. 
ASIO thus had a role in vetting employees for such jobs.
ASIO’s other target was the ACP itself. ASIO and the government believed 
that the ACP, on behalf of the Soviet Union, was engaged in a long-term 
campaign to undermine confidence in the Australian democratic system 
and ultimately to overthrow it. ASIO believed the ACP was pursuing its 
aims by infiltrating trade unions and by fostering ‘front’ organisations, 
which could draw support from idealistic but naïve Australian citizens 
who might not actually have supported the Soviet Union’s aims.
Meanwhile, the government was responding to the Cold War in a direct 
fashion. In May and June 1950, RAAF aircraft were deployed to Malaya 
to assist the British in operations against the ‘Communist Terrorists’. 
Soon after the outbreak of the Korean War in June, Australia sent a 
fighter squadron to South Korea. Early in July the government endorsed 
a three-year defence program and announced a national service training 
scheme for part-time service after an initial full-time training period. 
Then on 26 July the government committed an infantry battalion to the 
Korean War.
In the midst of these developments, on 17 July 1950 Colonel Charles Spry 
took over from Geoffrey Reed as Director-General of Security. Confident 
and capable, Spry, who had been director of Military Intelligence since 
1946, was determined to reshape the organisation and to make it 
a professional security service. He established a proper headquarters in 
Melbourne, and restructured the organisation so that it could improve 
its efforts to penetrate the ACP. ASIO’s staff continued to grow and by 
April 1951 numbered 181.23
23  Notes for DG, ‘Statement of ASIO strength, as at 30/4/51’, ASIO records. By 1963–64, ASIO 
staff had grown to 373 personnel. Horner, The spy catchers, 401.
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Preparing for internment
ASIO was soon responding to the government’s demands for information 
and support on subversion-related matters. The government began 
organising for a possible global war and it needed to update the 
Commonwealth war book. This book, first prepared before the Second 
World War, set out the actions to be taken by government departments 
both in the ‘precautionary stage’ before the outbreak of war, and during 
a war itself. The War book stipulated that in the precautionary stage the 
director-general of security was to provide the attorney-general with a list 
of persons for whom he recommended detention or restriction orders be 
made. Once war was declared, the director-general was to arrange for the 
persons to be detained. Similarly, the director-general was to provide lists 
of aliens (non-Australians or non-British subjects), and on the outbreak 
of war arrange for their internment.24
On 28 July 1950, just nine days after taking up his appointment, Spry 
directed that ‘in view of the uncertain international situation’ the measures 
were to ‘be undertaken immediately’. To avoid any misconception ‘the 
utmost discretion’ was to be used and other government departments 
were to be advised that ‘as a normal peacetime planning precaution we 
are accumulating certain information in case an emergency should arise’. 
By 14  August the ASIO regional offices were to provide lists of aliens 
who should be prevented from leaving the Commonwealth or should be 
interned in the event of war (as had occurred in both world wars), as well 
as a list of ‘British subjects’ to be interned. The latter group would include 
the leaders of the ACP and other communists in key positions.25 One 
complication was the likelihood that the Communist Party Dissolution 
Bill would become law in the next sitting of parliament, due to begin 
on 27 September, and ASIO believed that the ACP was preparing to go 
underground, as it had done when it was declared illegal in 1940.
When parliament reassembled on 27 September, Menzies reintroduced 
the Communist Party Dissolution Bill and unexpectedly it was passed by 
the Labor-dominated Senate on 19 October. Immediately, 10 trade unions 
announced that they would be challenging the Act in the High Court, 
and they obtained an interim injunction to restrain the Commonwealth 
from putting it into operation.
24  Commonwealth war book (Melbourne: Department of Defence, 1956).
25  Memo, ‘Measures to be taken in preparation for a possible emergency – Commonwealth War 
Book – policy statement No 1’, 28 July 1950, NAA: A6122, 1285.
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The High Court challenge prevented some activities, but ASIO remained 
busy gathering information to apply the provisions of the Act if it was 
found to be valid. On 23 October, three days after the Act was signed 
into law, officers of the CIS, assisted by the police and with ASIO officers 
present, raided ACP headquarters in Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Hobart 
and Darwin. According to one account, in Melbourne the security officers 
seized ‘more than half a ton of pamphlets, articles and other documents’.26 
On 6 December, Spry directed the regional offices to prepare new lists of 
aliens from communist countries to be interned. Approximate numbers 
were nearly 1,000 nationwide. Spry considered that ‘the immediate 
detention of about 750 selected communists would render the party 
organisation innocuous for a period of time’.27 With regard to non-enemy 
aliens, Spry directed that:
those with an adverse pro-Communist security record should be 
listed automatically either for internment or restriction, depending 
on the degree of their subversive activities.28
In January 1951 Menzies attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Conference in London, where he learned that Attlee had been working 
to persuade the Americans not to use an atomic bomb in Korea, and that 
the Western allies were likely to lose if a war developed with China.29 
He  arrived home in mid-February to be confronted by a serious coal 
strike. About the same time, the US State Department’s special negotiator, 
John Foster Dulles, arrived in Canberra for discussions with the Minister 
for External Affairs, Percy Spender, over a draft tripartite treaty between 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS). To Menzies’s 
surprise and satisfaction, Spender and Dulles initialled the draft treaty that 
eventually became the ANZUS Treaty and a key element in Australian 
defence policy for the next 70 years.
As soon as Menzies returned to Canberra in February 1951 he began 
referring to the widespread belief that global war was inevitable. 
The government, he said, would, therefore, be aiming to place Australia 
on a ‘semi-war footing’.30 On 7  March he told parliament that the 
26  ‘Swoop on Reds’ offices’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 1950, 1.
27  Memo, Spry to regional offices, ‘British Subjects (Natural born and naturalised)’, 7 December 
1950, ASIO records.
28  Memo, Spry to regional offices, ‘Aliens Non-enemy’, 7 December 1950, ASIO records.
29  Martin, ‘Mr Menzies’ anticommunism’, 55.
30  ‘A semi-war footing’, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 February 1951.
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democracies had no more than three years to make defence preparations 
that alone could avert war. ‘It is my solemn belief that we have not 
a minute more than three years at the best.’31
Then on 9 March the High Court ruled the Communist Party Dissolution 
Act 1950 (Cth) invalid under the Constitution. A week later Menzies 
asked the governor-general to approve a double dissolution of both houses 
of parliament, on the grounds that Labor had stopped a banking bill, and 
a general election was called for 28 April. The Menzies Government won 
the election and secured control of the Senate.
The High Court’s decision did not reduce ASIO’s work. In the four and 
a half months since parliament had passed the Act, ASIO had prepared 
‘declarations’ to be submitted to the relevant committee concerning 
key trade union officials and communist-dominated organisations. 
On 5 April, Spry wrote to his regional directors to thank them for this 
work and to assure them that it had not been a waste of effort. ‘On the 
contrary’, he said, ‘the actual declarations will be very useful for research 
work now being undertaken by this headquarters.’ He now urged:
the utmost effort, diligence, and ingenuity in order that we may 
produce clear legal proof that the ACP as an organisation or its 
individual members are engaged in activity prejudicial to the 
safety of the Commonwealth.32
While ASIO no longer needed to produce lists of communists to be dealt 
with under the Communist Party Dissolution Act, it still needed to keep 
tabs on the ACP, even though it remained a legal party, because of its 
potential for subversion.
The referendum
On 5  July 1951, the Federal Government introduced in parliament 
a bill enabling it to hold a referendum, which, if successful, would give it 
the power to deal with the communists. In preparation, Spry ordered the 
regional directors to compile reports on the covert organisations that 
the ACP was preparing to use in the event of the party being dissolved. 
31  ‘Three years – No more’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 March 1951.
32  Memo, Spry to Regional Directors, 5 April 1951, ASIO records.
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The regional directors were also to prepare lists of premises to be searched 
and of trade union officials, public servants and communist ‘front’ 
organisations to be ‘declared’ under the Communist Party Dissolution Act.33
During the referendum campaign ASIO prepared a report on the ACP, 
in which it assessed the strength of the party at between a minimum of 
6,845 and a maximum of 7,696 members, with almost half in NSW. 
According to ASIO’s report, the Central Committee of the ACP did not 
believe that the situation in Australia allowed for ‘the seizure of power in 
the foreseeable future’. Rather, it hoped to achieve a transitional ‘People’s 
Government’ to be followed later by ‘a Dictatorship of the Proletariat’. 
ASIO believed that the ACP’s strategy was to split the Labor Party and 
‘collect around itself a coalition of left-wing elements which will fight 
for “People’s Power”’. The ACP hoped to use the referendum campaign 
to establish a united front with the Labor Party, while at the same time 
conducting a separate campaign to publicise the work of the ACP itself. 
ASIO showed this summary to Menzies on 18 August.34
Spry took a keen interest in the conduct and outcome of the referendum 
campaign and directed his officers to keep a close watch on the ACP. 
Through its agent contacts and technical intercepts, ASIO was able to 
gain full coverage of the 16th National Congress of the ACP held in 
Sydney on 23–26 August 1951. ASIO learned that the party was ‘most 
concerned’ that as a result of the government’s attack on them its strength 
had been reduced by 40  per cent. On 31  August, Spry told Menzies 
about this surveillance operation and suggested he include some of the 
information in his speeches to disconcert the ACP.35 Clearly Spry did not 
believe that it was contrary to his charter to assist the government in its 
political campaign to win the referendum when he linked such assistance 
to achieving an advantage in his contest with the ACP. But while Spry’s 
charter required him to watch the ACP and thwart any apparent attack 
on Australian society, it did not authorise him to assist the government in 
a purely political campaign.
By this time, Ben Chifley had died, and Bert Evatt had succeeded him as 
Leader of the Opposition. Evatt might have chosen to proceed cautiously, 
but he launched himself into one of his most vigorous barnstorming 
33  Memo, Spry to Regional Directors, 30 August 1951, ASIO records.
34  Report, ‘Summary of Current Information on the Australian Communist Party’, n.d., but with 
note that it was shown to the prime minister on 18 August 1951, ASIO records.
35  Letter, Spry to Menzies, 31 August 1951, ASIO records.
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campaigns, stumping the country for the ‘No’ vote, in defiance of 
public opinion polls that forecast majorities of between 70 and 80 per 
cent in favour of the proposal. Enough voters were persuaded to change 
their minds for the referendum to be defeated by a narrow margin on 
22 September. Not everyone in ASIO supported the ‘Yes’ vote. Michael 
Thwaites recalled that within ASIO there was no ‘great dismay among 
my colleagues at the result’ of the ‘No’ vote. He claimed that he saw it 
as a ‘victory for civil liberties’, and that it made his job of watching the 
CPA easier. If the CPA had gone underground it would have been ‘far 
harder for ASIO to get on with the task of building up accurate, detailed, 
systematic knowledge of the party’.36
Continuing efforts against the CPA
The ‘No’ vote did not alter ASIO’s legitimate role of keeping watch on the 
ACP, which had now changed its name back to the Communist Party of 
Australia (CPA), and ASIO continued preparing lists of enemy aliens and 
others who would be interned in an emergency. Spry’s problem was that 
while he could prepare lists of people for possible internment, it was the 
government’s prerogative to decide who should be interned. Beginning 
in February 1951, Spry and his chief legal adviser, Bernard Tuck, had a 
series of meetings with Solicitor-General Kenneth Bailey and sometimes 
Attorney-General John Spicer, in which they attempted to refine the 
internment policy. In July 1951, ASIO estimated that in time of war it 
would need to consider the internment of about 3,100 persons, including 
2,000 enemy aliens, 100 other aliens, and 1,000 British subjects and 
displaced persons. While ASIO had files on the 1,000 British subjects, it 
had files on only 300 aliens.37 Discussion continued well into the following 
year as the policy was slowly developed. As a further complication, the 
situation in New Guinea was slightly different to that in the rest of 
Australia. For example, in January 1952 a total of about 270 persons were 
listed for internment. Of these, more than half were children, and most 
were described as ‘Asiatics’, which were mostly Chinese.38
36  Michael Thwaites, Truth will out: ASIO and the Petrovs (London: Collins, 1980), 40.
37  Memo, ‘Internment Policy, Notes of discussion by Deputy Director-General (A&L) with Director-
General on 26th July 1951’, ASIO records.
38  Memo, L Sheedy, RD PNG, to Spry, 19 January 1952, ASIO records.
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ASIO maintained the Australia-wide list for the rest of the decade, 
although it gradually reduced the number of people to be interned. Spry 
recognised the magnitude of the problem, observing in April 1955 that 
while members of the CPA were a ‘security risk’, the most dangerous 
were those holding office, particularly high office, in the party. The 
government would also need to detain CPA members in key positions 
in the Commonwealth and state public services, as well as in private 
industry, and ‘approximately 982’ ‘British subjects’ would need to be 
detained. There were also 500,000 Australian aliens in Australia and it 
might be necessary to detain 4,665 of them.39 In January 1957, Spry 
advised that it had ‘recently been decided to adopt a more liberal policy 
for the internment of aliens and to reduce the number of persons whom 
ASIO will recommend for internment in an emergency’.40
By this time the threat of global war had receded. In January 1953 
the Cabinet endorsed the Defence Committee’s ‘strategic basis’ paper, 
which concluded that while the Soviet Union’s ultimate aim was 
a  ‘Moscow-controlled communist-dominated world’, the development 
of NATO had forced the Soviet Union ‘to direct its main cold war 
effort towards the Far East and South East Asia’. In addition, the Soviet 
Union was ‘fostering subversive activities throughout the world’. Greater 
priority had to be given to Southeast Asia, and Defence preparations for 
a global war should therefore be reviewed, with the peacetime build-up 
for mobilisation being spread over a longer period.41 Further, the 
armistice in Korea in July 1953 allowed the government to reduce its 
military commitment there and to consider providing forces for service 
in Malaya.42 Despite this easing of the Cold War, ASIO did not let up in 
its campaign against the CPA, and in the 1960s the Vietnam War would 
see a vastly increased effort to keep tabs not only on communists, but on 
anyone actively opposing Australia’s involvement in the war.43
39  Memo, ‘Detention, restriction and control in wartime of persons whose activities may be 
prejudicial to the public safety’, CCF Spry, 2 April 1955, ASIO records.
40  Memo, Spry to Regional Directors, 22 January 1957, ASIO records.
41  Report, Defence Committee, ‘A strategic basis of Australian defence policy’, 8 January 1953, 
in Stephan Frühling, A history of Australian strategic policy since 1945 (Canberra: Defence Publishing 
Service, 2009), 175, 188.
42  Minute by Defence Committee, 13 August 1953, NAA: A5954, 1464/1.
43  See John Blaxland, The protest years: The official history of ASIO, 1963–1975 (Canberra: Allen & 
Unwin, 2015).
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The challenge of countersubversion
As illustrated by ASIO’s activities in the early Cold War, the challenge for 
a security service charged with countering subversion is to differentiate 
between attempts to undermine the government and the democratic 
system, and the legitimate expression of free speech in a democracy. It is 
in this area where ASIO has come under most criticism. Over the years, 
critics have levelled numerous charges against ASIO, beginning with 
the general one of assisting the allegedly ‘fascist’ Menzies Government 
to suppress legitimate political dissent. ASIO also has been accused of 
planning to intern thousands of the government’s political opponents, in 
preparation for which ASIO conducted a ‘huge’ surveillance operation and 
put together a ‘massive’ archive of dossiers on unsuspecting citizens. As we 
have seen, however, ASIO was acting at the direction of the government.
Nonetheless, not only ACP members, but indeed anyone vaguely 
connected with it were under suspicion, including trade unionists, 
members of front organisations, public servants, writers, artists and Labor 
politicians. It has been claimed that many Australians were persecuted, 
lost their jobs and generally had their lives ‘wrecked’ because ASIO had 
secretly asserted that they were a risk to national security. In pursuing 
its campaign of surveillance, ASIO officers allegedly acted illegally in 
tapping phones, conducting electronic bugging operations, opening 
private mail and breaking into ACP and front organisations’ premises. 
An element of truth can be found in many of these claims, but ASIO 
would argue that faced by the threat of possible war, it was critical to 
national security to ensure that communist sympathisers were not 
employed in areas where they had access to classified information. If there 
were doubts about a person’s reliability, the doubts needed to be resolved 
in the Commonwealth’s favour. Further, the decisions about excluding 
individuals from Commonwealth employment were made by the heads 
of the relevant government departments, not ASIO. Unfortunately, 
a balanced understanding has been hampered by the partisan nature of 
much of the existing accounts and by ASIO’s strong proclivity for secrecy.
Critics have also argued that ASIO exaggerated the ACP’s threat to 
Australian security because the party’s influence declined rapidly after 
the 1949 coal strike. With hindsight, we can question how dangerous the 
threat of subversion was, considering the decline in the ACP’s membership 
and its small vote in federal elections. But the government knew that in 
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the first two years of the Second World War, the Communist Party had 
sought to undermine Australia’s war effort. Even after the Nazis attacked 
the Soviet Union in June 1941, bringing the Soviet Union into the war 
on  the Allied side, Australia’s war effort was repeatedly disrupted by 
striking unionists labelled as ‘extremists’ or ‘Communists’ by non-Labour 
leaders.44 The government therefore believed that unless challenged, in the 
event of a general war the ACP had both the capacity and the inclination 
to undermine the nation.
The major consequence of the Cold War was that ASIO pursued its 
campaign against the communists with an almost religious fervour. ASIO, 
the relevant government ministers and indeed a large part of the Australian 
population believed that Australia was threatened by a monolithic 
worldwide communist campaign to undermine Western societies. 
With this view of the world, it was therefore considered legitimate to 
try to find out what the ACP and its members were doing. It was also 
considered legitimate to keep watch on citizens who, while not necessarily 
members of the ACP, were seen as possibly secret communists or at least 
communist sympathisers.
The reduction in the intensity of the Cold War after 1953 did not reduce 
ASIO’s work. Counterespionage, countersubversion and the vetting of 
government employees remained important tasks. During the subsequent 
years ASIO might not have warranted Menzies’ claim that it was the 
fourth arm of Australian defence. But circumstances change, and the rise 
of terrorist and cyber threats in the early twenty-first century again placed 
internal security high in the government’s priorities. Perhaps the internal 
security agencies were once again the fourth arm of Australian defence.






The Korean War was the product of Korean politics colliding with those 
of the Cold War. The peninsula, a Japanese colony from 1910, was divided 
into separate zones of occupation along the 38th parallel by the Soviet 
Union and the United States after the Japanese surrender in August 1945. 
This was not intended to be a permanent measure, but efforts to create 
a national government in 1947–48 foundered on superpower caution and 
intra-Korean hostility. Instead, the split hardened and gave geographic 
expression to the divisions within Korean politics. By the end of 1948, 
the communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had 
been established in the north, and the ultranationalist Republic of Korea 
(ROK) in the south.1
Despite this hardening, neither side accepted the division as permanent. 
The ROK president, Syngman Rhee, bombastically declared a desire to 
march north; his northern counterpart, Kim Il Sung, took more concrete 
measures. Beginning with an uprising on the island of Cheju-do in April 
1948, the Communist Party in the south waged a bitter guerrilla war 
first to try and prevent the formation of the ROK and then to overthrow 
it.2 In 1949 the conflict escalated, as units of the Korean People’s Army 
(KPA) and Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) began clashing along the 
border. Even as this went on, Kim Il Sung was pressing his Soviet patrons 
1  William Stueck, ‘The Korean War’, in The Cambridge history of the Cold War, vol. 1, Origins, ed. 
Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 266–73. 
2  Allan R Millett, The Korean War (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 9–14.
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to allow an outright invasion. Josef Stalin refused Kim’s requests in March 
1949 and again in September, but changed his mind in early 1950. Mao 
Zedong also signed off on the invasion, albeit reluctantly, in mid-May.3
The invasion itself began in the early hours of 25  June 1950. With 
significant advantages in firepower and mobility over the ROKA, the KPA 
advanced rapidly and captured Seoul on 28 June. The reaction from the 
United States was swift. President Truman and his Cabinet viewed the 
attack as part of a broader Soviet-directed conspiracy against the entire 
Western world, and believed a failure to make a stand in Korea would 
invite aggression elsewhere.4 On the evening of 26 June in Washington 
(mid-morning on 27 June in Korea) Truman authorised US air and naval 
forces to attack North Korean military forces anywhere below the 38th 
parallel. Three days later, the President agreed to the deployment of a US 
Regimental Combat Team to the peninsula. The United States was now 
firmly committed to saving the ROK.5
This US commitment came in the context of a widening international 
condemnation of the invasion. On 25 June the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) had passed Resolution 82, calling for a cessation of the 
invasion, the withdrawal of the KPA to the 38th parallel, and for UN 
members to refrain from assisting the DPRK. Resolution 82 was made 
possible by the absence of the Soviet Union from the UNSC, as a result 
of an ongoing boycott at the refusal to seat the People’s Republic of China 
rather than the Republic of China. When it became clear this resolution 
was being ignored, the Security Council adopted Resolution  83 on 
27  June.6 In recommending ‘that the Members of the United Nations 
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to 
repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the 
area’, Resolution 83 created the conditions necessary for an international 
military coalition to protect the ROK.7
3  Stueck, ‘The Korean War’, 273–74.
4  Millet, The Korean War, 20–21; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of containment, revised ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 107–8.
5  Robert F Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953 (Washington DC: Office of Air 
Force History, 1983), 34–37.
6  Millet, The Korean War, 21.
7  United Nations Security Council Resolution  83, 27  June 1950, S/1511, at: unscr.com/en/
resolutions/83.
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Even in this political climate, however, Australian participation in the 
Korean War was by no means guaranteed. Prime Minister Robert Menzies 
and much of his Cabinet shared the American view that the invasion of 
South Korea was part of a broader communist plan directed from Moscow, 
and they recognised the regional implications of a communist victory. But 
many of them believed the proper place for Australian forces in opposing 
communist expansion was in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, within 
the traditional security architecture of the British Commonwealth. At a 
meeting of Cabinet on 27 June, it was agreed that the invasion of Korea 
‘represented only one phase of Russian aggression and that Australia’s 
primary [objective] in the matter of opposing Communism was located 
in Malaya’.8 This was not idle discussion, and at the same meeting it was 
decided to agree to an outstanding British request for the commitment of 
a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) bomber squadron to Malaya.9
The notable exception to this view of Australia’s strategic orientation was 
Percy Spender, the Minister for External Affairs. Spender believed Australia 
needed a security guarantee from the United States and since becoming 
minister in 1949 had pursued this objective, despite the scepticism of 
Menzies. The outbreak of the war in Korea seemed to present as a golden 
opportunity. A substantial commitment of Australian forces, independent 
of Britain, would build political goodwill in Washington and would help 
clear the way for an alliance with the United States. It was this belief, 
as much as a desire to halt communist aggression, that drove Australian 
involvement in the Korean War.10
Spender’s tactics in achieving his aims have been discussed extensively 
elsewhere.11 Although the Australian Government had made the 
decision to withdraw Australian forces from the British Commonwealth 
Occupation Force (BCOF), 3  Battalion Royal Australian Regiment 
(3RAR), No.  77 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force, and the frigate 
HMAS Shoalhaven were all still in Japan, while Shoalhaven’s replacement, 
HMAS Bataan, was in Hong Kong. Menzies had agreed on 29 June to 
commit the Shoalhaven and Bataan to combat operations after it became 
clear the British Government had offered ships of its own. The next 
8  Cabinet Minute, 27 June 1950, quoted in Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, 
vol. 1, Strategy and diplomacy (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1981), 48.
9  O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, vol. 1, 47–49.
10  Robert O’Neill, ‘The Korean War and the origins of ANZUS’, in Munich to Vietnam, ed. Carl 
Bridge (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1991), 99–106.
11  See O’Neill, ‘The Korean War and the origins of ANZUS’.
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day, Spender, well aware the US Air Force (USAF) was desperate for the 
F-51 Mustangs flown by No. 77 Squadron, convinced Menzies that it too 
should be offered to the United Nations.12
The Minister for External Affairs saved his most audacious effort to use 
Australian forces to cement a security guarantee. Menzies opposed the 
commitment of the Australian Army to Korea, believing its proper role in 
the event of a more general war lay elsewhere. Spender thought otherwise, 
and consistently argued that an Australian ground commitment to Korea 
independent of Britain would be immensely well received in Washington. 
He got his chance on 26 July, when the Australian Government learned 
that the British Government was going to announce the commitment of 
troops to Korea by 8 pm (Australian time) that day. Menzies was overseas, 
sailing from the United Kingdom to the United States onboard the liner 
Queen Mary. Believing Menzies to be out of contact, Spender seized 
the initiative. He convinced acting prime minister Arthur Fadden and 
Defence minister Philip McBride of the wisdom of his ideas in time to have 
a bulletin announcing the commitment of Australian soldiers to Korea to 
be read out on the ABC’s 7 pm news bulletin. Menzies was unimpressed 
when he learned of what had taken place, but any unhappiness was 
lessened by the warmth of the reception he got in Washington.13
The result of Spender’s manoeuvring was that the Australian forces 
committed to Korea represented what was available, rather than being 
the product of a coherent long-term plan. By the end of 1950, the 
Australian presence in Korea consisted of 3RAR, No.  77 Squadron 
and associated support units, and the destroyers HMAS  Bataan and 
HMAS  Warramunga.14 This basic structure – an infantry battalion, 
a fighter squadron, two destroyers or frigates and support units – changed 
temporarily between September 1951 and January 1952, when the aircraft 
carrier HMAS Sydney raised the number of Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
ships deployed to three, and then permanently after April 1952, when 
a second Australian infantry battalion arrived in theatre. The need for 
Sydney was driven partly by an operational concern; HMS Glory needed 
a refit, and the Royal Navy had no aircraft carriers available to replace 
her. Yet the decision to send Sydney to Korea came in the context of a 
12  O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, vol. 1, 50–53.
13  O’Neill, ‘The Korean War and the origins of ANZUS’, 103–5.
14  Jeffrey Grey, A military history of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
209–10.
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formal US request in February 1951 for additional troops, one that the 
Defence Committee felt Australia unable to respond to.15 The subsequent 
commitment of a second battalion in 1952 was a purely political decision; 
the Defence Committee again argued that any such deployment would 
badly hurt Australian mobilisation efforts in the event of a wider war, 
but they were overruled because of a perceived need to build up political 
capital in Washington.16
The Army
The fighting in the Korean War can be divided into four stages. The first 
was the opening North Korean invasion, which lasted from 25 June to early 
September 1950. In that time the KPA succeeded in pushing UN forces 
into the Pusan Perimeter in the south-east of the ROK, but was unable to 
obtain further success. The second phase opened on 15 September, when 
the US X Corps landed at Inchon, to the west of Seoul. The capture of 
Inchon marked the start of a UN counteroffensive that routed the KPA 
and drove them well into the north. By 19 October the Eighth Army had 
captured the North Korean capital Pyongyang, and one week later the 
ROKA 6 Division reached the Yalu River – the border between the DPRK 
and the People’s Republic of China.17
It was this rapid advance that set the stage for the third phase of the 
war. Apprehensive about the presence of US forces on the Chinese border 
and under pressure from the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong ordered Chinese 
forces into the war.18 Beginning in late October 1950, the Chinese 
launched a series of offensives that would drive the UN forces out of 
the north and prompt a major crisis within the UN Command. General 
Douglas MacArthur wanted to expand the war onto mainland China 
and use atomic weapons if necessary. President Harry Truman disagreed, 
and when MacArthur started agitating for his policies in public and in 
Congress Truman fired him on 11 April 1951.19
15  O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, vol. 1, 212–13.
16  O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, vol. 1, 251.
17  Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, vol.  2, Combat operations (Canberra: 
Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985), 30–33.
18  Stueck, ‘The Korean War’, 278.
19  Stephen R  Taaffe, MacArthur’s Korean War generals (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2016), 183–84.
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MacArthur’s relief and the defeat of the Chinese Fifth Phase Offensive 
in May marked the start of the fourth and final stage of the war. Neither 
side had the ability to win an outright military victory on the peninsula, 
nor had the desire to widen the war outside it. With the frontline now 
roughly astride the 38th parallel, negotiations between the two sides 
opened on 10 July in the town of Kaesong. It would take another two 
years for an agreement to be reached; in the interim, fighting continued.
It was during the second phase that 3RAR entered the war in Korea, 
landing at Pusan on 28 September 1950. In the two months between the 
government’s commitment of the battalion and its arrival in Korea it had 
worked frantically to prepare for combat. A steady flow of reinforcements, 
weapons and equipment arrived in Japan during August and September, 
as the battalion was brought up from 550 officers and men to a wartime 
establishment of 960.20 Entire sub-units had to be re-established, and 
an intensive training program begun. In the midst of this, Lieutenant 
Colonel FS Walsh’s time as the battalion commander expired, and he was 
replaced by Lieutenant Colonel CH Green. In 1945 Green had earned the 
distinction of becoming the youngest Australian battalion commander of 
the Second World War; five years later, and still only 30, he faced an 
entirely new challenge.21
By the time Green arrived on 10 September the Australian Government 
had already made the decision that 3RAR would operate as part of the 
British 27 Brigade. Based in Hong Kong, Brigadier Basil Coad possessed 
only the understrength 1 Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 
and 1 Battalion, Middlesex Regiment. The brigade had gone into action 
in the Pusan Perimeter in late August and participated in the breakout that 
followed the Inchon landings. The addition of 3RAR gave Coad a third 
manoeuvre element, but the brigade lacked adequate transportation and 
remained dependent on the United States for supporting arms such as 
artillery and armour.22
On 5  October the brigade, redesignated 27  Commonwealth after the 
arrival of the Australians, was airlifted to Seoul and placed under the 
command of the US 1  Cavalry Division. For the next month 3RAR 
participated in the advance north, fighting a major action in an apple 
20  3RAR War Diary, 11 September 1950, Australian War Memorial (AWM): AWM 85 4/20.
21  Wayne Klintworth, ‘Formation of the Royal Australian Regiment’, in Duty first: A history of the 
Royal Australian Regiment, ed. David Horner and Jean Bou (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2008), 52.
22  Jeffrey Grey, ‘The regiment’s first war’, in Horner and Bou, Duty first, 57.
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orchard north of Yongyu on 22 October and helping the brigade clear and 
hold Chongju between 25 and 27 October. Despite its heavy losses over 
the previous months, the KPA continued to mount a determined defence, 
utilising armour and artillery alongside well-dug-in and camouflaged 
infantry.23 Although Australian losses during this period were relatively 
light, among them was Lieutenant Colonel Green. On 30 October he was 
wounded by a shell fragment and died two days later. His replacement 
was Lieutenant Colonel Walsh.24
Green’s death coincided with the Chinese entry into the war. 
The Australians’ first encounter with this new enemy, on 5 November, 
left Coad dissatisfied with Walsh’s performance and led to the Australian’s 
immediate relief.25 The battalion’s third commander within a fortnight, 
Major IB Ferguson, would endure a difficult first month. The events of 
5 November had been part of the Chinese First Phase Offensive, little 
more than spoiling attack to gain a sense of UN Command strength 
and intentions. The main effort, the Second Phase Offensive, opened on 
26 November. Within days the ROK II Corps had given way, and the 
Eighth Army began to withdraw.26
The retreat itself was a bitter affair. From the start of the conflict certain 
US Army units had suffered from an absence of cohesion and leadership, 
and these problems became all too apparent during the desperate journey 
south.27 The nadir occurred on 30 November when the brigade held open 
a corridor for the 2 US Infantry Division to retreat through. As the 3RAR 
war diary noted:
as was obvious then and as later confirmed by official US Army 
reports, 2nd US Division … were completely disorganized and 
were not withdrawing in any sort of military fashion.
So poor was American discipline that units were firing randomly as they 
moved through the Commonwealth position, killing a soldier from the 
Middlesex.28
23  See for example 3RAR War Diary, 19 October 1950, AWM: AWM 85 4/21.
24  Grey, ‘The regiment’s first war’, 74–76.
25  Grey, ‘The regiment’s first war’, 76–77.
26  O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, vol. 2, 68.
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Brigadier Coad had already been critical in private of US performance 
during the UN counteroffensive – now he was scathing. This British 
dissatisfaction with US performance, coming as it did during a moment 
of wider diplomatic crisis brought on by the Chinese entry into the war, 
was taken seriously in Washington. It would have been a serious blow to 
the UN coalition if a senior partner had expressed public dismay at the 
fighting ability of US troops. Ultimately, the solution lay with a more 
general improvement in US performance, brought about by improved 
leadership within the Eighth Army and a greater flow of reinforcements 
to frontline formations. Yet is interesting to note that 3RAR’s position as 
part of a larger Commonwealth formation rather than an independent 
Australian one appears to have insulated Australia from the worst of this 
intra-coalition disagreement.29
The worst of the retreat ended on 11  December, when the brigade 
went into IX Corps reserve. Even this was not a rest; on 13 December 
6 Platoon B Company got into a firefight with one of the guerrilla groups 
that continued to lurk in the rear areas of the UN Command.30 Ten 
days later, General Walker, the Eighth Army commander, was killed in 
a road accident. His successor, General Matthew B Ridgway, succeeded 
in stabilising the UN line and began a series of limited counteroffensives. 
3RAR participated in Operation THUNDERBOLT (25  January) and 
KILLER (21 February), both of which saw an overall improvement in 
the performance of the Eighth Army. During this period, 27 Brigade was 
strengthened by the arrival of 16  Field Regiment Royal New Zealand 
Artillery in January and 2 Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light 
Infantry (2PPCLI) in March.31
The last sequence of the third phase of the war was the Chinese Fifth 
Phase Offensive, which commenced on 22 April and lasted until 20 May. 
The opening communist attack led to the collapse of 6 ROK Division. 
On the afternoon of the 23 April, 27 Brigade was warned to establish 
a defensive position north of the village of Kapyong, across a wide valley. 
As ROK soldiers began retreating down the valley, 3RAR occupied 
Hill 504 east of the river and 2PPCLI Hill 677 to the west. A fierce fight 
developed early on the morning of 24  April, in front of both 3RAR’s 
29  Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth armies and the Korean War: An alliance study (Manchester; New 
York: Manchester University Press, 1988), 78–80, 86–87.
30  3RAR War Diary, 13 December 1950, AWM: AWM 85 4/23.
31  Grey, ‘The regiment’s first war’, 77–80.
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company positions and around its HQ. By the time 3RAR was withdrawn 
on the afternoon of the 24th, 32 Australians were dead, 59 had been 
wounded and three captured. The cost to the Chinese was much higher, 
but more importantly they had been prevented from breaking through 
the UN position.32
From May to September 1951, 3RAR was engaged in halting the 
remainder of the Chinese Fifth Phase Offensive and conducting limited 
UN counterattacks to restore the line. During this period, several more 
important administrative changes occurred. Both British battalions and 
the headquarters of 27  Commonwealth Brigade were replaced by new 
units from the United Kingdom, and the brigade consequently renamed 
28  Commonwealth Brigade. The brigade was then combined with 
25  Canadian and 29  British brigades and an Indian field ambulance 
to form 1 Commonwealth Division. At the same time, 3RAR began to 
experience a high rate of personnel turnover, as those who had originally 
served with the battalion became eligible to return to Australia. Although 
the battalion remained at its wartime establishment, the loss of so many 
experienced personnel was less than ideal.33
The final large, mobile battle fought by an Australian unit in Korea was 
the seizure of Maryang-San in early October. Operation COMMANDO 
was conceived as an offensive by US I  Corps to improve the UN 
position along what became known as the Jamestown line. As part of 
this, 1  Commonwealth Division was assigned to seize two key hills – 
Kowang-San (Hill 355) and Maryang-San (Hill 317). 3RAR’s role was 
to support the initial assault on Hill  355 and then capture Hill  317. 
The  division’s attack began on 3  October, with 3RAR assaulting their 
main objective two days later. Although the initial assault was successful, 
the Australians continued to fight around the feature until the early 
morning of 8 October. In capturing Maryang-San, 3RAR had destroyed 
an estimated two Chinese battalions, at a cost of 20 killed in action and 89 
wounded. The Official Historian, Robert O’Neill, argued that ‘the victory 
at Maryang San is probably the greatest single feat of the Australian Army 
during the Korean war’.34
32  Grey, ‘The regiment’s first war’, 81–84.
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From the end of COMMANDO in October 1951 to the ceasefire in 
July 1953, the war in Korea was a static one. What this meant for the 
Australian battalions – for 3RAR was joined by 1RAR in April 1952 – was 
a war of digging, patrolling and camouflage.35 ‘Static’ can be a misleading 
term; the failure to return a war of manoeuvre did not mean, as Jeffrey 
Grey has pointed out, ‘that the fighting did not continue, or did so at 
a reduced and somehow less dangerous pace’.36 Even in the absence 
of major action, the insistence from US I  Corps leadership that units 
maintain an aggressive posture – and in particular mount raids to ‘snatch’ 
prisoners – caused considerable friction with 1 Commonwealth Division. 
The Chinese were skilled and aggressive fighters who possessed large 
numbers of automatic weapons; coming to grips with them at night was 
an extremely dangerous business. Commonwealth commanders remained 
unconvinced of the utility of ‘snatch’ raids, but could not ignore orders 
from higher headquarters. It was one of the few points of operational 
friction in the coalition relationship in the final two years of the war.37
The arrival of a second Australian battalion within 28  Brigade meant 
that Australian personnel were now in the majority, and so command 
of the brigade went to an Australian. The first such officer was Brigadier 
Thomas Daly, who took command in July 1952; his successor, Brigadier 
JGN  Wilton, arrived in March 1953 and held the position until the 
ceasefire. Daly took the opportunity to put Australian officers into what 
was an entirely British headquarters, and exercise his own command style. 
Having a dominion officer in charge of British battalions was an unusual 
arrangement and one that was not entirely well received, but not to the 
extent that it impacted operational effectiveness.38
The Australian battalions rotated again in April 1953, with 2RAR replacing 
1RAR.39 Three months later, the ceasefire came into effect. The sudden 
transition from war to peace (albeit a fragile one) was startling. In the days 
leading up to the ceasefire, the Chinese fiercely bombarded Australian 
forward positions and mounted strong attacks on the neighbouring 1 US 
Marine Division, which were successfully repulsed. The ceasefire was 
signed at 10:00 am on 27 July 1953 and went into effect at 10:00 pm 
35  Grey, ‘The regiment’s first war’, 89.
36  Grey, ‘The regiment’s first war’, 88.
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on the same day. Just over 12  hours later, 3RAR’s intelligence officer, 
Lieutenant JM Mathers, toured one of the Marine positions. The ferocity 
of the Chinese bombardment was reflected in the fact most of the bunkers 
and trenches had been destroyed, and there were around 70 Chinese 
bodies scattered in front of the defences. Yet amid this carnage, Mathers 
noted the ‘very young’ Chinese stretcher-bearers recovering casualties 
‘were friendly towards us’.40 It was an apt end for a limited war.
No. 77 Squadron at war
Even before it was formally committed to combat by the Australian 
Government on 30 June, No. 77 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force was 
in high demand. Unlike the jet-powered F-80C Shooting Star operated 
by USAF squadrons in Japan, the F-51 Mustang flown by the Australians 
had the range to loiter over Korea and the ability to operate from 
temporary strips on the peninsula.41 As early as 26 June, the US Fifth Air 
Force was asking if Australian Mustangs were available to provide air cover 
for the evacuation of US citizens from Seoul. So intense was the desire for 
Mustangs that a week after the Australian Government agreed to commit 
No. 77 Squadron, the USAF decided to convert six jet squadrons in Japan 
back to the F-51.42
This need for Mustangs, and the worsening military situation, helps 
explain the intensive operations of No. 77 in the opening months of the 
war. The squadron flew its first sorties over Korea on 2 July and its first 
strike mission three days later.43 A routine quickly emerged for No. 77 
Squadron. Each day four flights of four Mustangs would take off from 
Iwakuni in Japan and land at Taegu, a makeshift strip within UN lines. 
From there they would fly anything up to six sorties in a single day, 
refuelling and rearming where necessary, before returning to Iwakuni in 
the evening.44 It was an intense schedule for the Australians, with each 
day lasting from around 4:15  am to 6:30  pm, and flying taking place 
most days.45 As the North Korean air force had largely been destroyed, the 
40  3RAR War Diary, 28 July 1953, AWM: AWM85 4/55.
41  Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953, 68.
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missions were focused on close air support of UN troops, and interdiction 
of communist supply lines. With their distinctive ‘Dropkick’ callsign, 
No.  77 became a familiar presence for the beleaguered soldiers of the 
Eighth Army.46
Even without a serious enemy air threat, or the vast amounts of light 
flak that would come to cover North Korea in the static phase of the 
war, the levels of danger were high for the Australian pilots. Ground 
attack missions required skilful flying, as pilots went into dives at low 
level to ensure accurate delivery of ordinance. Casualties were inevitable. 
On 7 July Squadron Leader Graham Strout, Spence’s deputy, was killed 
during a raid on Samchok; Spence himself was killed when his Mustang 
failed to pull out of a dive on 9 September.47
Spence’s death occurred as the UN forces began their long journey 
north, and No.  77 Squadron followed close behind. In mid-October 
the squadron moved, along with the USAF Mustang group, to Pohang, 
and again a month later to Hamhung in North Korea. The squadron’s 
stay north of the 38th parallel was only brief, however; with the Chinese 
steadily driving UN forces back, the Australians relocated to Pusan East 
on 3  December. Throughout this period, and until the squadron was 
withdrawn to re-equip with the jet-powered Gloster Meteor in April 
1951, a steady operational tempo was maintained.48
The emergence of the MiG-15 in Korean skies in November 1950 was 
the prompt for Australian authorities to seek a replacement for the 
Mustang. Flown by Soviet pilots, the MiGs had startled UN observers 
with performance levels that were superior to every UN fighter then in 
theatre.49 It was quickly made clear to the RAAF that its first preference, 
the North American F-86  Sabre, would not be available until 1954. 
Instead it was able to secure 36 Meteor Mk VIIIs from Britain. Although 
it was powered by twin jet engines, the straight-winged Meteor had first 
debuted in combat in 1944 and was a clear generation behind the MiG-15 
and the F-86. While aware of this, senior officers within the USAF and 
46  Milton Cottee, interview, 19 September 2003, Australians at War Film Archive, No. 863.
47  Stephens, Going solo, 227.
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RAF did not believe the gap between the Meteor and the MiG-15 was so 
great as to make the former unsuitable in an air-to-air role. It would be up 
to No. 77 Squadron to put this idea to the test.50
In the event, the gap would prove too great. A series of dogfights between 
29  August and 5  September 1951 left one Meteor destroyed and two 
damaged, for no losses on the Soviet side. The commander of No. 77, 
Wing Commander Gordon Steege, requested that the Meteors be limited 
to operations south of the Chongchon River.51 This prompted some 
disquiet amongst the upper echelons of the RAF and USAF, who were 
concerned by the political implications of limiting Meteor usage at a time 
when a swathe of NATO air forces were being equipped with the type. 
Senior British and American officers believed that Steege had thrown 
in the towel far too early and argued that, while acknowledging the 
limitations of the Meteor, deficiencies in Australian tactics and training 
were to blame for the poor results.52 Steege, for his part, maintained that 
the gap in performance was simply too big for the Meteor to do anything 
but try and survive against a competently flown MiG.53
Any lingering doubts were settled on 1 December 1951, when three Meteors 
were destroyed in a dogfight by MiGs of 176 GvIAP (the Gvardeyskiy 
Istrebitelniy Aviatsionniy Polk – Guards Fighter Air Regiment), with no 
loss on the Soviet side.54 In the aftermath the Australians were immediately 
relegated to air defence tasks. It was a bitter blow to professional pride 
made even more difficult by the fact that air defence duties were, in the 
words of a contemporary Australian report, ‘a “soul destroying” task at 
the best of times’.55 It also created a certain degree of tension within the 
coalition. Airfield space for jet units was at a premium in Korea, and 
No. 77 was one of just three squadrons based at Kimpo. The USAF began 
threatening to evict the squadron for a more useful unit. Finding an 
50  Stephens, Going solo, 231–32.
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expanded role for the Meteors now became not just a matter of restoring 
pride and unit morale, but also ensuring the squadron remained a valued 
part of the UN coalition.56
The answer came with Wing Commander RT  Susans, who succeeded 
Steege as commander of the squadron at the end of December 1951. 
Susans pressed for the Meteors to be fitted with rails for unguided rockets 
and trialled in a ground attack role. An initial sortie on 8 January proved 
to be a success, and the remainder of the squadron quickly transitioned 
into the role. The ability to generate over 1,000 sorties a month, at a 
time when the USAF was conducting a series of massive campaigns 
designed to destroy communist logistics networks across the peninsula, 
was also welcome.57
The switch to a ground attack role did not mean the complete end of 
encounters with MiGs, however. When necessary, the Meteors continued 
to be tasked in escort or fighter roles that invited the potential for air 
combat. From the start of 1952 to the armistice in July 1953, No. 77 
Squadron would claim three MiG-15s destroyed and a further two 
damaged, with only one Meteor damaged in return.58 Yet overall air-to-air 
combat remained a rarity for Meteor pilots after December 1951, and the 
majority of an individual pilot’s tour in Korea would be spent attacking 
ground targets.59
Some Australian pilots would argue after the war that the success against 
MiGs in 1952–53 showed that Steege’s decision had been premature and 
that with better training and tactics the Meteor could have given a better 
account of itself – thus avoiding the entire unfortunate episode. Yet it is hard 
in retrospect to criticise Steege’s actions. As he noted in early September 
1951, the MiG’s higher Mach number meant it could be controlled at 
higher speeds than the Meteor and thus – if competently flown – dictate 
the entire engagement. The aircraft shot down by the Australians in 
1952–53 appear to have been piloted by inexperienced Chinese rather 
than Soviet flyers who were unaware of this key performance advantage.60 
Even Air Vice Marshal Cecil Bouchier, the senior RAF officer in Korea 
56  Stephens, Going solo, 237.
57  Stephens, Going solo, 237–38.
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and a strong critic of Steege, cautioned his superiors in London from 
drawing ‘false conclusions’ from the Meteor renaissance in May 1952: 
‘the MIG 15 can always dictate the fight and it has a superior performance 
which should make it impossible for a Meteor ever to shoot it down in 
equal combat’.61
Steege’s decision not only reflected this basic technical reality but also an 
understanding that the RAAF simply could not sustain the level of attrition 
experienced by No. 77 Squadron in late 1951.62 This in turn reflected 
a basic unpreparedness on the part of the RAAF for active participation 
in a high-intensity conflict.63 Steege was left trying to balance Australia’s 
strategic objective of garnering American approval with the operational 
reality that his squadron could not continue to do what was asked of it. 
While Susans ultimately crafted an acceptable solution by converting the 
Meteor to a ground attack role, the fact remained the government’s goals 
had diverged from what was possible because of a failure of capability.
The Navy
Like the other two services, the initial commitment of the RAN to the 
Korean War was governed by what was available. The Tribal-class destroyer 
HMAS Bataan had left Sydney on 31 May to relieve the modified River-
class frigate Shoalhaven on BCOF duties. When the Menzies Government 
authorised both ships to be put at UN disposal on 29 June, Bataan was en 
route to Kure from Hong Kong and Shoalhaven was in Kure. The latter 
was put to immediate use, escorting a US ammunition ship into Pusan on 
1 July. When Bataan arrived on 6 July, she too was put to work escorting 
convoys to Pusan, and enforcing the UN blockade of the western coast.64
These tasks lacked obvious glamour but were crucial to the war in Korea. 
Although North Korea’s navy amounted to a handful of ex-Kriegsmarine 
torpedo boats and ex-Soviet submarine chasers, an audacious attempt to 
capture Pusan from the sea on the first night of the invasion showed they 
61  British Embassy Tokyo to Air Ministry London, ‘For Chiefs of Air Staff from Bouchier’, 10 May 
1952, TNA: AIR 8/1709.
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appreciated the potential of sea power.65 The entire UN effort in Korea 
rested on the ability to supply and reinforce the Eighth Army from the sea; 
securing these lines of communication was thus paramount. As it became 
clear the communist naval threat was minimal, the range of missions for 
UN naval forces rapidly expanded. Naval elements conducted amphibious 
landings, evacuations and raids. Gunfire support missions to interdict 
enemy supply lines or in direct support of UN troops were routine. US 
and British aircraft carriers conducted strikes up and down the peninsula, 
and screening them became an important task for other UN units.66
It was into this environment that Bataan and Warramunga, which 
replaced Shoalhaven at the end of August, operated. Bataan had been part 
of the force that screened the landings of 1 Cavalry Division at Pohang 
Dong on 18 July, and both destroyers were part of the covering force for 
the Inchon landings in mid-September.67 So rapid was the UN advance 
that by the start of November both destroyers found themselves, along 
with HMCS  Cayuga, Athabaskan and Sioux, and USS  Forest B.  Royal, 
blockading the Yalu Gulf. Yet within days UN forces began to retreat, 
and both destroyers were part of the evacuation of Chinnampo on 
5 December. By the end of the month, the Australians were back where 
they had started in September: off Inchon, where Bataan provided daily 
gunfire support to 25 Infantry Division.68
As the frontline stabilised in early 1951, both Australian destroyers 
returned to what had become routine duties: screening larger British and 
American vessels, enforcing the blockade and providing gunfire support 
for troops ashore. Bataan was relieved by the frigate HMAS Murchison in 
May 1951, Warramunga by the new destroyer HMAS Anzac in August. 
In total, four RAN frigates and four RAN destroyers served in Korea, with 
all four destroyers completing two tours. The operations of HMAS Tobruk 
in the war’s final month were as typical as any. She began the month 
escorting the light carrier HMS Ocean, spent several days replenishing in 
Saesbo, then conducted a war patrol on the east coast, where she enforced 
the blockade, conducted bombardments of communist installations and 
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shore batteries, sank a junk suspected of minelaying, operated in support 
of guerrilla groups on offshore islands and searched for a downed USAF 
bomber crew.69
While these tasks became routine, they were far from safe or easy. Bataan 
fired the first shots of the Navy’s war in Korea on 1 August 1950 when, 
while in company of the cruiser HMS Belfast, she was engaged by a shore 
battery near Haeju, northwest of Inchon.70 Communist gunners proved 
more than willing to trade blows with UN ships, and while Australia’s ships 
suffered only a few hits throughout the war many of their compatriots 
were not so lucky. Mines also represented a major threat, both inshore and 
at sea. HMAS Bataan recorded a typical event in April 1951:
On another occasion whilst screening the carriers in bad visibility 
our ‘next ahead’ ‘ATHABASKAN’ reported cheerfully over T.B.S. 
[Talk Between Ships] that he had just sighted a floating mine 
directly ahead of ‘BATAAN’ (DD). The few moments that elapsed 
until the mine was sighted were anxious ones but, with this prior 
warning, the danger was easily avoided and the mine was sunk by 
gunfire a minute or two later.71
Beyond mines and shore batteries, the other great threat to Australian ships 
were local conditions. Korea’s west coast was characterised by ‘shallow 
waters, extensive sandbanks, rapid tidal currents and narrow channels’.72 
Combined with Korea’s subarctic weather and the threat of hidden shore 
batteries and mines, patrols demanded a high level of seamanship from 
Australian crews at all times.
The most extreme example of the way in which enemy action and 
navigational hazards could combine to endanger Australian ships was 
HMAS  Murchison’s time in the Han estuary. Conceived in July 1951, 
Operation HAN aimed to ‘to probe forward as far as navigation would 
allow, into the HAN RIVER, to demonstrate Allied control of this area’.73 
The audience for this demonstration was the negotiators at Kaesong, 
with UN naval commanders hoping that sound of gunfire in the river 
69  ‘HMAS Tobruk, Report of Proceedings, July 1953’, 31 July 1953, AWM: AWM78 343/2.
70  Cutler, ‘Sea power and defense of the Pusan Pocket’, 20–21.
71  ‘HMAS Bataan, Report of Proceedings, April 1951’, 5 May 1951, AWM: AWM78 58/3.
72  Anthony Cooper, HMAS Bataan, 1952: An Australian warship in the Korean War (Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 2010), 68–69.
73  ‘HMAS Murchison, Report of Proceedings, July 1951’, 8 August 1951, AWM: AWM78 228/1.
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would be able to be heard at the negotiating table.74 Responsibility 
fell on Task Group  95.1 (TG  95.1), which consisted of a mixture of 
British, New Zealand, Australian and Korean frigates. Rear-Admiral 
Alan Scott-Moncrieff, of the UK Royal Navy, who commanded the 
Commonwealth Task Group, was sceptical of the value of the operation, 
but it went ahead anyway.75
From the outset the operation was demanding, with the frigates having 
to send out boats and survey parties in an effort to find channels through 
the mud flats to allow them to close with the enemy.76 Initial enemy 
resistance was light, but on 28 September Murchison was ambushed as 
she completed her turn at anchor to return down the river. Fire came 
from anti-tank guns, heavy machine guns, bazookas and small arms in 
concealed position. So close was the distance that the Australians replied 
over open sights, with weapons under individual control. When a rain 
squall came in, Murchison was forced to anchor for fear of running 
aground; when the rain cleared a cable party had to raise the anchor while 
totally exposed, and then gunfire resumed.77 Despite being hit numerous 
times Murchison suffered only a handful of light wounds and the loss of 
a Bofors gun. An even more intense ambush two days later resulted in 
one serious casualty, and Operation HAN ended shortly after. Despite 
the volume of enemy fire on both occasions, the captain of Murchison, 
Lieutenant Commander (later Commodore) Dollard, remained convinced 
the biggest threat of his ship had been the tides and mudflats.
The multinational command arrangements in Korea also caused some 
friction for the RAN, at least initially. Australian commanders found the 
orders from American commanders extremely detailed, so much so that 
they choked off initiative and were hard to comprehend or process in the 
time available. American signals and tactical procedure publications were 
so numerous that they presented problems of compliance and storage.78 
Although the issue of detailed orders had also been present in the Second 
74  Alistair Cooper, ‘The Korean War era’, in The Royal Australian Navy: A history, ed. David Stevens 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), 175.
75  Cooper, ‘The Korean War era’, 175.
76  ‘HMAS Murchison, Report of Proceedings, July 1951’, 8 August 1951, AWM: AWM78 228/1.
77  Commodore Allen Nelson Dollard DSC RAN (Rtd) interviewed by Lieutenant Commander 
Tony Hughes RANR, 22 November 2002, AWM: AWMS02803, 16.
78  O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, vol. 2, 417–18.
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World War, the passage of five years was enough to erase operational 
experience of it, and commanders had to readjust.79 By mid-1951 the 
captain of HMAS Bataan was reporting that
during the past few months it has been apparent that the United 
Nations Navy in Korea has been operating more and more as 
a composite force using common doctrines and standardized 
procedures with complete success  …  the stage has now been 
reached when it is the rule and not the exception to operate 
ships drawn from the United States and British Commonwealth 
Navies together in units as small as Task Elements with the certain 
knowledge that they will work as an efficient and happy team.80
Even the presence of ships from non-English-speaking navies, such as 
HMNS Piet Hein, was handled smoothly.81
The one significant departure from the RAN pattern of destroyer and 
frigate operations was the deployment of the light carrier HMAS Sydney. 
Carrying an air group of 22 Sea Fury fighters and 12 Firefly attack aircraft, 
between 4 October 1951 and 25 January 1952 she conducted seven war 
patrols, primarily off the west coast.82 Typical missions for the air group 
included combat air patrol, spotting for naval gunnery, search and rescue, 
and strike missions. It was the latter sorties that were the most dangerous. 
Like their RAAF counterparts, Navy pilots flew a mixture of close air 
support and interdiction missions against targets that were increasingly 
smothered in light flak. Sydney lost 10 aircraft to enemy action and 
another three to accidents, with three pilots killed.
The experience of the Sydney and her air group have come to dominate 
accounts of RAN participation in Korea. As the only Australian aircraft 
carrier to serve in combat operations in any war, she holds an obvious 
fascination for those interested in Australian naval affairs. Yet in retrospect 
the significance of her deployment lay in the circumstances in which it 
came about. It was yet another demonstration of the way in which the 
Australian Government was keenly aware of the political consequences of 
its decisions regarding force structure in Korea, and reacted accordingly.
79  O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, vol. 2, 417–18; Frame, No pleasure cruise, 212–13.
80  ‘HMAS Bataan, Report of Proceedings, May 1951’, 1 June 1951, AWM: AWM78 58/3.
81  ‘HMAS Condamine Report of Proceedings, December 1952’, 1 January 1953, AWM: AWM78 
88/3.
82  Cooper, ‘The Korean War era’, 177.
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Conclusion
Australia entered the Korean War looking to fulfil two major objectives. 
The first was to use the commitment of Australian forces to clear the way 
towards a security pact with the United States. This was accomplished 
in September 1951, with the signing of the Australia, New Zealand and 
United States (ANZUS) agreement. The second was to preserve the 
independence of the Republic of Korea and to demonstrate the willingness 
of Western nations to resist what Canberra perceived to be monolithic 
communist aggression. In some senses this objective was largely achieved 
by mid-1951, when it became clear to all parties that there would be no 
outright military victory on the peninsula; but it was not consolidated 
until July 1953, with the signing of the armistice.
Crucially, there was no tension between these two objectives, and by actively 
participating in the fighting Australian commanders worked towards 
both. Alliance warfare delivered its share of irritations, but Australian 
forces were insulated from these to an extent by their participation in 
Commonwealth formations on land and at sea. The controversy around 
the role of No. 77 Squadron in the second half of 1951 did show that the 
commitment of Australian forces came with potential political downsides. 
Yet this issue was solved relatively quickly, and in retrospect while British 
and American commanders hinted at Australian underperformance, their 
primary concern was the reputation of the Gloster Meteor.
Australian success in Korea came at a significant human cost: 
306 Australians were killed in action across all three services, a further 
32 died in accidents or of illness, and 1,216 were wounded. Twenty-nine 
Australians ended up as prisoners of war, where they were subject to brutal 
treatment and attempted indoctrination; one prisoner was treated so badly 
they died. Although ultimately overshadowed by Vietnam in popular 
memory, it was a hefty price to pay for guarantees of Australian security.
Part 2. Planning 






Planning for war in Southeast 
Asia: The Far East Strategic 
Reserve, 1955–66
Tristan Moss1
During the early Cold War, Australia expected to fight any global war 
alongside the British. Somewhat ironically, while it was increasingly 
independent from Britain in foreign policy and security planning, unlike 
during previous wars, Australia planned to fight any future war with its 
units integrated into Commonwealth formations. The cooperation of 
Australian forces with the British and other Commonwealth countries 
in the Korean, Malayan and Borneo conflicts reflected the close strategic 
and operational integration that built on the experiences of the two world 
wars, and the strategic desire of both Britain and Australia to engage the 
other in the efficient pursuit of their own security. The integration of 
forces at the formation level also reflected the smaller scale of people and 
resources involved. From 1955, these efforts were centred on the Far East 
Strategic Reserve (FESR), a force that contained British, New Zealand 
and Australian troops, aircraft and ships and was based in Malaya and 
Singapore.2 The FESR was Australia’s first permanent peacetime overseas 
deployment, and ultimately stretched to decades. The FESR was both 
a symbol, in that it represented the Commonwealth’s commitment to 
1  The author would like to thank the Australian Army History Unit for the award of a grant that 
assisted in this research.
2  There seems to be no accepted name for the FESR, even in archival documents: some authors 
include a reference to the Commonwealth or British Commonwealth in the acronym.
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defending the region, and a tangible contribution to Commonwealth 
Cold War aims, in its availability to fight wars in Malaya and Borneo 
and to ensure that the Commonwealth was ‘at the table’ with the United 
States and with the newly formed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO). For thousands of Australian service personnel, it was a central 
and unique part of their service in the 10 years prior to Vietnam, shaping 
their experiences, and also the focus of the services of which they formed 
a part.
Creating the FESR
At the strategic level, postwar Commonwealth military cooperation was 
managed through coordination between the various Chiefs of Staff in 
each nation. The British Commonwealth Occupation Force, Japan was 
planned and overseen through senior military representatives from the 
United Kingdom, Australia, India and New Zealand. These meetings 
led directly to the creation of the ANZAM defence planning system in 
August  1949 (named after the Australia, New Zealand and Malayan 
area it was intended to safeguard). The organisation was limited in its 
early aims: to secure the maritime approaches to Australia and New 
Zealand.3 ANZAM did not initially commit its members to particular 
troop numbers in the event of conflict, which was well enough for 
Australia, which had few permanent forces with which to make such a 
promise.4 Australian strategic thinking also assumed that, in the event of 
war, a third Australian Imperial Force would be sent to the Middle East.5 
The result, to use historian Raffi Gregorian’s phrase, was that ANZAM 
was ‘a fairly moribund organization for the first years of its existence’, 
as the Commonwealth’s strategic direction in Asia was concentrated on 
the Korean War.6
3  Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, The official history of Australia’s involvement in Southeast 
Asian conflicts 1948–1975, vol.  1, Crises and commitments: The politics and diplomacy of Australia’s 
involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948–1965 (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with 
the Australian War Memorial, 1992), 61.
4  Hiroyuki Umetsu, ‘The origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve: The UK proposal 
to revitalise ANZAM and the increased Australian defence commitment to Malaya’, Australian Journal 
of Politics & History 50, no. 4 (December 1, 2004): 510, doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2004.00350.x.
5  DM Horner, Strategic command: General Sir John Wilton and Australia’s Asian wars (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 141.
6  Raffi Gregorian, The British Army, the Gurkhas and Cold War strategy in the Far East, 1947–1954 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002), 117, doi.org/10.1057/9780230287167.
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Between August and October 1953, British, Australian and New Zealand 
military planners met in Melbourne as part of the ANZAM arrangements, 
and in particular to discuss the relationship’s future. This meeting laid the 
foundation for Commonwealth cooperation in the region for the next 
decade and a half. Key among their agreements was the creation of a 
Commonwealth force that might respond quickly to threats in the region. 
This proposal reflected Britain’s concerns about its own ability to provide 
troops to hotspots around the world, with the concurrent belief that 
the situation in Southeast Asia was deteriorating. In a letter to Menzies 
formally suggesting the reserve, the British Minister for Defence, Lord 
Alexander, wrote that ‘the United Kingdom will be prepared to play its 
part. But, as you will understand … there are limits to what we can do’.7
The FESR was also an effort to draw Australia and New Zealand into 
Commonwealth (rather than US) defence agreements.8 With all countries 
agreeing to the new arrangements, ANZAM became a permanent 
peacetime organisation, rather than one that would be staffed in the 
event of war. This decision also put an end to the concept of sending 
Australian troops to the Middle East in the event of global war.9 A new, 
more closely integrated ANZAM Chiefs of Staff Committee assumed 
responsibility for all planning for the defence of the Malayan area, as well 
as the Australian and New Zealand maritime areas.10 That this committee 
was based in Melbourne was further evidence of the British desire to draw 
the Australians deeper into the organisation, and to divest themselves of 
as much of the burden as possible.
For its part, the Australian Defence Committee saw ANZAM as an 
‘evolution in British Commonwealth Defence’, given that now Australia 
would focus almost entirely on Southeast Asia in its strategic thinking.11 
The Defence Committee believed that the creation of a strategic reserve 
conformed with Australian government policy to, as the Defence Minister 
7  Letter, Alexander to Menzies, 29  June 1953, National Archives of Australia (NAA): A5949, 
1464/1.
8  Umetsu, ‘The origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve’, 517.
9  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 163; Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean 
War 1950–53, vol. 1, Strategy and diplomacy (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and the Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1981), 347.
10  ‘Report on discussions between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Australian Defence 
Committee and the New Zealand Chief of the General Staff ’, 21  October 1953, NAA: A5949, 
1464/1; Umetsu, ‘The origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve’, 523.
11  ‘ANZAM as a regional arrangement: views of Australian Defence Committee’, October 1953, 
NAA: A5949, 1464/1; letter, Alexander to Menzies, 12 October 1954, NAA: A5949, 1464/1.
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stated to parliament in February 1952, check communist aggression while 
also ensuring that Australia made a tangible contribution in support of 
‘our powerful friends and to the Allied strategic starting point, should 
war occur’.12 More broadly, the FESR, as tangible evidence of ANZAM’s 
capabilities, was a means by which Britain, and the Commonwealth, 
could wield influence in US strategic planning. Having been kept out 
of the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty, and 
conscious of the need for American support in any global war, the British 
sought to position ANZAM as the Commonwealth regional command 
structure that would fit within US direction should the Cold War turn hot; 
Commonwealth countries would work through ANZAM as a collective, 
rather than individually with the United States, thereby giving ‘the 
ANZAM nations an effective voice at both political and strategic levels’.13 
Confirmed by the contributing nations in a 1955 London prime ministers 
meeting, the FESR was a force that was as much a tool of politics and 
diplomacy as it was a military and strategic one.14
The structures proposed in 1953 stayed largely stable throughout the 
FESR’s existence. The force was based around a brigade of infantry, 
with supporting units. The experience of integrating Commonwealth 
battalions in the Korean War was fresh in the planners’ minds, reflected 
in the decision to reraise the 28 Commonwealth Brigade that had served 
in last stages of Korea.15 Australia provided a single battalion of the Royal 
Australian Regiment (RAR), with the remaining two battalions coming 
from the British Army. Australia also committed to maintaining another 
battalion at high readiness in Australia for use in Malaya should an 
emergency arise.16 In 1957, New Zealand replaced one of the brigade’s 
British battalions with their own, making it a truly Commonwealth 
force.17 Other services were represented in the reserve. The Royal 
Australian Navy (RAN) provided two frigates permanently based in 
12  Joint Planning Committee, ‘Formation of a Far East Strategic Reserve’, 13 August 1953, NAA: 
A5949, 1464/1. See also Umetsu, ‘The origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve’, 522.
13  ‘Report on discussions between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Australian Defence 
Committee and the New Zealand Chief of the General Staff ’, 21 October 1953, NAA: A5949, 1464/1.
14  L  MacLean, ANZIM to ANZUK: An historical outline of ANZAM (Canberra: Government 
Publishing Service, 1992), 16.
15  ‘Formation of a Far East Strategic Reserve in Malaya: Paper by the Australian Joint Planning 
Committee’, 13 August 1953, NAA: A5949, 1464/1.
16  ‘Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve: Composition of Australian Contribution’, no date, 
A5949, 1464/1, NAA.
17  Christopher Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation: The New Zealand armed forces in Malaya 
and Borneo, 1949–1966 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003), 123.
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Southeast Asia. An  aircraft carrier was also allocated to the FESR, but 
given that Australian only had two, this ship rotated to Southeast Asia to 
exercise for a handful of months each year, and then returned to Australia 
for maintenance and training. Finally, the Royal Australian Air Force 
(RAAF) supplied three squadrons: two fighter squadrons of sixteen F-86 
Sabres each, and a single bomber squadron of eight Canberras. These 
were based at Butterworth on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula, 
which needed to be substantially upgraded, necessitating the deployment 
of an airfield construction squadron alongside other maintenance and 
administrative staff.18
Australian forces in the FESR
While small numbers of Australian soldiers and airmen had been in 
Malaya since 1950, the first large contingents arrived to join the FESR 
in 1955.19 The bulk of 2RAR and supporting units arrived in Penang 
in October, along with over 300 members of the RAAF who started 
work building Butterworth airfield. The destroyers HMAS Arunta and 
HMAS Warramunga, already in Malaya for ANZAM exercises, assumed 
their Strategic Reserve duties in June 1955.20 While the British already had 
significant peacetime forces in Malaya, largely to fight the Emergency, such 
a force was a departure for Australia, which had only six years previously 
created the permanent Army. This was Australia’s first permanent overseas 
deployment, and would amount to around 4,500 soldiers, sailors and 
airmen and would last until the 1970s.21
Australian forces came under the direction of the British Defence 
Coordinating Committee (Far East), the BDCC(FE). A civilian–military 
organisation, the BDCC(FE) was chaired by the British Commissioner-
General for Southeast Asia and the three British service commanders in 
18  Alan Stephens, The Australian centenary history of defence, vol. 2, The Royal Australian Air Force 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2002), 249.
19  Some units had been on loan to Far Eastern Land Forces (FARELF) , such as No 1 Detachment 101 
Wireless Troop, and Lincoln bombers and Dakota transports had participated in the Emergency. Peter 
Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, The official history of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948–
1975, vol. 5, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian military operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–
1966 (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1996), 77–78.
20  Jeffrey Grey, The official history of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948–1975, 
vol. 7, Up top: The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian conflicts, 1955–1972 (St Leonards: Allen 
& Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1998), 25.
21  Ibid.
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the region. Australia and New Zealand were involved in decision-making 
only when the committee considered matters relating to the ANZAM area, 
through the High Commissioners in Malaya and the ANZAM Defence 
Committee in Australia. After much debate in Britain, the committee 
structure was disbanded in 1962, to be replaced with a single Commander-
in-Chief for the Far East; the organisation they oversaw was known as Far 
East Command (FEC).22
28 Commonwealth Brigade itself fell under the purview of Far Eastern 
Land Forces (FARELF). From 1955, the use of Australian forces was subject 
to restrictions placed on it by the Australian Government: the Australian 
Cabinet, for instance, emphasised that the Australian component was not 
to be used in aid to the civil power and ensured that this was inserted into 
the directive to the British commander.23 It was telling that the directive 
to the unified commander also instructed him ‘to preserve our [Britain’s] 
links with Australia and New Zealand, particularly in ANZAM, and to 
contribute to their forward defence’.24
The commitment of so much of Australia’s combat power to the FESR 
allowed for excellent, and hitherto unparalleled, peacetime training not 
available in Australia. The opportunity to train was embraced by the 
RAN, for whom co-location with the Far East Fleet provided access to 
a far larger range of training activities not available in Australia, including 
anti-submarine warfare exercises; although the Department of the Navy 
was, at times, frustrated by what it saw as an overemphasis on training 
by Australian officers with the Strategic Reserve at the expense of other 
duties.25 The Army also saw service in Southeast Asia as an opportunity to 
learn. In its assessment of the Strategic Reserve in 1953, the Joint Planning 
Committee believed that ‘inclusion of Army units in the Reserve would 
enable them to gain experience in a new theatre and one in which the 
Army might be engaged in a global war’. The result would be the creation 
of a cohort of officers with knowledge of the region and the type of war 
that might be fought there.26
22  Ibid., 26–27.
23  ‘Minute by ANZAM Defence Committee meeting held on 28th July 1955’, 28  July 1955, 
NAA: A5954, 1467/9.
24  ‘Directive for the Commander-in-Chief Far East’, 1962, NAA: A1945, 287/2/13.
25  Grey, Up top, 30.
26  ‘Formation of a Far East Strategic Reserve in Malaya: Paper by the Australian Joint Planning 
Committee’, 13 August 1953, NAA: A5949, 1464/1.
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The 1961 SEATO exercise ‘Pony Express’ is illustrative of the benefits of 
service with the FESR. An Australian lieutenant colonel was sent as an 
observer to the exercise that simulated an amphibious landing in North 
Borneo. Composed of elements of the US Seventh Fleet, the British 
Far East Fleet, four Australian warships, the entire 3 Marine Division, 
42 Commando Royal Marines and one company of 1RAR, the exercise 
was the perfect opportunity to compare the amphibious warfare doctrines 
of Australia’s two partners, and ensure continued integration between 
them and Australia.27 Secretary of the Army, Bruce White, believed that 
‘such an exercise, particularly on the scale on which it is to be conducted 
[means that] the lessons to be learnt will be of considerable value’.28 For 
the Navy, the exercise saw HMAS Melbourne act as the flagship of the 
anti-submarine warfare group: participation in such a large fleet training 
was completely unachievable in Australia.29
Nonetheless, for the Army, operations took precedence over training for 
conventional war, at least in the FESR’s early years. As the first battalion 
to be deployed, and with the Malayan Emergency still ongoing, 2RAR 
found little time for training for war as part of the Strategic Reserve, as 
opposed to the small unit and basic skill training of use in its ongoing 
operations in Malaya. For many troops on this deployment, the FESR 
‘was little more than a shadow compared with the reality of the foetid 
jungle’.30 As the Emergency wound down, more time was found for 
training. 3RAR completed two months of training for conventional 
warfare during its tour, although much of this focused on company-level 
and below exercises; only two periods of a total of 299 were allocated to 
operations in an atomic battlefield, reflecting both the battalion’s focus on 
low-intensity warfare, and the unreality of global war involving nuclear 
weapons to many.
By 2RAR’s second tour from 1961 to 1963, most of its time was spent 
training with the Strategic Reserve; six months straight from October 
1962.31 While the time allocated to training changed, there was not 
necessarily an improvement in the Army’s ability to meet its requirements 
in the event of war. During 2RAR’s 1963 Exercise ‘Bellbuster’, significant 
27  Report, P Falkland, ‘SEATO Amphibious Exercise “Pony Express” Report by LT COL P Falkland’, 
24 May 1961, NAA: A6059, 65/441/125.
28  White to Secretary Prime Minister’s Department, 29 March 1961, NAA: A6059, 65/441/125.
29  Press release, 27 April 1961, NAA: A6059, 65/441/125.
30  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 132.
31  Ibid., 147, 156, 160–62.
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deficiencies were identified by the commanding officer, Lieutenant 
Colonel AB Streeton, including inappropriate jungle equipment, lack of 
small arms readiness, the weight of signals equipment and lack of training 
with helicopters. Many of these issues were out of Streeton’s control.32 It is 
also worth noting that 28 Commonwealth Brigade was not necessarily 
ready to undertake its primary role of emergency force at a moment’s 
notice: when Indonesian troops landed in Malaysia in 1964, for instance, 
only the New Zealand battalion was available, as 3RAR was on the Thai 
border, and the British battalion was in the process of being replaced.33
There was the more significant issue of the mismatch between the forces 
promised by each member of the Strategic Reserve in the event of war, and 
those actually available. If a limited war were to break out in Southeast 
Asia, the Strategic Reserve would be short destroyers and minesweepers. 
In 1959, when the RAN was requested to report on its readiness should 
the deteriorating war against communist-backed insurgents erupt into 
war in Laos, the two destroyers then with the reserve were ready but at 
reduced complements, and the troop transport HMAS Sydney and carrier 
HMAS Melbourne would take some weeks to be ready to be deployed.34 
For its part, the Army spent the period between 1955 and 1965 in 
flux. Faced with the possibility of a nuclear war in Southeast Asia, and 
responding to US experiments on the issue, the Army introduced the 
Pentropic divisional organisation in 1960.
Based around five combined-arms battlegroups of five companies each, 
the organisation was intended to pack more punch on the nuclear 
battlefield but was ultimately unwieldy in the field. The infantry battalion 
that was deployed to the Strategic Reserve was exempt from the Pentropic 
organisation, but a new battalion had to be raised to allow it to rotate 
back to Australia without having to reorganise on Pentropic lines. 
If war broke out, the Army planned to commit a Pentropic battlegroup 
as well, supporting American and Asian partners. This left the Army 
in the questionable position of maintaining two different structures in 
war. Pentropic organisation was discarded in early 1965, but not before 
causing a great deal of disruption as units were reorganised.35 By 1964 the 
Army was also entering a long period of expansion, with the introduction 
of national service and the creation of additional units.
32  Ibid., 162.
33  Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation, 202.
34  Grey, Up top, 28.
35  JC Blaxland, Organising an army: The Australian experience 1957–1965 (Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1989), 53.
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Commonwealth relations
The service of Australian units within a Commonwealth formation was 
a relatively new experience for Australia. During the Second World War, 
Australia vigorously resisted breaking up its divisions when fighting 
alongside the British. Australian troops served with British in the British 
Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in Japan, to which Australia 
contributed a brigade, three fighter squadrons and naval forces; about 
a third of the entire force.36 One battalion – later two – served with 
27 Commonwealth Brigade in Korea, part of 1 Commonwealth Division. 
This level of integration was continued and expanded on in the FESR, 
where Australians also served within integrated units, including provost, 
signals, field ambulance, service and engineering units.
The creation of integrated Commonwealth units created some teething 
problems as Australian and British service personnel learned to work 
together, particularly in the inclusion of an Australian platoon in 
a  British Royal Army Service Corps company. An officer from 2RAR, 
Major LC Chambers, reported problems caused by differing experience 
levels between Australian regulars and the British national servicemen 
with whom they had to work, differing attitudes towards the proper 
relationship between officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks, 
and the perception of unfair restrictions on ‘the more mature Australian 
soldier’, particularly curfews. Chambers believed that while individually 
the complaints were minor, ‘even petty’, taken together ‘they could … add 
up to a general sense of disgruntlement if they were disregarded’.37 
The integration of a sub-unit within a company, Chambers felt, ‘depends 
for its success too much on personalities and individual characteristics’. 
He recommended that from thereafter, Australian administrative units 
should be of company strength at least.38
Nonetheless, Australian sub-units were not withdrawn from integrated 
units: to do so, it was reasoned, would undermine the ‘all arms’ nature of 
the Australian commitment, and remove an important contribution to the 
36  James Wood, The Australian military contribution to the occupation of Japan, 1945–1952 
(St Leonards: Allen & Unwin 1998), 11.
37  HQ 1 Federal Division District, ‘Integration of Australian Components in Commonwealth 
Units’, 22 August 1956, NAA: A6059, 41/441/32.
38  GOC Malaya Command, ‘Integrated British/Australian Units’, 30 August 1956, NAA: A6059, 
41/441/32.
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FESR at a time when British manpower was stretched. While there were 
always irritants, efforts by Australian and British commanders to ensure 
that integration ran smoothly seemed to keep a lid on any problems.39
One notable facet of the Australian deployment of troops to Malaya during 
peacetime was the presence of service families. Some had accompanied 
troops to BCOF but, alongside service families in Papua New Guinea, 
this was the first time that service families had travelled overseas in large 
numbers to permanent bases. While the Defence Minister at the time, 
Phillip McBride, promised that the deployment of 2RAR to Malaya 
would include provision for service families, shortages of appropriate 
housing caused problems. Almost 400 servicemen within the battalion 
were eligible for married quarters (although some did not take up the 
option); that the battalion was arriving in an area already occupied by 
British troops made for slim pickings either for married quarters on base 
or in the private market, contributing to low morale among Australian 
troops. Complaints to British commanders in the area went unheeded 
until the commanding officer of 2RAR, Lieutenant Colonel JG Ochiltree, 
himself made a statement by refusing the married quarter allocated him, 
in front of the entire officers’ mess. While more housing was reallocated 
from British servicemen after this incident, inadequate housing dogged 
Australian forces for years.40
At a time when relatively few Australians travelled to Asia, life in Malaya 
was an eye-opening experience for hundreds of Australian service families.41 
Once housing issues were smoothed out in the 1960s, families lived in 
suburbs often more salubrious that those to which they were accustomed 
in Australia, with beautiful tropical gardens and access to base services 
such as a cinema, swimming pool and hospital – all only for the use of 
Commonwealth troops and their dependants. On and around bases in 
Penang, Butterworth and Singapore, Australians were exposed to a foreign 
culture to which they were the outsiders. All families were entitled to at 
least one domestic servant, an unheard-of luxury in Australia.42 At the 
same time, there was shopping to be had in the towns near the base, 
39  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 86.
40  Ibid., 88–89.
41  For a detailed discussion of Australian life at Butterworth, see Mathew Radcliffe, Kampong 
Australia: The RAAF at Butterworth (Sydney: NewSouth Books, 2017).
42  Christina Twomey, ‘Bring the family: Australian overseas military communities and regional 
engagement, 1945–1988’, in Beyond combat: Australian military activity away from the battlefield, ed. 
Tristan Moss and Tom Richardson (Sydney: NewSouth Books, 2018), 13.
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and excursions to the surrounding Malayan countryside. Australians were 
also exposed to the particular racial relations then prevalent in the former 
British colony and brought their own racial attitudes; this was the period 
of White Australia, after all. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, 
the three Australian services actively discouraged their servicemen from 
marrying non-European women.43 Defence policy was to emphasise the 
difficulties of marrying an ‘alien’ to soldiers hoping to marry.44
Planning for war
With the exception of the operations against Indonesian incursions into 
the Malaysian peninsula and in Borneo between 1963 and 1966, the 
FESR was never deployed on combat operations. Instead, its role was 
a ‘force in being’, prepared for whatever emergency might arise, from 
global war, regional conflict with China or counterinsurgency in Laos 
or Vietnam. Fundamental to this was an ongoing process of planning, 
with a series of operational plans produced, amended and discarded as the 
threats shifted during the Cold War.
British plans for war in Asia during the early 1950s centred on the defence 
of Malaya. While chastened by its disastrous experience in the opening 
months of the Pacific War, which ultimately saw the fall of Singapore, 
the British were beholden to the geographical reality that the easiest place 
to defend Malaya was the narrow Kra Isthmus, in particular where it 
narrowed north of the border, in Thailand. During the 1940s and early 
1950s, they believed that the Thais would not be able – or willing – 
to defend their country from a concerted attack. The British therefore 
planned to move north into Thailand to occupy the so-called ‘Songkhla 
position’, around 70 kilometres from the border. The political sensitivities 
of both moving troops into Thailand, and the assumption that most 
of Thailand would fall to the enemy, placed the British in an awkward 
position, and made difficult the assessment of the right time to begin 
moving troops into the area.
43  Matthew Radcliffe, ‘In defence of White Australia: Discouraging “Asian marriage” in post war 
South-East Asia’, Australian Historical Studies 45, no. 2 (2014): 184–201, doi.org/10.1080/103146
1x.2014.911761.
44  Principal Administrative Officers’ Committee (Personnel), ‘Marriage between service personnel 
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The British planned to meet around 80,000 communists – with the same 
in reserve – at the Songkhla position. In 1951 they believed they required 
three divisions, with attached armour and artillery, in addition to internal 
security forces of around 22 battalions. With other commitments around 
the world, particularly in Europe, the British would struggle to provide 
these forces in a timely fashion, with the potential that they would have 
to rely on the mobilisation of a division from the Territorial Army.45 
Nonetheless, in the event of a global war, the British Chiefs of Staff revised 
its estimate upwards of the forces needed to defend the Songkhla position 
in 1954 to around five divisions, but admitted that it was ‘improbable’ 
that the United Kingdom could send forces additional to those already in 
country. Commonwealth contributions were therefore crucial.
Australia committed to sending a corps of three divisions to Malaya, the 
first of which would arrive three months after war being declared, and 
the other two at a rate of one per month thereafter. New Zealand agreed 
to send a single division.46 This was a plan that followed the assumptions 
of the Second World War, in which there was time to mobilise forces 
to meet a threat. Increasingly, planners worried that this would not be 
possible. The mismatch of forces was not necessarily a grave issue: in 
November 1954, the ANZAM Defence Committee estimated that ‘overt 
aggression in SE Asia is highly unlikely’, but that the main threat facing 
the Commonwealth in Malaya was an ‘intensification of the cold war and 
subversive action’.47 Reflecting this, the force designated for the defence 
of the Kra Isthmus – by then called Plan Hermes – was downgraded in 
1956 to two divisions, 65 naval vessels and 248 aircraft, but a new plan, 
Warrior, developed to meet a North Vietnamese and Chinese intervention 
in the region required four divisions, 600 aircraft and 200 warships.48
These plans were designed for the Commonwealth to defend its territory 
alone; the absence of the United States to these plans lent ‘an air of 
unreality’ to the process.49 While the Commonwealth could, on paper and 
depending on the threat, potentially go it alone for a period of time, the 
45  Gregorian, The British Army, the Gurkhas and Cold War strategy in the Far East, 1947–1954, 192.
46  ‘Visit of General Loewen and Admiral Lambe to Australia’, 22 December 1954, UK National 
Archives: COS(54)393, DEFE 5/55.
47  ANZAM Defence Committee, ‘Probably form and scale of attack against Malaya up to the end 
of 1956’, November 1954, Australian War Memorial: AWM 121 408/A/1.
48  Damien Fenton, ‘SEATO and the defence of Southeast Asia, 1955–1965’ (PhD thesis, University 
of New South Wales, Canberra, 2006), 109–10.
49  Ibid., 110.
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difficulties in procuring the troops called for in the plans – a minimum of 
two divisions for Hermes – made the prospect questionable. Manpower 
shortages in Britain, the reluctance of Commonwealth nations to commit 
troops during peacetime, and the time to deploy troops from Britain or 
elsewhere to Malaya were all factors. In the event of war both Australia 
and New Zealand, for instance, planned to raise divisions from reserves 
and volunteers, as they had during the Second World War; a process 
that would take at least six to nine months.50 By 1957 Far East planners 
recognised that the Commonwealth would be hard pressed to provide 
adequate conventional forces, and instead sought to redress the balance 
by the deployment of nuclear weapons in wartime, although these plans 
similarly were more aspirational than concrete.51
Accepting that the United States would provide the bulk of troops in 
any future war (and therefore would direct strategy), the Commonwealth 
increasingly sought to gauge American intentions in the region and 
engage them in joint planning. The ANZAM plans were presented to 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, for 
comment in early 1955. The Americans were highly critical of the gap 
between the plans and the actual ability of the Commonwealth to provide 
the troops to carry them out, and the plans’ focus on defending Malaya 
and abandoning the rest of Southeast Asia. Refusing a request for four-
power joint planning, the Americans insisted on working through SEATO, 
which had been created just a few months previously, in September 1954. 
In many ways, coordination with SEATO gave ANZAM’s planning new 
life and the FESR a more concrete role.52
From 1956, SEATO planning began under the auspices of the Military 
Planning Office. The assembled staff officers from across the region 
focused their concern on the threat of Chinese and Vietnamese 
communist aggression against Southeast Asia. It was overt, rather than 
covert, communist action that was considered to be the principal threat: 
counterinsurgencies, after all, had been successfully waged in Malaya 
and the Philippines. The first priorities were therefore those states 
bordering China and North Vietnam: Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand 
and Cambodia.53
50  Ibid., 111.
51  David French, Army, empire, and Cold War: The British Army and military policy, 1945–1971 (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 245, doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548231.003.0001.
52  Gregorian, The British Army, the Gurkhas and Cold War strategy in the Far East, 1947–1954, 117.
53  Fenton, ‘SEATO and the defence of Southeast Asia, 1955–1965’, 134.
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There were two types of potential operation: limited war, which would 
require part or all of the FESR; and large-scale conflict, which would see 
the Strategic Reserve deployed initially, with larger follow-on forces from 
ANZAM nations coming later.54 Seven SEATO plans were developed. 
Plans  1 and 2 prepared for the defence of Southeast Asia, against the 
Viet Minh, and against North Vietnam and China, respectively. Plan 3 
was concerned with the defence of South Vietnam from an attack from 
North Vietnam with Chinese assistance. Plan  4 was developed against 
the unlikely possibility of a Chinese attack across the whole of Southeast 
Asia, while Plan 5 focused on a communist insurgency in Laos. Plan 6 was 
a variant of other plans against North Vietnamese aggression in Southeast 
Asia, and Plan 7 prepared for an insurgency in South Vietnam.55 While 
these plans were developed concurrently, those focusing on Laos, Thailand 
and Vietnam were considered more urgent.56
The escalating Laotian crisis, during which communist forces threatened 
the US-backed Laotian Government, was as close as the FESR came to 
being deployed in support of SEATO. Indeed, the large-scale training 
for air movements within 28  Commonwealth Brigade in preparation 
for such an operation were the first time that the various Australian, 
British and New Zealand battalions worked closely together.57 One 
concept put forward by the ANZAM Defence Committee would have 
seen 28 Commonwealth Brigade seizing crossings on the Mekong River 
while a US airborne brigade took the nearby Laotian town and airfield 
of Seno.58 As the likelihood of a deployment to Laos diminished, this 
plan (Buckram) morphed into the broader-focused Plan Taffy, which 
allowed for a deployment to either Laos or northern Thailand in support 
of Plan 5, and to the Mekong region in support of Plan 4.59
ANZAM planners recognised that these plans would meet some difficulty 
were they to be implemented, and there was ongoing discussion and 
refinement, with the constantly changing strategic situation adding a degree 
of uncertainty to the planning process. In the event of the conventional 
war envisaged in Plan 4, an Australian, New Zealand and UK (ANZUK) 
54  MacLean, ANZIM to ANZUK, 23.
55  Horner, Strategic command, 182.
56  Ibid., 179.
57  Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation, 176.
58  ANZAM Defence Committee, ‘Deployment of the Commonwealth Brigade and Supporting 
Forces in SEATO Plan 4 Operations’, October 1963, NAA: A5799, 49/1963.
59  MacLean, ANZIM to ANZUK, 24–26.
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Division was to be formed from the Strategic Reserve with an Australian 
battle group and the New Zealand Brigade. The divisional headquarters 
was to be Australian.60 Ultimately, however, the inability of SEATO 
members to commit to action in Laos in 1961 also seriously undermined 
the organisation, and while planning continued, the possibility of 
deployment under the auspices of SEATO became less likely.61
The only SEATO-related deployment of Australian forces was the 
commitment of a squadron of Sabres to Ubon airfield in northern 
Thailand to protect Thailand’s territorial integrity.62 Around 220 airmen 
and officers made up the contingent, operating in basic facilities that 
amounted to the airstrip, tents and a lone US radar unit. The Sabres’ 
role was to assist in the defence of Thai airspace and the aircraft were 
armed with Sidewinder missiles and cannon. Two armed Sabres were 
placed on alert during daylight hours. Ultimately, however, the Ubon-
based Sabres never fired a shot in anger. The arrival of US Air Force 
Eight Tactical Fighter Wing from April 1965 relegated the Sabres, who 
were not permitted to join the US fight in Vietnam, to a secondary, local 
defence role.63
Confrontation
With the increase in antagonism between Indonesia and Malaysia 
that culminated in the period of Confrontation between 1963 and 
1966, ANZAM came closest to war; it was also the last time that the 
Commonwealth planned to meet such an eventuality collectively.64 
The military strategy of FEC during Indonesian Confrontation was the 
product of uncertainty about Indonesian intentions, an unstable political 
situation in Malaysia, a British desire to decrease defence spending and 
60  Ibid., 26.
61  Horner, Strategic command, 184.
62  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 242.
63  Stephens, The Royal Australian Air Force, 255–56.
64  Brian Farrell’s detailed analysis of Far East Command’s planning for Confrontation is by far the 
best study of that period, and the aims of the Commonwealth nations in developing their plans. Brian 
Farrell, ‘Escalate to terminate: Far East Command and the need to end Confrontation’, in The 2005 
Chief of the Army military history conference, ed. Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (Canberra: Australian 
Military History Publications, 2005), 125.
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free up its stretched military, and the fact that the Commonwealth 
countries contributing to the defence of Southeast Asia did not always 
share the same goals.65
Australia, for its part, also sought to ensure its own security from its 
nearest neighbour.66 Sharing a border with Indonesia in Papua New 
Guinea, and with Darwin only a short distance away, war with Indonesia 
was an occurrence that would quickly and directly affect Australia. While 
it could refrain from participating in Commonwealth actions against 
Indonesia or pull its troops out of the Strategic Reserve to bolster home 
defence, the automatic involvement of Australian interests in any war 
involving Indonesia meant that full participation in any offensive against 
Indonesia in an emergency probably offered the best chance of Australian 
goals being met.67
Throughout the conflict with Indonesia, a range of plans were maintained 
to allow for the ever-changing strategic situation and the uncertainty 
over Indonesian intentions, while also providing a suite of options for 
Commonwealth governments and FEC, ranging from open war to the 
redeployment of troops as in preparation for the possibility of future 
action or to send a political message to the Indonesians. These plans, at 
their heart, reflected the desire of Commonwealth planners to resolve 
the conflict through non-military means; there was no wish to occupy 
or destroy Indonesia.68 The reaction of Commonwealth partners – and 
therefore their provision of forces to a conflict – had to be considered, 
as well as that of the world community who might provide support or 
opprobrium.69 Finally, the political reactions of Indonesia were key to 
each and every plan, with the goal of convincing Indonesian leaders that 
war would be costly and contrary to their interests. The series of ‘anti-
confrontation plans’, as they were termed, therefore, allowed for prompt 
and proportional Commonwealth reaction to Indonesian actions, rather 
than the opening blow of a wider conflict.
The Indonesian incursions into Malaya in August 1964 represented the 
high point of tension between Indonesia and the Commonwealth. 
The overt nature of these actions also fundamentally changed the nature 
65  Ibid., 128–29.
66  See Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 197–204.
67  Farrell, ‘Escalate to terminate’, 136.
68  Ibid., 126.
69  Ibid., 142.
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of the conflict. Nonetheless, the Indonesian landings were almost absurdly 
poorly planned and executed. Indeed, so woeful was the Indonesian 
planning that many of their forces landed near 28  Commonwealth 
Brigade, the battalions of which quickly and easily rounded up the 
Indonesian troops.70 However minor, Indonesian actions galvanised the 
ANZAM partners, and caused them to commit more firmly to FEC 
and its plans. Equally as important, the British responded by sending 
additional forces to the region, including bombers, fighters, air defence 
units and infantry battalions. FEC now had firm plans for strikes against 
Indonesia, the forces with which to carry them out and the political will 
to do so.71
To meet the worst-case scenario, outright war with Indonesia, FEC 
planners developed a group of plans designed to destroy Indonesian 
offensive capability as quickly and as completely as possible. Initially 
named Cougar, the plan went through three more iterations: Hemley, 
Althorpe and Allvar.72 Planners assumed four weeks’ notice would be 
available, and the plan assumed that the United Kingdom would not be 
engaged in other operations in Southeast Asia at the same time (such that 
sufficient troops would be available), Indonesia would not receive outside 
support from countries such as China but nor would the United States 
intercede on the Commonwealth’s behalf, and that nuclear weapons, then 
based at Singapore, would not be used in the conflict.73
While land forces took the brunt of limited conflicts, it was air forces that 
would take the lead if the conflict widened under Plan Cougar. Airpower 
was a key in plans to combat Indonesia; it was through air strikes that 
a decisive blow might be struck by either side.74 Only Indonesia’s air force 
represented a credible threat to Commonwealth forces in the region, and 
wiping out this capability in the first days of any conflict was seen as 
crucial. Having recently received 25 new Soviet TU-16 Badger bombers, 
Indonesia also had around 30 fighters, including MiG-17s, MiG-19s 
and 18 of the newest MiG-21s, as well as a number of piston-engine 
aircraft, including 16 P-51  Mustangs and 16 B-25  Mitchell bombers. 
70  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 225.
71  Farrell, ‘Escalate to terminate’, 146, 149–50.
72  ANZAM Defence Committee, ‘State of Anti-Confrontation Plans’, Agendum No.  9/65, 
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The main threat to FEC was low-level attacks against the primary FEC 
bases in the region, at Singapore, Butterworth and in Borneo. Although 
this was considered unlikely, an airstrike launched by Indonesia with all 
the forces available to it could come with little warning, and cause a great 
deal of damage to aircraft caught on the ground and other vital defence 
installations such as radar and fuel storage areas.75
To meet an Indonesian air attack, FEC had a substantial force in theatre, 
but these initially fell short of what was required as many of the aircraft 
earmarked for the defence of Malaysia were to be deployed as and when 
the situation called for it. The plan included a total of 191 aircraft, 
including 24 medium bombers, 40 light bombers including Canberras, 
52 all-weather fighters, 44 ground attack fighters (including RAAF 
Sabres) and reconnaissance aircraft. Of these, over 100 were already in 
theatre.76 After the Indonesian escalation of the conflict in 1964, more 
aircraft were provided to FEC, including the powerful Vulcan bombers.77 
With these forces, FEC had close to the planned capability required to 
carry out Plan Cougar and could be confident in dealing a crippling blow 
against Indonesia if called to do so.78
More limited strikes were also planned for, should the situation have 
called for a tough response short of a comprehensive strike. Plan Florid, 
submitted in 1965, provided for more limited strikes on Indonesian 
targets in Kalimantan. Indeed, the target list was designed to be scalable, 
with the plan providing ‘the option of ordering operations against any 
number of targets from one to eighteen according to the degree of 
severity required’.79 Written shortly after the first Indonesian incursion 
on the Malaysian peninsula, Plan Mason provided for air and naval 
attacks against Indonesian bases from which paramilitary operations 
were launched. Plan Hedgehog expanded on Mason as the number of 
Indonesian bases increased, revising the target list and adding Indonesian 
military headquarters. Hedgehog was to be implemented ‘when Indonesian 
preparations for attack or infiltration against Malaysia and Singapore were 
75  Annex B to Appendix 1, ‘Offensive Operations Against Indonesia: Reinforced Theatre Plan 
No. 7 (Draft) – Plan Cougar’, 1964, NAA: A1945, 245/3/14.
76  Farrell, ‘Escalate to terminate’, 132.
77  Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation, 228.
78  Farrell, ‘Escalate to terminate’, 146.
79  ANZAM Defence Committee, ‘State of Anti-Confrontation Plans’, Agendum No.  9/65, 
3 September 1965, Annex J to CINCFE 3182/2064/3, NAA: A7942, A227.
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detected’.80 Yet further plans provided for more limited scenarios, such as 
the reinforcement of certain areas; one plan, Salaam, was implemented 
to move troops to Borneo.81 The scalability of the plans available for the 
use of the FESR provide a variety of options for a range of contexts, but 
all nonetheless reflected FEC’s desire to respond in such a way that an 
ongoing and ever-expanding war was avoided, and a political settlement 
might be reached through the precise application of force.
Conclusion
For a decade before the Vietnam War, Australia prepared to fight 
a  conventional war in Southeast Asia. The FESR was ANZAM’s 
contribution to SEATO and the force that allowed it a seat at the planning 
table. While at the strategic level Australia and the Commonwealth 
contributed to SEATO planning and alliance management, on the ground 
preparations for a regional war in Southeast Asia sometimes took second 
place to more pressing operational needs, such as the Malayan Emergency. 
Only after operations against communist guerrillas wound down did the 
FESR focus more energy on SEATO operations; by that time, political 
considerations made a deployment increasingly unlikely.
The plans developed by FEC to confront the Indonesian threat contrasted 
with its involvement in SEATO. First and foremost, the Commonwealth 
expected to fight Indonesia alone. Unlike British plans to defend the 
Kra Isthmus by itself, however, anti-confrontation plans were far more 
credible. The threat was clear, and it was immediate. Indeed, Indonesia 
had tipped its hand with incursions in Malaya. The plans themselves 
were closely aligned with political goals, which were most evident in their 
scalability. Importantly, the Commonwealth had the forces on hand to 
achieve its goals, particularly in terms of its air forces.
Confrontation was the FESR’s zenith. At a time when the Australian 
armed forces were undergoing substantial change as they grappled with 
the postwar strategic landscape, the forces sent to the FESR were a well-
balanced contribution that achieved their desired goals of deterrence 
80  ANZAM Defence Committee, ‘State of Anti-Confrontation Plans’, Agendum No.  9/65, 
3 September 1965, Annex J to CINCFE 3182/2064/3, NAA: A7942, A227.
81  Commander in Chief Far East, ‘Offensive Operations Against Indonesia: Reinforced Theatre 
Plan No. 7 (Draft) – Plan Cougar’, 1964, NAA: A1945, 245/3/14. These plans included Nightrider, 
Buxom, Haycock and Spillikin.
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and alliance maintenance. However, the British ‘East of Suez’ policy, 
and the US and Australian focus on Vietnam saw the force decline even 
before Australia’s decision to focus on the defence of the continent. 
Commonwealth involvement in the region continued briefly with the 
creation of the ANZUK force of around 7,000 from 1971, but this was 
disbanded in 1975. Australian forces remained in the region for some 
time longer: while Butterfield air base was handed to the Malaysian 
Government in 1971, RAAF squadrons were based there until 1988 
and the Australian Army continues periodic rotations of a rifle company 
to Butterworth. These vestigial involvements reflect the continued 
importance of the peninsula to Australia’s defence, and the origin of this 






The Australian commitment to the Malayan Emergency lasted from June 
1950 to June 1962. The product of Australia’s fear of a gradual communist 
takeover of Southeast Asia, this commitment never matched in size those 
made to the wars in Korea or Vietnam, and the intensity of the fighting was 
below that of Confrontation. Nevertheless, alongside the commitment to 
the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR), the contribution to the Malayan 
Emergency was one of Australia’s longest overseas deployments. The war 
itself was low-intensity. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and its 
armed wing, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), were always 
deeply reluctant to engage British Commonwealth security forces – 
particularly by the time the major Australian commitment, an infantry 
battalion group, was deployed in 1955. The result was a war of intense 
frustration, as Australian soldiers and airmen searched for a comparatively 
small number of enemy who did not want to be found and had the 
advantage of hiding in the vast jungle wilderness of northern Malaya.
Yet the experience in Malaya exerted a strong influence on how the 
Australian Army thought about how it would, and ultimately did, fight 
across Southeast Asia. The Army entered Malaya with a large practical 
knowledge of jungle warfare gained in the Second World War, but unsure 
of how that knowledge would translate to a counterinsurgency. The Army 
was right to be sceptical; while this prior understanding of how to operate 
in a jungle environment proved valuable, the nature of the Emergency 
demanded a substantially different operational framework and tactics. 
Over the course of nearly seven years, Australian units had the opportunity 
to master these, benefitting in the process from a British system that 
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had itself gone through a learning curve. The resulting understanding 
of tropical counterinsurgency would significantly influence Australian 
operations in Vietnam and beyond.
The Emergency
One of the most important factors in how the Malayan Emergency 
developed was the fact that the insurgents were almost as unprepared for 
the conflict as the government.1 The MCP formed in the 1920s and had 
been banned by British authorities prior to the Second World War. Yet the 
Japanese invasion and occupation of Malaya in 1941–42 created a mutual 
enemy that saw the MCP and the British become allies of convenience. 
By the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the MCP-controlled 
Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) numbered around 
3,500 men, armed with British weapons provided by the clandestine 
Force  136.2 While never formally legalised, the credit accrued during 
the struggle against the Japanese helped allow the MCP to function as 
a quasi-legitimate political organisation in the immediate postwar period. 
The MPAJA disbanded and either surrendered its weapons or cached 
them, while considerable effort was poured into front organisations and 
the trade union movement.3 This policy of moderation was championed 
by Lai Tek, Secretary General of the party, who had achieved an exalted 
status amongst his subordinates during the struggle against the Japanese.4
The prospects for political struggle initially seemed promising. Like 
much of Southeast Asia after the surrender of the Japanese, Malaya 
faced intense economic hardship and political uncertainty – conditions 
exacerbated by a botched series of British administrative decisions.5 
1  John Coates, Suppressing insurgency: An analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1954 (Boulder: 
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3  Cheah Boon Kheng, ‘The Legal Period: 1945–8’, in Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 
255–57.
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Largest of these was the proposal put forward in January 1946 for the 
reorganisation and consolidation of the various British-controlled polities 
in Malaya into a single Malayan Union. The proposal included generous 
provisions for citizenship for Malaya’s Chinese and Indian populations. 
This provoked an immediate backlash from Malayan leaders, one so 
strong that the British withdrew the union proposal. In its place came 
a proposal for a Federation of Malaya that, through its omission of the 
generous citizenship provisions, angered sections of the Chinese and 
Indian communities and seemingly provided the MCP with a significant 
political opportunity.6
Several factors conspired in early 1948 to shift the course of the MCP to 
armed struggle, however. The disappearance of Lai Tek in March 1947 and 
subsequent revelation he had been an agent of the British and Japanese 
left the MCP reeling and helped discredit the moderate policies he had 
championed.7 Equally important, however, was the apparent failure of 
these policies by the start of the following year. Despite the success of the 
MCP in dominating the trade union movement and initiating repeated 
and widespread industrial action, no political concessions had been 
forthcoming from the British; Lai Tek’s successor, Chin Peng, first discussed 
the possibility of a change in strategy over the sound of artillery salutes 
inaugurating the Federation of Malaya.8 On top of this, new legislation 
promised to effectively gut MCP control of the trade union movement. 
‘The prominent factor that influenced us, when we decided to take up 
arms, was the British policy at the time,’ Chin Peng later recalled. ‘We felt 
we were being cornered, gradually, back to the corner. We had nowhere 
to move.’9 As a result, at a meeting of the Central Committee between 
17 and 21 March 1948, the party resolved to adopt a new strategy.
From March onwards, the MCP prepared for an open confrontation 
with the government – a confrontation its leadership expected to happen 
around September. Yet events outran it. Violence associated with ongoing 
strikes increased, and it was in this context that three European planters 
were murdered at Sungei Siput in the state of Perak by members of the 
MCP on 16  June.10 A state of emergency was declared by the British 
6  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 8.
7  Anthony Short, The communist insurrection in Malaya 1948–1960 (London: Frederick Muller, 
1973), 41.
8  Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 119.
9  Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 117.
10  Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 18.
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Administration in parts of Perak, and extended across the entirety of 
Malaya a few days later. A belated mass police operation on 18  June 
succeeded in arresting 1,100 party members or supporters, but the 
leadership and hardcore cadres of the old MPAJA had already escaped 
into the jungle.11 Just over a year later in July 1949, in an attempt to 
expand the appeal of the struggle beyond the Chinese community, the 
military units of the party were renamed the National Liberation Army; 
the original Chinese phrase was poorly translated as the Malayan Races 
Liberation Army, and the acronym MRLA was commonly used afterwards. 
The British Commonwealth forces, for their part, described the enemy as 
‘Communist Terrorists’ and the acronym ‘CT’ became commonplace.12
The initial MCP strategy reflected the influence of Mao and called for 
a three-phase struggle in which an initial wave of terrorism and guerrilla 
activity would then allow the creation of rural base areas to support larger 
guerrilla units; in the third and final phase, the base areas would begin to 
link up, and a general revolt would be initiated in urban areas.13 It proved 
a failure, for several reasons. Rural base areas were simultaneously too 
remote from the civilian population and too vulnerable to attack by 
security forces thanks to Malaya’s well-developed road and rail network. 
Only the base area in the Betong on the Thai border was established and 
lasted, and that was thanks largely to the ability of the CTs to hide within 
Thailand.14 The party’s disorganisation and decentralisation also meant 
that little damage was actually done to the government, security forces or 
economic infrastructure in the early days of the Emergency. Indeed, for 
the first two years of the Emergency rubber and tin production actually 
increased, despite the violence.15
Despite – or perhaps because of – the MCP being caught unprepared 
by the declaration of the Emergency, and the failure of its initial Maoist 
strategy, the British Government’s response to the new insurgency was 
remarkably haphazard. The bombastic overconfidence evident in the 
July 1948 declaration by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 
Malaya, Major General Boucher, that ‘I can tell you this is by far the 
easiest problem I have ever tackled’ appears to have been common but 
11  Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 18.
12  Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 149.
13  Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 51.
14  Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 51–52.
15  Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 51–52.
119
6. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY
by no means universal within the British Administration in 1948–49.16 
Yet even those who appreciated the scale of the threat faced the problem 
of an emaciated police force, a non-existent intelligence system, an army 
untrained in jungle warfare or counterinsurgency and a government 
bureaucracy divided over what to do, how to do it and who it should be 
done by.17
The relative failure of the government response allowed the MCP to 
regroup and reformulate its thinking. While the MCP/MRLA never gave 
up its desire to create base or liberated areas, and indeed saw them as 
fundamental to victory, it did recognise from 1949 onwards that a change 
of tactics was required.18 This was driven not only by the vulnerability of 
larger units to the Commonwealth security forces, but also the difficulty 
in supplying them. Instead, smaller units began operating in the fringe 
area of jungle next to cleared or cultivated land. From here they could 
mount attacks on isolated or vulnerable targets, and receive supplies 
from the MCP Masses Organisation (Min Yuen) that operated covertly 
within settlements. The MCP intended that a sustained period of such 
attacks would attrit security force strength and build up rural support 
for the party to such a degree that the establishment of base areas would 
become possible.19
While the MCP/MRLA shift in tactics still failed to bring about 
conditions favourable to the establishment of rural base or liberated areas, 
much less victory, they did dramatically increase the scope of the security 
crisis faced by the government. A total of 2,716 ‘incidents’ were recorded 
across 1948–49; in 1950 the number jumped to 4,739 and continued 
to increase in 1951 to 6,082. As if to underline the seriousness of the 
situation, on 6 October 1951, High Commissioner Gurney and several 
members of his escort were killed when Gurney’s car was ambushed by 
an MRLA platoon 60 miles outside of Kuala Lumpur. Sixteen days later, 
on 22 October, a British platoon was also ambushed, leaving 16 dead and 
16 wounded.20
16  Stubbs, Hearts and minds, 72.
17  Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 23–41.
18  Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 59–61; Chin and Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng, 151.
19  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 11–12.
20  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 18.
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It should be noted at this point that despite the dramatic increase in 
MCP/MRLA activity and success in 1950–51, in retrospect there were 
significant structural barriers to any sort of communist victory in Malaya. 
The MCP lacked active support outside the Chinese community within 
Malaya, and even within it many had little interest in the party’s political 
program. This lack of support helped explain the MRLA’s military 
weakness; even at its largest it numbered no more than 8,000 men and 
women. Exacerbating this was the lack of external support available to the 
party. With the Thai Government hostile, and the sea and air approaches 
to Malaya dominated by the British, the MCP/MRLA was cut off from 
any kind of external help. This made it entirely reliant on supplies it could 
gain from the Min Yuen organisation in the villages, or later the Orang 
Asli tribes in the interior; and it also meant the MRLA was limited to the 
small arms it had cached after the Second World War and any weapons 
it could capture off the security forces. This further restricted the combat 
power of units, who only deployed small arms for the entire Emergency.21
These structural issues notwithstanding, the surge in communist violence 
in early 1950 finally pushed the British Administration into a stronger 
response. In March 1950 Gurney asked the British Government for 
a Director of Operations; that is, an official who could coordinate security 
forces operations against the MCP. The man eventually appointed was 
Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, an officer with a long career in 
Asia that included command of a division in Burma and subsequent 
time as GOC Burma Command between 1946 and 1947.22 Briggs 
produced an appreciation of the situation almost immediately, followed 
by a more detailed plan on 24 May 1950. As John Coates has argued, 
both documents make clear that Briggs understood that ‘the Emergency 
was not a war in the classic sense, but a competition in government’.23 
The MRLA was able to exist and commit acts of violence because of the 
supplies, recruits and information that came from the Chinese population 
close to the jungle fringe. Those supplies did not magically appear in the 
jungle; instead they were extracted by the Min Yuen, whose very presence 
indicated to the population that the government could not protect them 
and that a political alternative to the Malay Administration existed.24
21  Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 49.
22  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 13.
23  Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 82.
24  Appendix C, ‘Appreciation of the Situation in Malaya, 10 April 1950, by Lieutenant General Sir 
Harold Biggs’ in Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 203.
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Briggs thus argued that in order to restore security, the government had to 
not simply defeat the MRLA but ‘eliminate the Communist cells among 
the Chinese population to whom we must give security and whom we 
must win over’.25 The second part of this formulation was key; the physical 
security of the population would not be sufficient, and indeed would not 
be possible, without winning their active support. This in turn would 
require both effective propaganda and certain political concessions. ‘It must 
be realised that the Chinese are here for good’, Briggs wrote, ‘and such 
land as they occupy must carry promise of a permanent title subject to 
good behaviour’.26 Moreover, active government administration had to be 
extended to all communities both as a measure of control and as a way of 
winning support through the provision of services. A combination of active 
support from the community, strong administrative control measures and 
a revitalised and rebuilt intelligence system and police force would allow the 
Min Yuen to be destroyed.27 This in turn would force the MRLA, deprived 
of its supplies and already under intense pressure from army-led security 
operations, to ‘attack us on our own ground’ and thus be defeated.28
Briggs’s ideas did not represent an instantaneous solution, and his own 
timelines proved wildly optimistic. Command arrangements continued 
to prove less than optimal and were subject to a major reshuffle in early 
1951. Briggs had resigned in November 1951 due to poor health, and 
Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton ended up combining the positions 
of Director of Operations and High Commissioner into one following 
Gurney’s death.29 The man appointed to this new post, General Sir 
Gerald Templer, benefited from Lyttelton’s determination to centralise 
and streamline authority. Nor was the implementation of the Briggs Plan 
smooth. The basic issues that had dogged the authorities since the start of 
the Emergency, such as the lack of trained and capable manpower, money 
and coordination, were all still factors. The plan to resettle or relocate 
communities on the jungle fringe, primarily Chinese, was executed in 
haste and suffered accordingly.30
25  Appendix C, ‘Appreciation of the Situation in Malaya, 10 April 1950, by Lieutenant General 
Sir Harold Biggs’ in Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 203.
26  Appendix C, ‘Appreciation of the Situation in Malaya, 10 April 1950, by Lieutenant General Sir 
Harold Biggs’ in Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 204.
27  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 15.
28  ‘Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April, 1950 to November 1951’, UK Public Records 
Office (PRO): DEFE 11/47, pp. 3–5, quoted in Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 15.
29  Stubbs, Hearts and minds, 138–40.
30  David French, The British way in counterinsurgency 1945–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 180.
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Yet Briggs’s basic plan, and his conception of the conflict as a struggle of 
governance, proved sound. During Templer’s time in command between 
January 1952 and May 1954, the British hacked away at the MCP’s 
political appeal by expanding citizenship throughout the community, 
empowering local leaders and ultimately granting Malaya independence. 
This independence settlement entrenched Malayan political power but 
still succeeded in undermining the central plank of the MCP’s platform.31 
Resettlement continued and conditions inside the ‘New Villages’ improved, 
thanks in part to the provision of amenities such as electricity, running 
water, medical clinics and schools. The size and quality of the police force 
was upgraded, while the system for the collection and dissemination 
of intelligence through Special Branch was streamlined and improved. 
Templer also drove the creation of the Anti-Terrorist Operations Malaya 
pamphlet, which guided security force operations for the remainder 
of the Emergency. Increasingly eschewing the large-scale sweeps of the 
Emergency’s first few years, security forces instead built a sophisticated 
concept of operations based around food denial that fulfilled Briggs’s basic 
idea of disrupting the lines of communication between the Min Yuen and 
MRLA units in the jungle.32
By the time Templer left Malaya in May 1954, this raft of measures had 
broken the back of the insurgency. While the Emergency was far from 
over, both the number of incidents and estimated MCP/MRLA strength 
entered a steady decline that would not be reversed. The MCP, wracked 
by internal disagreements, began shifting to a policy of conservation as 
it looked to bring a negotiated end to the Emergency.33 From a peak of 
around 8,000 armed guerrillas, by mid-1955 the MRLA was down to an 
estimated strength of between 3,100 and 3,800.34 As its armed strength 
declined, the party also began to be overtaken by political events. The first 
federal elections were held in Malaya in July 1955, and full independence 
granted on 31 August 1957. Outflanked politically, the MCP concentrated 
on conserving its remaining strength in remote regions on the Thai/
Malaya border in what it termed a policy of ‘lowering the banners and 
muffling the drums’. While the party and what was left of its military 
31  French, The British way in counterinsurgency, 194; Peter Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War 
(Sydney: NewSouth Books, 2014), 57.
32  Stubbs, Hearts and minds, 168–80; Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 109–36.
33  Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 63, 69.
34  Hack and Chin, ‘The Malayan Emergency’, 20; Combined Intelligence Staff, ‘An Estimate 
of Current Armed Terrorist Strength, 10th May 1955’, n.d., Australian War Memorial (AWM): 
AWM347 208.
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forces did not finally cease armed struggle until 1989, the  threat they 
posed to Malaya had effectively been extinguished, and the Emergency 
was declared over on 12 July 1960.35
The Australian commitments, 
1950 and 1955
It was in this context that the Australian Government made two 
distinct commitments of military forces to fight in Malaya. The first 
was the dispatch of a squadron of Lincoln heavy bombers of No. 1 (B) 
Squadron, and Dakota transports of No. 38 Squadron, in June 1950 after 
a request from the British Government in April.36 While the Dakotas 
were withdrawn in 1952 due to demands imposed by the Korean War, 
the Lincolns remained until 1958. The second commitment was the 
deployment, announced by Prime Minister Menzies on 1 April 1955, of 
substantial military assets including ships of the Royal Australian Navy 
(RAN), additional Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) squadrons, an 
infantry battalion, a field artillery battery and an engineering troop as 
part of Australia’s larger commitment to the FESR.37 While the destroyers 
and frigates of the RAN, and the Canberra and Sabre aircraft of No. 2, 
No. 3 and No. 77 Squadrons RAAF, largely focused on the ‘primary role’ 
of FESR, the Army units spent their time operating against CTs. Serving 
roughly two-year tours, in total four battalions would participate in 
operations against the MRLA – initially during the Emergency and then, 
in the case of 1RAR (1 Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment) and 2RAR 
during its second tour, after its formal cessation in 1960.38
The broader strategic logic of the Australian commitments is discussed 
elsewhere in this book, and so will only be briefly covered here. The Menzies 
Government deployed forces to Malaya because, as Peter Edwards put it, 
‘like the United Kingdom Government, it saw the conflict not as merely 
a local struggle but as part of the global conflict between communism and 
35  CC Chin, ‘In Search of the Revolution: A Brief Biography of Chin Peng’ in Chin and Hack, 
Dialogues with Chin Peng, 365–70.
36  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 22–24.
37  Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, The official history of Australia’s involvement in Southeast 
Asian conflicts 1948–1975, vol. 1, Crises and commitments: The politics and diplomacy of Australia’s 
involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948–1965 (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association 
with the Australian War Memorial, 1992), 169.
38  Jeffrey Grey, A military history of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 222.
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democracy’.39 In addition, Australian deployments to Malaya achieved 
the wider objective of signalling its commitment to the defence of the 
region from communist threats and its willingness to pull its weight from 
a funding perspective. The utility of military force in Malaya in achieving 
Australian objectives was thus twofold: the Australian commitment 
contributed directly to the defeat of the MCP’s insurgency, despite being 
a small part of the overall British Commonwealth force (which by 1954 
numbered 24 British infantry battalions alone), while  the commitment 
itself – regardless of operational results – helped achieve the  goals of 
Australian alliance politics.40
This logic justified both the initial commitment of RAAF squadrons in 
1950 and the subsequent FESR commitment in 1955, and meant that in 
both cases units became small cogs in the much larger British machine. 
There is, however, one notable wrinkle in the willingness of the Menzies 
Government to cede operational control of Australian units to the British 
command in Malaya. When the issue of deploying Australian troops first 
arose for the Menzies Government in 1950, at least one Cabinet minister 
expressed his disquiet at British tactics and wondered if they could not 
learn something from an Australian Army well versed in jungle warfare 
and open to adaptation.41 These concerns led to Menzies proposing 
on 26  May 1950 to the British Government that a small mission of 
Australian officers be sent to Malaya in order to provide their expertise 
in jungle warfare to the British commanders and return information on 
British operations and tactics to the Australian Government.42 The British 
quickly accepted and the Australian officers departed Sydney on 19 July.
Known as the Bridgeford mission after its commander, Quartermaster-
General Major General W  Bridgeford, the mission also included 
Lieutenant Commander AM  Synnot (Director Staff and Training 
Requirements, Navy Office), Colonel JGN Wilton, Lieutenant Colonel 
FG  Hassett (General Service Officer Level  I, 2  Australian Division), 
Lieutenant Colonel GR  Wharfe (Commanding Officer, 5  Infantry 
Battalion), Lieutenant Colonel GS  Cox (Commanding Officer, 
45 Infantry Battalion), Major SP Weir (General Service Officer Level II, 
39  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 102.
40  Andrew Mumford, The Counter-insurgency myth: The British experience of irregular warfare (UK: 
Taylor & Francis, 2011), 33.
41  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 93–94; Dennis and Grey, Emergency and 
Confrontation, 45.
42  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 93–94.
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Directorate of Military Intelligence) and Wing Commander G  Steege 
(attached to RAAF headquarters).43 The presence of officers from the 
RAN and RAAF was not initially anticipated by Menzies and stemmed 
from the Army’s discomfort with the idea that Australian experiences in 
New Guinea had any particular relevance to the Emergency, in contrast 
to views of government ministers. In the event, Bridgeford’s final report 
largely endorsed both the Briggs Plan and the tactical methods in use by 
the British Army, laying to rest the concerns of Cabinet and confirming 
the Army’s initial impression of the situation.44
Moreover, in the four years between Bridgeford’s report and the 
deployment of 2RAR in late 1955, there had been much improvement in 
British conduct of the Emergency. In 1949 the British Army had created 
the Far Eastern Land Forces Training Centre (FTC), located from 1950 
in Kota Tinggi in Johore. Experience gradually drove a shift in tactics 
between 1950 and late 1951, from large-scale operations to smaller 
ones that emphasised patrolling, while the adoption of the Briggs Plan 
provided a new concept of operations. Briggs made clear that the role of 
the Army was to provide security for populated areas while government 
administration was restored and the Min Yuen attacked (‘framework 
operations’), and that it was to interpose itself between the units of the 
MRLA and the populated areas they relied upon for support. These 
ideas, and the tactical lessons taught at FTC, were codified at Templer’s 
insistence in late 1952 in a pamphlet entitled The conduct of anti-terrorist 
operations in Malaya (commonly abbreviated as ATOM).45
By 1953, therefore, the British had established and put into practice an 
effective system of counterinsurgency. This system relied fundamentally 
on separating the insurgents from the population in order to starve 
the MRLA of intelligence, recruits, supplies and, above all, food. This 
separation was achieved by the resettlement of population on the jungle 
fringes, an intensive program of physical control run primarily by police 
and auxiliary forces, and the use of Army units to dominate the area 
around settled areas. Templer left little doubt as to his view on the role of 
the Army, famously declaring in the introduction of ATOM that ‘the job 
of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist terrorists in 
43  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 46–47.
44  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 47–49; Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and 
commitments, 101.
45  Daniel Marston, ‘Lost and found in the jungle’ in Big wars and small wars: The British Army and 
the lessons of war in the 20th century, ed. Hew Strachan (UK: Routledge, 2009), 98–103.
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Malaya’.46 Yet where at the start of the conflict the British had emphasised 
large-scale sweep operations that had attempted to drive MCP/MRLA 
personnel within a certain area into pre-established blocking positions, 
ATOM counselled the used of many patrols and ambushes conducted 
from company or platoon ‘bases’ in the jungle to dominate an area.47
The British system also emphasised not only the need to ground 
operations in accurate intelligence but also to shape them to maximise 
the quantity and quality of intelligence generated by the operation itself. 
Thus a typical priority operation was divided into three phases. The first 
was a preparatory phase in which Special Branch built a detailed picture 
of the insurgent network in the chosen area. The second was the start of 
the operation itself, with food control measures put in place and military 
operations shaped to exacerbate those measures – in particular through 
the ambush or patrolling of areas that likely saw the transfer of supplies 
between villagers, the Min Yuen and the MRLA. The third was the use of 
a growing body of intelligence – generated by surrendered or captured 
enemy personnel (at times through torture), information discovered in 
CT camps and general military operations – to further target operations, 
further increasing the pressure on the MCP/MRLA in the area and leading 
to further contacts, captures and surrenders.48
Taken together, this meant that by the time 2RAR deployed in 1955, the 
dynamic anticipated by the Menzies Cabinet in 1950 had largely been 
reversed. It was the Australians who stood to learn, and would ultimately 
be absorbed into the British system.
Operations: 1955–63
The main body of 2RAR arrived in Malaya on 19 October 1955, and 
spent the remainder of the year training on Penang Island and in the state 
of Kedah. It began combat operations on 1 January 1956 with Operation 
Deuce in southern Kedah, and continued in that role into mid-April. 
At  the end of April it shifted to Operation Shark North in the Kuala 
Kangsar – Sungei Siput area of Perak. With only a brief pause for training 
46  General Sir Gerald Templer, ‘Foreword to the First Edition’, in The conduct of anti-terrorist 
operations in Malaya (Singapore: Directorate of Operations Malaya, 1954).
47  Chapter 7, ‘Patrolling’, in The conduct of anti-terrorist operations in Malaya.
48  Coates, Suppressing insurgency, 156–57.
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in its ‘main role’ in December 1956, the battalion would continue Shark 
North until the end of July 1957, before spending another month training 
in the ‘main role’ and then returning to Australia. The service of 3RAR, 
which arrived in Malaya in October 1957, followed a similar course. 
Its first combat operation was the still-continuing Shark North in Perak, 
which the battalion entered on 1 December and continued until mid-
January 1958. Shark North was then replaced by Operation Ginger, which 
commenced on 15 January 1958 and aimed ‘to eliminate some 220 CTs 
in the area including 31  Independent Platoon and 13/15  Independent 
Platoon, the State Committee Secretariat and Press’ through intensive 
food denial. 3RAR would continue Ginger through until its conclusion 
on 21 April 1959, and remain on operations in Perak until its eventual 
withdrawal on 12 September 1959.49
Both battalions thus spent the majority of their two-year tours conducting 
food- and contact-denial operations in central Perak, in particular the area 
in and around Sungei Siput. Although by the time 2RAR arrived in Malaya 
in late 1955 the Security Forces were in the ascendency, Perak remained 
a bastion of MCP strength. In May 1955, the Combined Intelligence 
Staff estimated that between 1,170 and 1,210 CTs were active in Perak 
or the adjoining Thai border areas; this was approximately a third of 
total estimated remaining CT strength within the Malayan Federation.50 
Moreover, the MCP was believed to enjoy widespread support within the 
state. Roughly half the non-indigenous population of the district were 
Chinese, and ‘an alarmingly high proportion’ were ‘communist supporters 
or sympathisers, either by tradition, sympathy or fear’. The remaining 
half of the populace were believed to be split evenly between Indians 
and Malays; the former were ‘dominated by Communism to a large 
extent’ while the latter were considered ‘on the whole unreliable’, with 
‘a rather indifferent attitude towards the prosecution of the Emergency 
and its associated restrictive regulations’.51 Even after nearly 18 months 
of intensive operations, Far Eastern Land Forces (FARELF) noted in 
49  See ‘Summary of Royal Australian Regiment War Diaries Malaya and Emergency’, n.d., AWM: 
AWM269 B/12/16. For torture allegations see French, The British way in counterinsurgency, 157 and 
Leon Comber, Malaya’s secret police 1945–1960: The role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 82–84, doi.org/10.1355/9789812308306.
50  Combined Intelligence Staff, ‘An Estimate of Current Armed Terrorist Strength, 10th May 
1955’, n.d., AWM: AWM347 208.
51  ‘Interim report: Operation “Shark North” 1 May – 3 Dec 1956’, n.d., AWM: AWM125 27.
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February 1957 that the Perak ‘CT organisation is wealthy and has no 
difficult in acquiring … additional funds when required. It is supported 
by the Chinese population and the Masses Organisation is strong’.52
Yet if Perak remained ‘the blackest of the black’ by the standards of the 
Emergency, it was also true that the number of CTs remained small 
compared to the overall operational area.53 Shark North aimed to destroy 
two Armed Work Forces, with a combined strength of around 20, and 
embraced an area of operations that covered 370 square miles – 80 per 
cent of which was primary jungle.54 2RAR had already learned during 
Operation Deuce just how difficult it could be to come to grips with 
the enemy. Four months of intensive patrolling produced just 18 contacts 
with the enemy and the discovery of 27 CT camps or food dumps – a rate 
of return reflecting the fact the 40 or so CTs targeted by the operation 
were spread out over an area of approximately 300 square miles.55 As one 
Australian report from March 1956 noted:
There is undoubtedly a feeling of frustration in 2RAR at the lack 
of positive results  …  Discussion with individual troops usually 
leads to a reference to ‘looking for a needle in a haystack’ and often 
to the disconcerting fact that the ‘needle’ moves about.56
Compounding such frustration was the inconclusive nature of many 
of the few encounters with CTs in the jungle that Australians did have. 
While this was broadly typical of combat in the Emergency, with the 
28 Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Standing Orders noting that ‘contacts 
with terrorists are comparatively rare and often fleeting’, a feeling existed 
within 2RAR that they were not making the most of their opportunities.57 
Of the 18 contacts the battalion experienced during Operation Deuce, 
only four were believed to have resulted in enemy casualties, leaving one 
CT dead, an estimated five wounded, and one captured. In return one 
Australian was killed by enemy fire, and one killed and one wounded in 
separate friendly fire incidents.58
52  GHQ Far East Land Forces Sitrep No 462, ‘FARELF Sitrep on the Malayan Emergency for 
Week Ending 0900 Hours 31 January 1957’, 5 February 1957, AWM: AWM347 211.
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55  ‘Incident Log “Op Deuce”’, n.d., AWM: AWM125 27.
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Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel JG  Ochiltree attributed the 
failure to convert contacts into enemy casualties in part to the nature 
of the small arms training given to the battalion at the Jungle Training 
Centre (JTC) at Canungra. Based on the Australian experience in the 
Second World War, the battalion had been instructed to shoot from the 
hip during any contact.59 This was in direct contradiction to the training 
given to British units in Malaya, which emphasised the value of taking the 
split second necessary to bring the weapon up to the shoulder and ‘ensure 
an aimed shot, thereby increasing the certainty of elimination of the all 
too elusive communist terrorist (CT)’.60
This seemingly minor point reflected Ochiltree’s broader concern that 
his battalion had not been adequately prepared for the situation it faced 
in Malaya.61 The rush to get 2RAR ready for deployment meant the 
sophisticated training apparatus built by the British for the Emergency, 
and the lessons it was designed to impart, was bypassed by the Australians. 
Ochiltree did not see a copy of Conduct of anti-terrorist operations 
in  Malaya before he landed in Malaya, and did not have time to do 
a pre-deployment reconnaissance. Nor did the battalion initially train at 
the British JTC at Kota Tinggi. Instead, it undertook a program at the 
Australian JTC at Canungra, based on Australian doctrine derived from 
the war in the Pacific between 1942 and 1945. ‘In terms of preparing 
troops physically and mentally for the rigours of the jungle, Canungra 
excelled,’ Peter Dennis later mused, ‘but whether it fitted 2 RAR for the 
anti-CT role that it was subsequently called upon to perform is much 
more problematic.’62
2RAR also learned that while the enemy was elusive, they could also pose 
great danger. On 22 June 1956 a six-man patrol was ambushed along the 
water pipeline that led from the Sungei Bemban reservoir to Sungei Siput 
by a force of between 23 and 25 guerrillas from 13/15 Platoon. The initial 
ambush killed one Australian and mortally wounded another, and it was 
only the chance presence nearby of two other patrols that prevented the 
first being overrun. When the engagement concluded, two CTs had been 
killed, one wounded and one probably wounded, while 2RAR had three 
59  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 91.
60  Major JO  Langtry, Memorandum  1/57, ‘User comments: FN Rifle and Owen Machine 
Carbine’, 9 August 1957, AWM: AWM B/7/15.
61  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 91.
62  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 91.
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killed and three wounded.63 The Australian patrol had committed the 
cardinal sin of returning to its patrol base via the same route it had used 
to go out, and blundered into a sophisticated ambush that was 100 yards 
long and studded with five improvised explosive devices.
3RAR was in some ways better prepared than its sister battalion; its time at 
Canungra emphasised fitness, constant action drills and acclimatising to 
the jungle, while a month-long stint at Kota Tinggi between 12 October 
and 18  November 1957 further refined its skills in anti-terrorist 
operations.64 Nonetheless, it encountered many of the same frustrations 
as 2RAR. For both battalions, operations in Perak consisted of a relentless 
program of ambushing and patrolling. Platoons operated on a 14-day 
roster that was broken down to two days of leave, two days of preparation 
and 10 days of patrolling. Ambushing could require watching a track, 
CT food dump or camp for over a week at a time, with the only break 
coming when individual soldiers retired to a rear area to prepare food. 
In the meantime, soldiers had to lie still, exposed to all of the elements 
of the jungle. Platoon commander Claude Ducker recalled:
You might sit on a track for a week or two at a time and it was very 
tedious of course, lying in mud, lots of leeches, and never knowing 
when the enemy was going to come along … It was a very difficult 
honed skill to be silent in an ambush for that long.65
In an effort to generate additional contacts, Commonwealth security 
forces and the Australians constantly innovated. ‘Comds must always 
be searching for new ways by which to outwit the terrorists’ noted 
the  28  Commonwealth Brigade Standing Orders. ‘Ops must NOT be 
allowed to become stereotyped. Try anything that appears a good idea.’66 
Operation Rubber Legs (23 February – 7 March 1957) and Operation 
Captain Zip (21–30 July 1957) eschewed the usual method of trying to 
push CTs into established blocking positions and ambushes in favour of 
flooding the assigned operational area with patrols in the hope that CTs 
63  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 110–13.
64  ‘Summary of Royal Australian Regiment War Diaries Malaya and Emergency’, n.d., AWM: 
AWM269 B/12/16.
65  Claude Ducker, interview, 16 May 2000, Australians at War Film Archive, No. 2562.
66  28 Commonwealth Independent Infantry Brigade GP, ‘Operational Standing Orders for the 
Emergency’, 29 December 1955, AWM: AWM347 209.
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fleeing from one would bump into another. Both operations involved 
multiple battalions from 28 Commonwealth Brigade and both ultimately 
failed to deliver results commensurate with the effort expended.67
The other significant area of innovation was the intersection between 
the desire to make better use of Commonwealth firepower, particularly 
airpower, and the problems posed by MCP/MRLA operations in deep 
jungle areas. While, as already noted, bases in the deep jungle posed serious 
political and logistical challenges for the communists, the increasing 
success of the Briggs Plan and food denial operations in the early 1950s 
made them more attractive for the MCP. Moreover, the MCP had put 
significant work into building relationships with Malaya’s indigenous 
peoples – the Orang Asli. These indigenous tribes functioned as an 
effective intelligence screen, alerting the communists to the approach of 
security force elements well in advance of their actual arrival.68 As a No. 1 
(B) Squadron’s report later argued:
What was required was a swift and accurate attack against the 
heart of the area to catch the C.T’s off balance and to shatter their 
security screen and food supply organisation; then, as soon as 
possible after the attack, the aboriginals should be won over to the 
side of the Government.69
The use of airstrikes against communist camps thus offered the possibility 
of negating the MCP’s intelligence advantage, while also justifying 
the deployment of valuable Royal Air Force (RAF) and RAAF aircraft 
in theatre at a time when questions were being asked in London and 
Canberra as to their suitability for use in the Emergency.70
No.  1 (B) Squadron RAAF was heavily involved in the first major 
operation to use these techniques, Operation TERMITE, in July 1954. 
The plan called for two flights of five Lincoln bombers each to execute 
simultaneous attacks on two suspected CT camps; three squadrons of 
22 Special Air Service Regiment would then parachute into the area to 
clear the camps and establish blocking positions. Once this had been 
done, the main force, drawn from five infantry battalions and the police, 
67  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 120–22, 130–31; ‘2RAR Operations carried 
out in Malaya 1955–1957’, n.d., AWM: AWM125 27 1, PART 1.
68  John D Leary, Violence and the dream people: The Orang Asli in the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960 
(Ohio University, Athens: Center for International Studies, 1995), 102–05.
69  Air Headquarters, Malaya, ‘Report on Operation “Termite”’, July 1955, AWM: AWM269 B/13/12.
70  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 38–39.
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would move in while airstrikes by Lincolns and de  Haviland Hornet 
fighters continued. While the operation went largely to plan, it resulted 
in the confirmed death of just 15 CTs, a seemingly low return for the 
level of investment.71 Between May and July 1956, Support Company 
2RAR conducted Operation Eagle Swoop, which aimed to use MCP 
defector Tow Sen to guide a patrol to the camp of District Committee 
Secretary Wai Shan on the Thai–Malaya border and then to destroy it 
with airstrikes.72 While Wai Shan’s camp was never located, on 24 June 
a 4-man patrol contacted a large CT camp. Two of the Australians were 
killed in the initial contact, while a nearby patrol killed one of the CT and 
wounded another as they attempted to break contact. Elements of B and 
C Company were deployed in pursuit, and both airstrikes and artillery 
were also used liberally in the hope of hurting the fleeing enemy. Such 
hopes, however, appear to have been in vain.73
One other operation illustrated both the possibilities but also the severe 
limitations of airpower in the context of the Malayan Emergency. 
In March 1958 the pilot of an Auster spotter aircraft observed five CTs 
walking through the jungle. The pilot was able to divert five Lincolns 
from No. 1 (B) Squadron who had had to abort on their primary target to 
attack this moving target, and then a subsequent strike by RAF Venoms. 
While this displayed an impressive degree of flexibility, the fact that the 
CTs escaped the initial deluge of 70 500-pound bombs from the Lincolns 
– necessitating the subsequent strike by Venoms – and that a follow-
up police patrol found no evidence that any CTs had been killed did 
seem to suggest that if CTs were the proverbial needle, airstrikes were the 
equivalent of throwing darts into the haystack and hoping for a hit.74
Although the Emergency officially ended in July 1960, Australian units 
would continue intermittent operations against the remaining CTs until 
August 1962: 1RAR from 1959 to 1961, and 2RAR from 1961 to 1963. 
Of the 609 CTs that Special Branch estimated in April 1960 to still be 
active, just 107 were believed to be within Malaya.75 The remainder lived 
on the Thai side of the Thai–Malaya border, although incursions back into 
Malaya were frequent. Ensconced in the deep jungle, the surviving MCP 
71  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 84.
72  ‘2RAR Op Instr 3/57 – Op EAGLE SWOOP’, 19 May 1957, AWM: AWM125 27, PART 1.
73  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 126–29.
74  GHQ Far East Land Forces Sitrep No 546, ‘FARELF Sitrep on the Malayan Emergency for 
Week Ending 0900 Hours 4 Sep 1958’, 6 September 1958, AWM: AWM347 211.
75  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 150.
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and MRLA communicated via courier routes and relied on the Orang 
Asli for intelligence, supplies and even recruits. Despite the complications 
introduced by the border, the security force concept of operations against 
the MCP/MRLA remained basically the same. The  first operation 
undertaken by 1RAR, Operation Bamboo (24 November 1959 – mid-
April 1960), aimed to disrupt the flow of food and supplies to the MCP/
MRLA by destroying the 12 Regiment Asal Organisation, which served 
as a conduit between the Orang Asli and the communists.76 Subsequent 
operations by the battalion (Operation Bamboo Bar, August 1960 – June 
1961) and its successor 2RAR (Operation Magnus, 1  August 1962 – 
6 October 1962, 1 May 1963 – late June 1963) had a similar focus.77
Operations during this period posed unique challenges for the Australian 
battalions. Even more so than in previous years, MCP/MRLA personnel 
were determined to avoid contact with the security forces. The standing 
orders of 1RAR noted that:
at this stage of the Emergency it appears that CTs are loath to risk 
contact with S[ecurity] F[orces], and will normally retreat with 
speed on contact, or suspicion of the presence of SF.78
In the event, the battalion did not have a single contact with a CT during 
its time in Malaya, although it found clear evidence of the presence of 
the enemy during operations. Despite conducting operations for a much 
shorter period of time 2RAR had two contacts – a successful ambush on 
4 August 1962 that left one CT wounded, and a contact on 3 May 1963 
in which the enemy escaped unharmed. So rare were contacts by mid-
1962 that the battalion executed an entire operation, Hot Trail, in an 
effort to locate the man wounded on 4 August. The man was never found, 
emphasising just how elusive the enemy had become.79 In the absence of 
CTs, the jungle remained the major threat to the Australians. Standing 
orders emphasised the need for patrols to carry sufficient supplies in case 
they became lost, kits to deal with snakebite, and the dangers posed by 
scrub typhus and leptospirosis.80
76  1RAR OO No 1, ‘Brief: “Op Bamboo” to 3 Nov 59 – final verbal briefing by IO prior to move 
into FWD bases’, 10 November 1959, AWM: AWM95 7/1/1.
77  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 150–63.
78  ‘1RAR SO’s for Anti-CT Ops’, 14 November 1959, AWM: AWM95 7/1/1.
79  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 157–63.
80  ‘1RAR SO’s for Anti-CT Ops’, 14 November 1959, AWM: AWM95 7/1/1.
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Legacy
Just over a month after 2RAR began withdrawing from operations on 
the Thai–Malaya border in June 1962, members of the Australian Army 
Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) touched down in Saigon, Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN).81 The arrival of the AATTV marked the start of  just 
over a decade of active Australian involvement in the defence of the 
RVN, a commitment that ultimately dwarfed that made to Malaya 
during the Emergency. Thirteen Australian soldiers and two airmen were 
killed on operations in Malaya between 1950 and 1963, with a further 
36 dying from non-operational causes.82 Over 400 Australians would be 
killed in action in Vietnam, with thousands more becoming casualties.83 
This disparity in numbers reflected not only differences in the size of 
the Australian commitment, but also the nature of combat. In Malaya, 
Australian battalions faced an enemy who was never encountered in groups 
larger than a reinforced platoon, whose heaviest weapons were small arms, 
and who invariably wanted to avoid contact. In Vietnam, Australian units 
faced enemies who were known to operate in battalion- or regimental-
sized groups, possessed larger numbers of modern automatic and infantry 
support weapons, and were often prepared to offer sustained resistance. 
Unsurprisingly in light of this, combat in Vietnam was not only more 
frequent than in Malaya but could also be considerably more intense.
Yet despite these differences, the experience of the Malayan Emergency 
exerted a strong influence on the Australian Army during its years in 
Vietnam. Australian doctrine, codified in 1965 in The division in battle 
series, was heavily informed by what had occurred in Malaya and by 
ATOM.84 The ideas encapsulated in The division in battle and ATOM in 
turn influenced the vision of Australian commanders in Vietnam as to 
how they should fight. In a postwar interview, Major General SC Graham, 
the second commander of 1 Australian Task Force, explained his concept 
of operations (itself an extension of that of his predecessor) as a focus on 
‘the breaking of the links between the main and local forces’. Graham 
81  Ian McNeill, The team: Australian Army advisers in Vietnam (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 
1984), 15.
82  ‘Casualties in Operational Areas’, May 1966, AWM: AWM269 B/7/17.
83  Grey, A military history of Australia, 249.
84  RN Bushby, Educating an army: Australian Army doctrinal development and the operational experience 
in South Vietnam, 1965–72 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National 
University, 1998), 16–22.
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went on to argue that ‘if we could be successful in this we would deprive 
the main forces of their supplies; their information; their recruits; their 
contact with the people and their prestige’.85 The parallels with the British 
system in Malaya are unmistakable, as is the contrast with an American 
approach that emphasised targeting not the linkages but the main 
forces themselves.86 Equally, the Australian concept of close ambushing 
– in which access to the villages of Phuoc Tuy province was denied to 
the enemy through an intensive program of ambushing at night – was 
explicitly based on experiences in Malaya. Highly successful, it formed the 
basis of Australian operations from early 1970 through until mid-1971.87
85  Major General Graham, interview, 29 March 1971, transcript at AWM: AWM107 2, 8–9.
86  Thomas Richardson, Destroy and build: Pacification in Phuoc Tuy, 1966–72 (Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 69–72, doi.org/10.1017/9781316995648.





with Indonesia and military 
commitment to Borneo, 
1964–66
Lachlan Grant and Michael Kelly
In response to the newly formed Federation of Malaysia, in 1963 the 
government of Indonesia, led by President Sukarno, adopted a policy of 
‘Konfrontasi’ (Confrontation) with the new state. As a result of this new 
and dangerous situation, following continual requests by the Malaysian 
Government, in 1965 Australia deployed troops to the Malaysian states 
of Sabah and Sarawak in North Borneo to help protect the borders from 
incursions by Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) insurgents. The events 
surrounding the Indonesian Confrontation of the Federation of Malaysia 
occurred against the backdrop of the escalating war in Vietnam, which 
has cast a long shadow over Australian experiences and memory of 
Confrontation.
The Vietnam War, lasting from 1955 to 1975 was the defining conflict 
of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Australia had sent military advisers 
to Vietnam in 1962, and then on 29 April 1965 Sir Robert Menzies’s 
Liberal Government announced the commitment of Australian troops. 
In June 1965, 1 Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR) and 
supporting units arrived in Vietnam; by 1975 some 60,000 Australians 
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had served in the conflict, and over 500 were killed.1 Yet at the time of 
Australia’s escalation of commitment to the Vietnam conflict and the 
dispatch of 1RAR, Australia was most concerned about Confrontation 
and the possibility of open conflict with Indonesia. In unison, Australia 
was committed to curbing the expansion of communism in the region, 
supporting the new nation state of Malaysia and keeping good terms with 
its closest allies. In doing so, Australia trod a fine diplomatic path to avoid 
war with its neighbour and the largest state in Southeast Asia. Where 
Vietnam escalated and demanded a significant Australian commitment, 
Confrontation would evolve into a small conflict that petered out in 
August 1966, costing the lives of 22 Australian servicemen.2 However, the 
engagement in Borneo provided important experience for the Australian 
Army in patrolling and fighting guerrilla forces and counterinsurgency 
in Southeast Asia ahead of significant deployments to Vietnam.
Creation of Malaysia and Indonesian 
retaliation
In 1961 a proposal was put forward by the Malayan prime minister, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, to create a new nation state, the Federation of Malaysia. 
This would combine the current states of Malaya, Singapore and the 
British territories of North Borneo (to be renamed Sabah), Sarawak and 
the Sultanate of Brunei. Britain came to support the proposal. Brunei 
would later withdraw from discussions, the benefits for the oil-rich 
territory being less appealing than for its neighbours, and subsequently 
did not become part of Malaysia. The proposal was opposed by Indonesia, 
who shared a border with Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo. Sukarno declared 
the Malaysia proposal neo-colonialism, painting Tunku as a puppet of the 
British.3 An unsuccessful revolt in Brunei by the ‘North Borneo National 
Army’, with clandestine Indonesian support, in December 1962 increased 
tensions. The instigators of the rebellion were cadres who had received 
both military training and political indoctrination in Indonesia, and their 
1  Ashley Ekins with Ian McNeill, Fighting to the finish: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 
1968–1975 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 828, 834.
2  Figures from the Australian War Memorial’s Roll of Honour, www.awm.gov.au/advanced-
search/ people?roll=Roll%20of%20Honour&facet_related_conflict_sort=16%3AIndonesian%20
Confrontation %2C%201962-1966 (accessed 27 June 2018).
3  Peter Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War (Sydney: NewSouth Books, 2014), 81–82.
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aim was not to overthrow the sultan but to protest Malaysia’s federation. 
The revolt was short-lived and put down by British forces, some of whom 
were ferried from Singapore by a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft of the 
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).4
A diplomatic feud ensued, and resulted in Indonesia declaring a policy of 
Confrontation. This was formally announced by the Indonesian foreign 
minister Dr Subandrio on 20 January 1963.5 What was specifically meant 
by the term ‘confrontation’ was not defined, but the intention by the 
Indonesians was probably to use bluff, both diplomatic and militarily, 
as it had to wrest West New Guinea from the Dutch. But unlike the 
Netherlands, Malaysia had strong diplomatic and military support from 
its allies: Britain, Australia and New Zealand.6
Australia’s response
Diplomatically, Australia was placed in a difficult position. It wanted 
to support the new state of Malaysia but avoid war with Indonesia. 
A  concerted approach in partnership with its major allies, Britain and 
the United States, proved difficult as both had fundamentally different 
policies.7 The Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement between Britain and 
Malaya, entered into following Malaya’s independence in 1957, ensured 
Britain’s commitment to the defence of Malaysia. Australia came under 
pressure from Britain to commit to the defence of Malaysia, but had its 
own regional concerns. It was important to Australian forward defence 
strategy to encourage Britain and the United States to remain committed 
to security in Southeast Asia.
4  Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, The official history of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian 
conflicts 1948–1975, vol. 5, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian military operations in Malaya and 
Borneo 1950–1966 (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 
1996), 175–76; Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, The official history of Australia’s involvement 
in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948–1975, vol. 1, Crises and commitments: The politics and diplomacy of 
Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948–1965 (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin and the 
Australian War Memorial, 1992), 257.
5  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 258.
6  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 171–73.
7  David Lee and Moreen Dee, ‘Southeast Asian conflicts’, in Facing north: A century of Australian 
engagement with Asia, vol. 1, 1901 to the 1970s, ed. David Goldsworthy (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2001) 270.
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However, where Prime Minister Menzies was keen to support Britain, the 
Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, and his departmental 
officials wanted to proceed cautiously. They were fundamentally aware 
that Britain and the United States could abandon the region, and since 
Australia and Indonesia would always be neighbours, Barwick proceeded 
on a path to try and avoid risking hostility with Indonesia. The resulting 
Cabinet decision on 5 February 1963 was to support Malaysia, and make 
clear to Indonesia Australia’s disproval of its campaign. While pursuing this 
path of avoiding conflict while expressing disapproval for Confrontation, 
it was also desirable to improve relations with Indonesia.8 Thus, Australia 
kept its relationship with Indonesia steady and meetings between officials 
continued – such as cooperating on the demarcation of the border 
between Papua New Guinea and West Irian – and Indonesian students 
were still welcome under Australian training programs, and development 
aid continued to be provided under the Colombo Plan. Notably, during 
Confrontation a small number of Indonesian army officers remained 
enrolled at the Australian Army’s Staff College.9
It was quite a balancing act, which occupied the Australian Government 
for over 12 months from early 1963 until 1964, in which time Malaysia 
had officially come into being on 16  September 1963. Barwick, his 
department and ambassadors in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta worked 
tirelessly throughout the year, urging restraint on both sides.10 During 
this period, Barwick was accused of ‘appeasement’ by sections of the press 
and opposition, a word that derived negative connotations associated 
with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s handling of Adolf 
Hitler’s Nazi Germany prior to the outbreak of the Second World 
War.11 Regardless of these accusations in Australia, Sukarno recognised 
that Australian policy was distinct from those of Britain and the United 
States. On 16 September 1963, mobs in Jakarta protesting the creation 
of Malaysia attacked the British and Malaysian embassies: the British 
embassy was burnt down, but the Australian embassy was left alone.12
In contrast to Britain, the United States was concerned by military 
intervention against Indonesia over the defence of Malaysia. The United 
States wished to develop long-term ties with Indonesia, and did not want 
8  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 258–59.
9  Lee and Dee, ‘Southeast Asian conflicts’, 273.
10  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 262–63.
11  ‘Barwick accused on appeasement’, The Canberra Times, 17 May 1963, 10.
12  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 262–63.
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them falling into the communist bloc, knowing that the Communist Party 
of Indonesia was a pillar of support to the Sukarno presidency (and may 
become more influential) and that the Indonesian military build-up had 
been enabled by extensive loans from the Soviet Union.13
There was a widespread concern in Australia, amid both government and 
the general public, as to the extent to which the United States might 
support Australia militarily under the Australia, New Zealand and United 
States (ANZUS) Treaty if war broke out with Indonesia. The messages from 
the United States were mixed. When asked by Prime Minister Menzies in 
a meeting on 7 June 1963 about the application of the ANZUS Treaty 
should Australian troops defending Malaya come under attack, United 
States Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Averell Harriman was 
positive that ‘the ANZUS Treaty would, according to the advice given to 
the United States Administration by its lawyers, come into operation’.14 
United States President John F Kennedy was concerned when he learned 
of Harriman’s statement, and the matter was discussed with Menzies 
who sought further clarification when he met with President Kennedy 
during a visit to Washington on 8 July. The ultimate outcome of these 
discussions in June and July, as the Australian Government concluded, 
was that the American reassurances meant Malaysia was now considered 
part of the Pacific under the terms of the ANZUS Treaty.15
Regardless, US support was lukewarm and included qualifications that 
the United States would act if there were an ‘armed attack by Indonesian 
armed forces, on the armed forces, public vessels or aircraft of Australia 
in Malaysia’, but only if the attack was ‘overt’ rather than ‘subversion, 
guerrilla warfare or indirect aggression’. Further, the involvement of 
American troops was excluded; limiting support to ‘air and sea forces 
and to provide logistics’ and any action needed to be ‘subject to the 
constitutional processes of the United States’.16
13  Lee and Dee, ‘Southeast Asian conflicts’, 271; Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 
258.
14  Report of meeting with Mr Averell Harriman, United States Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, in the Cabinet Room, Parliament House, Canberra, ‘Malaysia – Application of ANZUS Treaty’, 
7 June 1963, National Archives of Australia (NAA): A1209, 1963/6587.
15  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 265–67.
16  Washington memorandum, ‘ANZUS – Interpretation – Malaysia’, 17 October 1963, NAA: 
A1838, 270/1/1, Part 1.
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Although Australia did not commit troops to Borneo in the face 
of continued requests by Britain and Malaysia during the second half of 
1963, it did hold discussions with the British to plan such a scenario.17 
In December 1963, the British and Malaysians asked Australia to send 
an infantry battalion and a squadron of the Special Air Service (SAS) 
to Borneo. At this point, Australia agreed that 3  Battalion, the Royal 
Australian Regiment (3RAR), recently arrived on the Malaysian peninsula 
as part of the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR), be posted on the Thai–
Malaysian border for anti-terrorist operations, so as to free up a Malaysian 
battalion for service in Borneo. Following a second request in April 1964 
along similar lines, Australia committed a squadron of army engineers to 
Sabah, and two Royal Australian Navy (RAN) minesweepers for patrol 
duties in Borneo waters.18 British and Malaysian units in Borneo at this 
point numbered 10 battalions, and 187 contacts with insurgents had been 
reported in the 12 months since April 1963.19
At this time, the Australian Government decided against sending the 
requested infantry battalion and SAS squadron, as it risked involving 
direct  contact with Indonesian forces. It recognised the possibility of 
their need in future but felt the British and Malaysian forces present were 
equipped to deal with the current threat. In May 1964 Prime Minister 
Menzies wrote to his British counterpart, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 
outlining Australia’s position. While being ‘sensitive to the burden you 
are carrying in Malaysia’, wrote Menzies, ‘we face an unhappy choice’. 
He felt there was ‘no pressing military requirement to commit Australian 
combat forces to action in Borneo at this stage of covert aggression’.20 
The  following week, the government reaffirmed Australia’s position to 
assist the defence of Malaysia gradually while not giving up on the prospect 
of ‘persuading Indonesia by political means to call off confrontation’.21
Throughout 1963 and 1964, Australian foreign and defence policies 
were dominated by discussion of Confrontation. The situations in both 
Borneo and Vietnam were monitored closely, but by the end of 1964, 
17  Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War, 87.
18  Department of External Affairs outward cablegram, ‘The military situation in Borneo’, 22 May 
1964, NAA: A1209 1964/6040, PART 1.
19  Attachment to Defence Committee Minute No. 26/1964, NAA: A1209 1964/6040, PART 1.
20  Message, Sir Robert Menzies to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 15 May 1964, NAA: A1209 1964/6040, 
PART 1.
21  Department of External Affairs outward cablegram, ‘The military situation in Borneo’, 22 May 
1964, NAA: A1209 1964/6040, PART 1.
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Confrontation was still considered the ‘only direct threat to Australia and 
its territories’.22 Nevertheless, Paul Hasluck, who in April 1964 replaced 
Garfield Barwick as Minister for External Affairs, was more aligned to 
the view of the United States that the situation in Vietnam was a more 
significant threat than Confrontation. Events in the second half of 1964 
and early 1965 changed Australia’s position leading to the deployment 
of troops to Borneo.
In August, the Gulf of Tonkin incident in Vietnam led to the escalation 
of American involvement in South Vietnam, which was to be supported 
by an increased Australian commitment. The same month, Indonesian 
paratroopers landed on the Malaysian peninsula. They were quickly 
rounded up, with assistance from 3RAR. These two separate events 
had increased regional tensions and Australian commitments to both 
conflicts.23
A response to these developments was the introduction of conscription 
in  November 1964 to increase the size of the Australian Army. This 
saw the passing of the National Service Act 1964 (Cth) by parliament. 
By the final month of 1964, Australia and Britain were planning military 
responses to further unprovoked attacks by Indonesia. These plans 
included an agreement for the Royal Air Force to use Darwin as a ‘strike 
base’ in northern Australia for reprisal attacks on targets in Indonesia.24 
On 1 January 1965, Sukarno announced that Indonesia was withdrawing 
from the United Nations, in a direct protest of Malaysia gaining a non-
permanent seat on the Security Council. Sukarno also became more 
extreme in his pronouncements, and relations between Indonesia and 
China had firmed, with talk of a ‘Beijing–Jakarta axis’ or ‘Beijing–Jakarta–
Hanoi–Phnom Penh–Pyongyang’ alliance.25 Such talk linked the conflicts 
in Vietnam and Borneo, raising US concerns about the influence, or 
possible takeover, of the communist party in Indonesia. As historian Peter 
Edwards has stated, ‘the Australian government faced its most acute crisis 
in foreign policy since 1945’.26
22  Edwards, Australia’s Vietnam War, 99.
23  Edwards, Australia’s Vietnam War, 98–103.
24  Message, Sir Robert Menzies to Mr Harold Wilson, ‘Chronological exchanges of information with 
UK government on Malaysian confrontation’, 8 December 1964, NAA: A1939, TS687/9/3, PART 1.
25  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 340.
26  Edwards, Australia’s Vietnam War, 104.
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During this time, Indonesia had been moving more troops to Borneo and 
positioning them near the borders of Sabah and Sarawak.27 In December 
1964, British intelligence sources estimated that the Indonesians had 
placed 10,000 combat troops in Kalimantan. They were being reinforced 
by the equivalent of another six more brigades and it was expected that they 
would be ready for operations by late January or early February 1965.28 
To  meet the growing threat to Malaysia and the Indonesian military 
build-up in Kalimantan, Australia agreed in January 1965 (announced 
publicly in February) to send 3RAR and an SAS squadron to Borneo.
3RAR arrives
When Confrontation began in December 1962, there was barely a full 
British brigade in Borneo, but by March 1965, there were some 17,000 
Commonwealth troops deployed across four infantry brigades: the West 
Brigade consisted of five battalions and had responsibility for 290 kilometres 
of the Kalimantan border; the Mid-West Brigade had two battalions and 
covered 707 kilometres; the Central Brigade had two battalions and covered 
427 kilometres; and the East Brigade, which covered the eastern extremity 
of Sarawak and all of Sabah, had three battalions covering 130 kilometres. 
All four brigades were controlled by the Director of Borneo Operations 
(DOBOPs) from his headquarters on Labuan.29
3RAR was warned to prepare for deployment to Borneo on 13 February 
where the battalion would relive 1/7 Gurkha Rifles in West Brigade, located 
in Sarawak.30 In the lead-up to the deployment, 3RAR had received lessons 
on conducting operations in Borneo as well as weapons training.31 During 
February and early March, 3RAR’s commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel 
Bruce McDonald, and other officers of the battalion, visited Sarawak to 
27  Message, Mr Harold Wilson to the Rt Hon John McEwan, 15 January 1965, NAA: A1939, 
TS687/9/3 PART 1.
28  Joint Intelligence Committee report on the military situation in Malaysia, ‘Borneo territories – 
Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei – Confrontation’, 13 January 1965, NAA: A1838, TS696/14/1.
29  David Horner and Jean Bou, ed., Duty first: The Royal Australian Regiment in war and peace (North 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990), 160.
30  ‘3 Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, narrative, annexes [1–28 Feb 1965]’, Australian War 
Memorial (AWM): AWM 95 7/3/45, 6.
31  ‘3 Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, narrative, duty officer’s log, annexes [1–31 Mar 1965]’, 
6–7, AWM: AWM 95 7/3/46; Ian Kuring, Redcoats to Cams: A history of Australian infantry 1788–2001 
(Loftus: Australian Military History Publications in association with the Australian Army History Unit, 
2004), 309.
145
7. AUSTRALIA’S CONFRONTATION WITH INDONESIA AND MILITARY COMMITMENT TO BORNEO
gain an appreciation of the area that the battalion would be operating in. 
At the same time, other battalion officers were being sent to South Vietnam 
to gain an appreciation of the situation there as well.32
The main body of 3RAR arrived off Kuching in mid-March, having sailed 
from Terendak aboard the Royal Marine Commando fast troop transport, 
the converted Royal Navy aircraft carrier, HMS Albion.33 The Australian 
companies were flown directly from the flight deck to their forward bases 
with the Gurkhas being brought out on the return journey. 3RAR was 
seconded to West Brigade, which was commanded by Brigadier William 
Cheyne.34 West Brigade was under the most direct threat from Indonesian 
forces as the capital Kuching was less than 50 kilometres from the border. 
By December 1964, Indonesia had moved eight regular companies of 
up to 200 men and 11 irregular companies to the area, which presented 
a clear and immediate danger to the capital of Sarawak.
3RAR was given the most direct line of advance to Kuching as its area of 
operations. The battalion was responsible for a zone around 48 kilometres 
long and 48  kilometres in depth along the border. Three of the rifle 
companies occupied company bases along the border; the fourth rifle 
company and battalion headquarters were located south of Kuching.35 
3RAR was considered by the British to be a ‘veteran’ battalion, with many 
of its members having served during the Second World War, the Malayan 
Emergency and the more recent operations hunting Communist Terrorists 
along the Malay–Thai border and rounding up Indonesian infiltrators 
in mainland Malaysia. Unlike British battalions, who had to serve one 
operational tour in either Sarawak or Sabah before being able to conduct 
Claret operations – top-secret, cross-border incursions by Commonwealth 
forces – the Australians would take part in these operations after only 
a month of acclimatisation in North Borneo.36
A Company, which had arrived in Sarawak the week prior, had been sent 
to Stass, where patrols began immediately. B Company was deployed to 
Bukit Knuckle and C Company to Serrikin. Battalion headquarters and 
D Company were flown to Bau. The handover was completed at 11:00 am 
32  ‘3 Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, narrative, duty officer’s log, annexes [1–31 Mar 1965]’, 
AWM: AWM 95 7/3/46, 5–10.
33  Kuring, Redcoats, 303.
34  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 246.
35  Kuring, Redcoats, 303.
36  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 246.
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on 23 March.37 The seriousness of their task was brought home sharply 
to the men of 3RAR that afternoon when members of a patrol from 
3 Platoon, A Company triggered a mine near the Sarawak–Kalimantan 
border. Sergeant Reg Weiland was killed instantly and a local Iban tracker, 
Mudah anak Jali, died of his wounds some 15 minutes later while being 
carried out of the jungle. Another three men were wounded.38 The same 
platoon suffered a second fatal mine incident on 17 May when Private 
Larry Downes triggered a mine and was killed along with Sergeant Vince 
Vella, who had replaced Reg Weiland as acting platoon sergeant.39
The company bases that the Australians occupied were a key feature 
of the operations against Indonesia. They were not static defensive 
positions, rather bases from which patrols could deploy on local tasks and 
cross-border operations. A full rifle company could be housed there, as 
well as the supporting artillery or mortars. Corporal Bob Wyssenbach of 
B Company, 3RAR, recalled that after arriving at Bukit Knuckle:
one platoon had to move out immediately for four days, the other 
two platoons had to double up at the fort for two days, then one 
move out … thus setting the pattern … four days out on patrol 
and two days in [Company] base.40
The same pattern was followed in the other company bases. The bases 
also gave the remote border people a sense of security, knowing that any 
incursion by Indonesian soldiers would be swiftly dealt with. The forward 
company bases were resupplied by helicopter, as no roads stretched that 
far south.41
Following the first mine incident, 3RAR maintained border patrols, 
including ‘hearts and minds’ operations. Much like the Malayan 
Emergency, ‘hearts and minds’ operations were key to keeping the local 
populace on side, especially as many of them had relatives in Kalimantan. 
The Australians were also faced with having to deal with the sizeable 
Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO), based mainly around 
the Bau area. Though the CCO was meant to be handled by Malaysian 
security forces, the Australians remained aware of the threat they posed. 
37  ‘3 Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, narrative, duty officer’s log, annexes [1–31 Mar 1965]’, 
AWM: AWM 95 7/3/46, 15.
38  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 266.
39  Bob Wyssenbach, ‘Bukit Knuckle (Borneo Campaign 1962–1966)’, in We were there in the 
R.A.R., ed. Bill Parry (Baguio City, Philippines: Immaculate Heart Printhall, 2005), 50.
40  Wyssenbach, ‘Bukit Knuckle’, 57.
41  Kuring, Redcoats, 305.
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Australian patrols moved slowly and took care not to use worn tracks. 
Tracks, it was thought, could be mined or ambushed by the Indonesians. 
With the border area being mountainous and covered in thick jungle, 
contact was usually initiated by those in static positions. When patrol 
contacts did occur, Australian and other Commonwealth forces fired first 
70 per cent of the time and inflicted greater casualties at a rate of 1 to 12.7 
Indonesians.42 But it was the Claret operations that succeeded beyond all 
expectations by destabilising Indonesian efforts, causing heavy casualties 
and pushing the enemy back from the border with Sarawak.
Claret operations: Patrolling the border
Operation Claret came about in response to Indonesia’s increasingly hostile 
cross-border incursions into Sarawak, Sabah and mainland Malaysia during 
1964. Britain’s parliament authorised the cross-border operations in July, 
following Malaysia’s concern that Indonesia’s continued attempts to land 
troops by air and sea on its mainland, as well as the increasing incursions 
into Sarawak and Sabah, would lead to an escalation of the conflict.43
Major General Walter Walker, as DOBOPs, pushed for permission to 
cross the border into Kalimantan with the aim of throwing Indonesian 
forces off balance, thereby gaining the initiative. He understood the 
application of low-intensity operations, having been one of the key 
architects of the successful counterinsurgency during the Malayan 
Emergency.44 To maintain operational security and minimise the risk of 
any escalation of the fighting, Walker drew up a strict set of regulations 
with which Claret operations would be prosecuted. Known as the ‘golden 
rules’, these were:
1. Every operation will be authorised by DOBOPs.
2. Only trained and tested troops would be used.
3. Depth of penetration must be limited and the attacks must 
only be made to thwart offensive action by the enemy.
42  Bob Hall, Andrew Ross, and Derrill de Heer, Comparative study: Combat operations in North 
Borneo (Indonesian Confrontation) and 1ATF in Vietnam (Sydney: University of New South Wales, 
2012), 57.
43  Will Fowler, Britain’s secret war: The Indonesian Confrontation 1962–66 (Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing, 2006), 24.
44  John A  Nagl, Learning to eat soup with a knife: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 97–98.
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4. No air support will be given to any operation across the border, 
except in the most extreme of emergencies.
5. Every operation must be planned with the aid of a sand table 
and thoroughly rehearsed for at least two weeks.
6. Each operation will be planned and executed with maximum 
security. Every man taking part must be sworn to secrecy, full 
cover plans must be made and the operations to be given code-
names and never discussed in detail on telephone or radio. 
Identity discs must be left behind before departure and no 
traces – such as cartridge cases, paper, ration packs, etc. – must 
be left in Kalimantan.
7. On no account must any soldier taking part be captured by the 
enemy – alive or dead.45
The border crossings were authorised by the British Government with 
an initial depth of 5,000 yards (about 4,500 metres). This was to keep 
troops within support range of artillery and mortars, but this distance 
was increased to 10,000  yards by the end of 1964.46 Some operations 
conducted by the SAS went up to and beyond 20,000 yards. The golden 
rules, including the incursion depths, were adapted as the campaign 
went on, but the security and planning elements were strictly adhered 
to, and Walker later credited to them the minimising of Commonwealth 
casualties.47 As 3RAR made ready to deploy to Sarawak, Walker handed 
over as DOBOPs to Major General George Lea, who was the polar 
opposite to Walker in demeanour. However, the quiet and considered Lea 
continued to use the golden rules when planning operations.48
During its time in Sarawak, 3RAR carried out 32  Claret operations, 
which resulted in four major contacts with Indonesian regular forces, all 
of which were Australian-initiated ambushes. The last of these, known 
as Operation Blockbuster, conducted by 2  Platoon, A  Company and 
an attached forward observation officer (FOO) party, was the most 
successful. The total strength of the ambush party was two officers and 
32 other ranks.49 The operation was authorised after Second Lieutenant 
45  Fowler, Britain’s secret war, 24; Raffi Gregorian, ‘CLARET operations and Confrontation, 
1964–1966’, Conflict Quarterly: Journal of the Centre for Conflict Studies 11, no. 1 (1991): 54.
46  Horner, Duty first, 165.
47  Gregorian, ‘CLARET operations and Confrontation’, 54.
48  David Horner, SAS: Phantoms of war, a history of the Australian Special Air Service (Crows Nest: 
Allen & Unwin, 2002), 78.
49  ‘Operation Blockbuster’ After Action Report (AAR), 16 June 1965, document held in private 
collection.
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Douglas Byers’s platoon located an east–west track in Kalimantan that had 
shown signs of recent use. The ambush party spent three days in position 
before hearing the approach of their quarry. The Indonesians apparently 
believed they were safe as they moved openly along the trail and were 
talking loudly, had their weapons slung and were tightly bunched up.
When about 25  men had entered the killing zone, Byers initiated the 
ambush by standing up and opening fire with his Owen Machine Carbine 
at a range of no more than 6 yards. The resulting fusillade resulted in 
heavy casualties to the Indonesians with at least 12 men killed outright. 
Three men at the head of the group attempted to escape along the track, 
but were killed instantly when a cut-off group fired two Claymore mines. 
The Indonesians responded with small arms, machine gun and mortar 
fire. The FOO, Lieutenant Stephen Overton, Royal Artillery, called 
in fire support in the form of artillery and mortars, which silenced the 
Indonesian mortar and was believed to have inflicted further heavy 
casualties on the Indonesians. Overton continued to call in fire as Byers 
called for the withdrawal of the ambush patrol; by the following morning 
they reached their company base at Stass.
The operation had been entirely successful with 25 Indonesians confirmed 
killed, but the final tally was thought to be up to 50 killed, due to the 
accurate artillery fire brought down by Overton. The Australians had 
suffered two men wounded: one by small arms the other by mortar fire.50 
Byers was awarded a Military Cross for his actions during the operation. 
Brigadier Willian Cheyne later stated that ‘the perfect ambush only 
happens once in a while but this is one of those occasions’.51 After four 
and half months, 3RAR was replaced by 2/10  Gurkhas. In September 
they were relieved at Terendak by 4RAR. By the end of its operational 
tour in Borneo, 3RAR had suffered three men killed, all by mines, and 
five wounded.52
After several months of training, 4RAR deployed to Sarawak in April 
1966; this was the first time that national servicemen were deployed on 
operations with the Australian Army. 4RAR joined West Brigade and was 
sent to the Bau area, where the battalion occupied similar positions to 
those of 3RAR the year before. As the battalion had a high number of 
50  ‘Operation Blockbuster’ AAR, 16 June 1965.
51  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 277.
52  Kuring, Redcoats, 304.
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officers and non-commissioned officers with previous active service, and 
a number of men from 3RAR who had already served in Borneo in 1965, 
Brigadier Cheyne considered the battalion to be ‘tried and tested’.53 Patrols 
on the Malaysian side of the border were constant, and 4RAR began 
Claret operations in early May. At least a dozen Claret reconnaissance 
operations had been completed by the time cross-border operations were 
suspended later in the month due to the start of peace talks between 
Malaysia and Indonesia.
The suspension of Claret operations led to an increase in the rate of 
Indonesian incursions into Sarawak. In June, Major General Lea authorised 
Claret operations to recommence to once again push the Indonesians 
back from the border of Sarawak and keep their attempted operations off 
balance. 4RAR fought its most significant action on 15 June 1966, when 
C Company was involved in a series of rolling firefights with a 10-man 
Indonesian patrol on the Sarawak side of the border. The initial contact 
was made by 8 Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Doug Byers MC, who 
had transferred to 4RAR at the end of 3RAR’s deployment. During the 
first contact, the Indonesians broke into two groups of five and began to 
withdraw, with one of the groups evading the Australians and escaping 
back into Kalimantan. 8 Platoon pursued the other group and pushed 
it into an ambush, which was initiated by 9 Platoon. Four Indonesians 
were subsequently killed and 4RAR’s only combat loss occurred during 
the action when Private Vic Richards was shot in the stomach and 
mortally wounded. He died from his wounds several days later.54 4RAR’s 
operational tour came to an end on 11 August 1966 when the peace treaty 
between Malaysia and Indonesia was signed. The battalion left Borneo 
soon after and was back at Terendak at the end of the month.55
Australian SAS operations
The Australian SAS saw active service for the first time during 
Confrontation with both 1 and 2 SAS squadrons being deployed. Led by 
Major Alf Garland, 1 SAS Squadron arrived in Brunei in mid-February 
53  Brian Avery, Our secret war: The 4th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment: defending Malaysia 
against Indonesian confrontation, 1965–1967 (Melbourne: Slouch Hat Publications, 2002), 126.
54  AWM 152 Roll of Honour cards: Sabah/Sarawak, 311512 Private Victor Herbert Richards, 4th 
Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment; Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 293.
55  Kuring, Redcoats, 305.
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1965 and served in the border regions of Sabah and Sarawak. 2  SAS 
Squadron, commanded by Major Jim Hughes, arrived at Kuching in 
January 1966 and operated in the western side of Sarawak. For their 
respective deployments, both squadrons were attached to the British 
22 Special Air Service Regiment, which came under the direct control 
of DOBOPs. The SAS’s primary role was reconnaissance. Both SAS 
squadrons adopted the British four-man patrol set-up, which gave them 
the ability to deploy more patrols and cover more ground. It was thought 
that smaller patrols would be less easy to detect, and if enemy contact 
did occur, the ‘shoot and scoot’ method would be applied, which meant 
delivering a large amount of initial firepower, followed by rapid fire and 
movement away from the contact point.56
With 1 SAS Squadron based in Brunei Town and 2 SAS Squadron in 
Kuching, the only way the patrols could be effectively deployed was by 
helicopter. Patrols would be dropped off at cleared landing sites near the 
Kalimantan border, after which they would patrol on foot across into 
Kalimantan. Soon after arriving, both squadrons deployed on lengthy 
patrols, primarily to familiarise themselves with their operational areas and 
conduct ‘hearts and minds’ operations among the border tribes, providing 
medical aid and gathering intelligence with which to assist planning of 
future operations. During their deployment both 1 and 2 SAS squadrons 
conducted numerous deep reconnaissance operations into Kalimantan, 
which yielded valuable intelligence and identified numerous Indonesian 
bases, and on several occasions the SAS also conducted ambushes against 
Indonesian troops. On 21 July 1965 a 10-man patrol by 1 SAS Squadron 
ambushed a boat with six Indonesian soldiers, all armed and carrying 
kit bags. All six Indonesians were killed, after which the SAS patrol 
withdrew. Indonesian soldiers in the area opened fire in all directions in 
a clumsy effort to locate the Australians, who made it to their exfiltration 
point unharmed.57
The cancellation of Claret operations in late May 1966 proved frustrating 
for 2  SAS Squadron. Recently arrived in Borneo, they had conducted 
a number of familiarisation patrols and were preparing to deploy across the 
border. The squadron did complete a number of Claret operations when 
Claret was reactivated in June in response to an Indonesian incursion, 
56  Kuring, Redcoats, 308.
57  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 305.
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and though these were predominantly reconnaissance patrols, there were 
a  number of contacts with Indonesian troops. 2  SAS Squadron’s tour 
ended on 21 July, after which it left Borneo and returned to Perth.58
The Australian SAS suffered three men killed over the course of two 
deployments. In early June 1965 a four-man reconnaissance patrol 
met with disaster when it disturbed a wild elephant in the jungle. The 
elephant, which had a broken tusk, charged the patrol, goring Lance 
Corporal Paul Denehey under his ribcage. The limited size of the patrol 
and the nature of the terrain meant that extracting Denehey, who was 
a tall man, by stretcher was extremely difficult. With the patrol radio 
damaged and only able to send signals, the patrol members were unaware 
if their calls for assistance had been heard. With no helicopters able to 
enter Indonesian airspace, the patrol commander and another man were 
forced to walk to the extraction point to find assistance. Along the way 
they were stalked by the elephant and were forced to evade the animal. The 
third trooper, after running low on medical supplies, also left Denehey to 
look for assistance. Sadly, by the time help did arrive, Denehey had died 
a lonely and agonising death.59
Further misfortune occurred during 2  Squadron’s deployment. 
On  21  March 1966 two members of a patrol, Lieutenant Ken ‘Rock’ 
Hudson and Private Bob Moncrieff, were swept away and drowned while 
attempting to cross the flooded Sekayan River in darkness and driving 
rain. The remaining two troopers survived and made their way out of the 
jungle. Despite an 11-day search by another patrol, their remains were 
unable to be located and both men were declared dead on 1 April.60 Local 
villagers had recovered and buried Hudson’s and Moncrieff ’s remains, 
which were located and positively identified in 2010 by the Australian 
Army’s Unrecovered War Casualties team, with support from the 
Indonesian Armed Forces.61
58  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 308.
59  Horner, SAS, 110–21.
60  Horner, SAS, 158–60.
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Australian artillery, engineers and 
signallers in Borneo
Australian artillerymen, engineers and signallers played vital roles during 
Confrontation. The regular units of the Royal Australian Artillery had 
replaced their 25-pounder guns with the Italian-made L5 105 mm Pack 
Howitzer, which was light and easy to break down, making it ideal for 
transport by helicopter to remote company bases. Australian artillerymen 
served at company bases in Sarawak and Sabah, and provided vital gunfire 
support and FOO parties to Commonwealth troops on local and Claret 
operations.62 Prior to deploying to Borneo, gunners from 102  Battery 
had served as infantry with 3RAR, hunting Communist Terrorists along 
the Malay–Thai border, and had also assisted in rounding up Indonesian 
infiltrators who had been landed south of Terendak in October 1964.63 In 
the context of Confrontation, Australia also contributed assets to defend 
installations on the Malaysian peninsula against possible Indonesian 
attacks, and 111  Light Anti-Aircraft Battery was sent to the Royal 
Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base Butterworth to provide air defence. 
The battery did not have to fire a shot in anger, and after 26 months of 
service the unit returned to Australia.64
Royal Australian Engineer Field and Construction Squadrons were also 
deployed to Borneo from 1964 and were employed on a variety of tasks, 
which included road and airfield construction and maintenance. Many 
engineers became friendly with the local people and conducted ‘hearts and 
minds’ operations, building infrastructure such as schoolhouses and wells. 
Some of these projects were done during off-duty hours. Engineers also 
carried out surveying operations, the results of which were used to provide 
more accurate maps to the infantry and SAS.65 Australian signallers served 
with British signals units at Labuan and Singapore during Confrontation. 
The nature of their work collecting signals intelligence remains largely 
shrouded in secrecy, but signals intercepts were used to gain an accurate 
picture of the Indonesian order of battle in Kalimantan and to plan 
Claret operations.66
62  Alan H Smith, Gunners in Borneo: Artillery during Confrontation 1962–1966 (Manly: Royal 
Australian Artillery Historical Company, 2008), 31–102.
63  Kuring, Redcoats, 302.
64  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 309.
65  Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 311–14.
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The RAN and RAAF contributions
Australia’s naval commitment to an independent Malaysia had 
begun during the Malayan Emergency following the formation of the 
British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR). When the 
Indonesian Confrontation began in earnest in 1964, the Australian 
Government increased the RAN’s presence in Malaysian waters by 
sending HMAS  Sydney (III), which by this time had been converted 
from an aircraft carrier to a fast troop transport, and the destroyers HMA 
Ships Vampire, Vendetta and Duchess. In addition, 16  Minesweeping 
Squadron, which consisted of six Ton-class coastal minesweepers, was also 
committed.67 The minesweepers were sent to patrol the coastal waters of 
Borneo and were involved in many stop and search operations, which led 
to the arrest of a number of Indonesians, including military personnel.
A notable incident took place during the night of 13 December 1964 
when HMAS Teal detected two unlit Indonesian vessels travelling together. 
The  vessels separated immediately and made for Indonesian waters. 
Teal gave chase and illuminated one of the vessels with a  searchlight. 
The Indonesian vessel responded with a burst of automatic fire, but 
did no damage. The Australians returned fire, killing three of the seven 
Indonesians on board. The remaining four men surrendered and their 
vessel was boarded. One of the men was later found to be an Indonesian 
Marine officer. A search of the vessel located and seized explosives, 
weapons and other equipment.68 Teal ’s commanding officer Lieutenant 
Keith Murray was awarded a Distinguished Service Cross, ‘for his coolness 
and judgement during this, and a previous interception’.69 It was the only 
gallantry award made to a member of the RAN during Confrontation.
RAN vessels were also involved in shore bombardments against Indonesian 
forces. On 28 July 1965 Indonesian troops crossed the border onto the 
eastern side of Sebatik Island. In response to a call for assistance most 
likely by Malaysian troops, HMAS Yarra conducted three runs and fired 
67  Jeffrey Grey, The official history of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948–1975, 
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70 rounds to harass the Indonesians as they withdrew. In early July Yarra 
was twice called on to fire at Indonesian targets, which on both occasions 
were in Sabah.70 At the end of Confrontation, the RAN maintained its 
presence in the region as part of FESR as well as its commitment to the 
escalating war in Vietnam.
Though the RAAF was not involved in Claret operations, No.  36 
Squadron, flying C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, ferried troops and 
supplies between Malaysia and Borneo. During the same period of time, 
the squadron supported Australia’s commitment to Vietnam. The RAAF 
also flew in support of operations along the Malaysia–Thailand border. 
One unit that made a particularly interesting contribution was No.  5 
Squadron, Detachment C, flying the UH-1 Iroquois. This is noteworthy 
as it is the first RAAF deployment using helicopters. This squadron flew 
operations in support of 28  Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Group, 
including ferrying soldiers to the Malaysia–Thailand border where they 
would search for Communist Terrorists, hold-outs from the Malayan 
Emergency. The unit was disbanded in 1966 and its personnel redeployed 
to Vietnam.71
The end of Confrontation
Indonesia’s efforts to destabilise the Malaysian Union ultimately failed. 
Much like the Malayan Communist Party’s efforts failed to win over the 
populace by acts of brutality during the Malayan Emergency, so too did 
Indonesia’s efforts to win over the border tribes between Kalimantan, 
Sarawak and Sabah, for much the same reasons. Indonesian operations 
in Kalimantan were further negatively impacted in October 1965 when 
members of the military attempted to depose Suharto. The failed coup led 
to a purge of communist sympathisers in the government and military, 
paving the way for a change in leadership. With the ascension of General 
Sukarno to the Presidency of Indonesia in March 1966, there was still 
no immediate guarantee of an end to Confrontation. However, the goal 
of destabilising Malaysia was now unattainable and it was thanks in the 
70  Grey, Up top, 70.
71  Chris Coulthard-Clark, The RAAF in Vietnam: Australian air involvement in the Vietnam War 
(St  Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1995), 8; John Moremon, ‘No  5 Squadron’, Wings: The official 
publication of the RAAF Association 69, no.  1 (Autumn 2017): 25; ‘No.  5 Squadron (RAAF)’, 
Australian War Memorial, at: www.awm.gov.au/collection/U60467 (accessed 10 March 2019).
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main to the Claret operations conducted by British and Commonwealth 
troops that Malaysian sovereignty was defended. Facing the prospect of a 
drawn-out conflict, as the nearby war in Vietnam was clearly becoming, 
Sukarno’s government began peace negotiations with Malaysia in May 
1966. Much like the Korean War, negotiations between the parties 
dragged on and the fighting in Borneo continued. On 11 August 1966 
a peace treaty between Malaysia and Indonesia was signed in Bangkok, 
bringing hostilities to an end. The following day an order was sent to all 
British and Commonwealth units to cease operations in Borneo.72
Conclusion
The Malaysia–Indonesia Confrontation was a challenge for Australia, as it 
maintained diplomatic relations with the Indonesian Government while 
conducting a low-intensity conflict against its military. Australia risked 
and avoided outright war with its much larger neighbour. In courting the 
United States to shore up regional security and help stop the spread of 
communism, Australia also became increasingly committed to the war in 
Vietnam. As that war escalated in the second half of the decade and into 
the 1970s, it would become Australia’s largest Cold War conflict, rapidly 
overshadowing Australia’s commitment to Malaysia. But at the time of 
Confrontation, it was events in Borneo and the risk of war with Indonesia 
that caused most concern for the Australian Government.
The British and Commonwealth response to Indonesia on both political 
and military fronts, especially Operation Claret, remains a model 
of conducting a successful low-intensity conflict while maintaining 
diplomatic relations with the opposing nation. Australia’s armed forces, 
particularly the Royal Australian Regiment and Australian Special Air 
Service, learned many valuable lessons in the jungles of Borneo, which were 
then applied for future service in Vietnam. Despite their skilful application 
of low-intensity warfare, the success of Borneo did not necessarily directly 
translate to Indochina, where different local circumstances in Vietnam led 
to a different outcome.





The Australian military 
in Papua New Guinea
Tristan Moss
Although no war was fought there after the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) occupied an important place in Australia’s 
strategic thinking during the early Cold War. Not only was the island 
seen as a barrier to Australia’s enemies, it was also a potential base from 
which to strike the Australian mainland should it fall. During the 1950s 
it continued its position as a barrier to invasion against the threat of 
communist aggression from the north. However, with the Indonesian 
takeover of West Papua in 1962, Australia, for the first time, shared a land 
border with a potentially hostile nation, and when Indonesia embarked 
on its policy of Confrontation with Malaysia the following year, PNG was 
never far from Australian planners’ minds.1 As a result, throughout this 
tumultuous period PNG was closely integrated into Australian strategic 
thinking and wider planning in the event of a conflict with Indonesia, 
with Australian forces also drawing on experiences in Borneo against 
Indonesia to inform their preparations in PNG. At the same time, the 
Australian Army’s units in PNG had a clear peacetime role, helping to 
1  Bruce Hunt, Australia’s northern shield? Papua New Guinea and the defence of Australia since 1880 
(Clayton, Victoria: Monash University Publishing, 2017), xxii.
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patrol the border, gathering topographical and human intelligence, and 
building relationships with the people on whom they would rely during 
any war or conflict.
By the 1950s, PNG’s geographic importance had long been a significant 
part of Australian strategic thinking. It was concern about the defence of 
the Australian mainland that led to the 1888 annexation of Papua, the 
south-eastern portion of the island of New Guinea. In late 1914, Australia 
annexed German New Guinea in the country’s first military operation 
of the First World War and demanded that the territory be administered 
by Australia at the end of that conflict. In Australian defence thinking 
thereafter, the two separately administered territories of Papua and New 
Guinea together formed a land barrier to Australia’s north and would add 
depth to Australia’s defence. Australian defence of New Guinea would also 
deny its use by hostile powers, as Germany had threatened. The island, 
former prime minister Billy Hughes informed the Defence Committee 
in 1939, would be a ‘dagger aimed at the heart of Australia’ should it be 
occupied by a hostile power.2 The physical barrier of the PNG landmass, 
with its rugged terrain and impenetrable jungle, combined with the power 
of the British (and Royal Australian) Navy, was considered by Australian 
planners to be a suitable foundation of the nation’s defence.3
The Second World War undermined the assumption that PNG would 
be a sufficient barrier without significant defence investment, while at 
the same time the desperate battles across the Owen-Stanley Range and the 
campaigns to isolate the Japanese naval base at Rabaul served to reinforce 
the strategic importance of the island to Australia. The campaigns in the 
jungle between 1942 and 1945 also forced Australia, like its allies, to 
come to grips with operating in a tropical environment. While technically 
and operationally Australia learned that there was ‘no black magic’ in 
jungle fighting, this appreciation took time. Adjusting equipment and 
structures, training troops and learning the quirks of the jungle were all 
key to this process.4 Alongside these efforts, Australia recruited Papua 
New Guineans to act in a scout and reconnaissance role, thereby lending 
their indigenous knowledge of the environment to the Allied war effort. 
The Papuan Infantry Battalion was raised in 1940 and, after serving 
2  Cited in ibid., 37.
3  Ibid., 25–46.
4  See John Moremon, ‘No “black magic”: Doctrine and training for jungle warfare’, in The 
foundations of victory: The Pacific War 1943–44, ed. Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (Canberra: Army 
History Unit, 2004), 76–85.
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in the Kokoda campaign, were joined by four New Guinea Infantry 
Battalions by war’s end, grouped under the Pacific Islands Regiment 
(PIR). These battalions saw action in all Australia’s campaigns, save that 
at Milne Bay, and were disbanded at the end of the war. The general 
demobilisation of the Australian armed forces was the main reason for 
this. However, Australian civilians and the colonial government (termed 
‘the Administration’ and run by the Department of External Territories 
in Canberra) were also wary of the threat an armed body of Papua New 
Guineans might pose to colonial rule.
The Cold War
It did not take long for the security of PNG, so assured after the 
unequivocal victory of the Second World War, to be brought into question 
again. The potential threats of a hostile and newly communist China, 
a global conflict with the Soviet Union and the spectre of communist-
inspired insurgencies soon came to shape Australian defence policy.5 PNG 
remained an Australian responsibility after the Second World War and 
remained on Australia’s strategic doorstep. The Defence Committee, as 
the body responsible for advising the government on strategic policy, 
emphasised the role of PNG in safeguarding sea and air communications, 
and as a final strategic barrier, when formulating its strategic vision for 
Australia. In this, PNG was considered alongside Australia’s north, and in 
particular the Darwin region.6 The regular Australian Army was created in 
1947; that year also saw the last company of the PIR disbanded, leaving 
no combat forces in PNG. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) maintained 
a supply base on the strategically positioned Manus Island, inherited from 
the United States, and the need for additional manpower saw the creation 
5  Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, vol. 1, Strategy and diplomacy (Canberra: 
Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), 21–34. For 
a detailed discussion of Australian defence policy during the late 1940s, see DM Horner, Defence 
supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the making of Australian defence policy (St Leonards, NSW: Allen 
& Unwin, 2000), 236–315.
6  See the Defence Committee’s ‘Strategic basis of Australia’s defence policy’ for 1953 and 1956, 
in Stephan Frühling, A history of Australian strategic policy since 1945 (Canberra: Defence Publishing 
Service, 2009), 167–246.
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in 1948 of the first Papua New Guinean peacetime unit, the RAN PNG 
Division. It was not, however, a fighting force, and was instead intended 
to assist in maintaining the naval base.7
By 1950, the absence of combat forces defending PNG worried Australian 
politicians, expatriates in PNG and the press. One Labor politician, 
FM Daly, criticised the Menzies Government for leaving the ‘practically 
defenceless’ New Guinea ‘wide open to infiltration’. Daly pointed 
particularly to the possibility of Indonesia making good on its claim to 
neighbouring Dutch New Guinea, reflecting a similar concern in the 
Defence Committee.8 The Australian Administrator, JK Murray, voiced 
similar concerns, referring to reports that foreign submarines had been 
spotted in the area.9 Murray called for the power to raise emergency units 
from expatriates in the territory; this was not granted, not least because 
Murray, as a member of the Department of External Territories, did not 
have vice-regal powers, as in other colonies.
Both the Army and the Menzies Government agreed that a volunteer 
force drawn from Europeans in PNG would best serve its interests 
and approved a Citizen’s Military Force battalion in January 1950. 
Drawing on the lineage of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, the Papua 
New Guinea Volunteer Rifles was to be the first line of defence for the 
territory. The decision to raise an all-European force also reflected the 
racialised nature of colonial rule at the time, in which Australians were 
suspicious of the loyalty of Papua New Guinean soldiers and doubted 
their capability of serving in a modern army as a result of their supposed 
inherent racial characteristics. However, while Australians in PNG had 
clamoured for improved defences, they were less enthusiastic when it 
came to surrendering their own time to serve in part-time military, and 
recruitment rates were disappointing. While better than having no force 
there at all, the unit’s effectiveness was hampered by its small size, and the 
fact that it would be scattered around PNG in small depots, unable to 
fight as a coherent whole.
7  For an overview of the RAN PNG Division see James Sinclair, To find a path: The Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force and the Australians to independence, vol. 2, Keeping the peace, 1950–1975 (Gold 
Coast: Crawford House Press, 1990), 179–80.
8  ‘New Guinea defenceless’, Townsville Daily Bulletin, 16 August 1950. See also ‘“Defence lack in 
N. Guinea”’, The Courier-Mail, 16 August 1950. See also ‘New Guinea defence: Infiltration reports’, 
The West Australian, 5 August 1950; ‘New Guinea defence: Liberal M’s HR critical’, The West Australian, 
17 August 1950; ‘Measures to stop Reds in N.G.’, The Advertiser, 20 March 1951.
9  Taylor to Morgan, 30 May 1949, National Archives of Australia (NAA): MP729/8 37/431/114; 
JK Murray to Secretary External Territories, 16 July 1950, NAA: A5954 2331/9.
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Almost immediately, the Defence Committee recognised that a regular 
force was also needed. The dispatch of an Australian infantry battalion to 
Port Moresby was out of the question. The outbreak of the Korean War in 
June 1950, the need to maintain a reserve on mainland Australia and the 
cost of sending Australian troops and their families to PNG in peacetime 
all mitigated against such a move. Equally, in late 1950 only three infantry 
battalions existed. Papua New Guinean troops, however, represented an 
inexpensive means by which to defend Australia’s north, as they could be 
paid and equipped at a lower rate compared to Australia-based units.
The postwar PIR was raised in mid-1951 around a cadre of Papua New 
Guineans who would later form many of the non-commissioned officers for 
the battalion. The first commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert 
Sabin, arrived on 2 October 1951, and the PIR achieved its full establishment 
of around 600 Papua New Guineans in November 1952. The unit made 
use of the wealth of infrastructure remaining from the Second World War in 
PNG, establishing itself on the site of a former hospital at Taurama, about 
8 kilometres from Port Moresby.10 Newer materials were scarce, however, 
and soldiers were housed in tents while huts were built.
The reraised battalion had its role shaped by the Second World War. In the 
event of war in the 1950s, the PIR was to fight as a reconnaissance and 
raiding force that was auxiliary to Australian-manned Army units. The 
battalion would form the initial tripwire should an enemy invade PNG, 
fighting to delay the enemy and trading space for time in PNG’s difficult 
geography. Once troops were deployed from the mainland, Papua New 
Guinean soldiers would act as a reconnaissance force for the rest of the 
Australian Army, with subunits attached to Australian battalions. Small 
groups from the PIR were also to conduct long-range fighting patrols.11 
The PIR was structured as a battalion, with four companies of infantry, 
and the equivalent of two companies of administration troops. However, 
with these roles, it was not intended to fight as a complete unit. Indeed, 
the battalion never trained as a whole during the 1950s. Moreover, the 
PIR was established on a ‘light scale’, lacking the heavier infantry weapons 
allocated to the battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment, such as 
medium machine guns, mortars and anti-tank weapons.12 This unique 
10  Seacombe to AHQ, ‘Construction of a Permanent Barracks – Pacific Islands Regiment – Moresby’, 
9 March 1951, NAA: MT1131/1 A259/47/3.
11  Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 194.
12  Northern Command, ‘Proposal for a New Lower Establishment to Supersede II/23C/2 (LE)’, 
27 July 1956, NAA: A6059 21/441/15.
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structure reflected the rugged nature of the Papua New Guinean terrain, 
in which heavy weapons were difficult to move and supply. But it also 
stemmed from an Australian perception, rooted in racism, that Papua 
New Guineans were unsuited to managing these more technical weapons, 
and other equipment, such as radios.13
While the PIR was reraised to defend Australia’s north, its existence cannot 
be divorced from the colonial context. In creating the PIR, the Australian 
Army reflected and sometimes reinforced the colonial structures of PNG 
– themselves based in radicalised conceptions of Papua New Guineans. In 
addition to different rates of pay, Papua New Guineans were not permitted 
to rise above the rank of sergeant during the 1950s. Their conditions 
were also substantially different to those allocated Australian troops in the 
territory: their rations consisted of only seven items, and they were not 
regularly issued with shoes until 1962.14 Nonetheless, the PIR represented 
a popular occupation in PNG, and many young Papua New Guineans 
joined what they considered to be an elite group. This elitism was at the 
heart of two euphemistically termed ‘disturbances’ during the unit’s first 
decade, which saw some of the unit march out of barracks in 1957 to clash 
with other Papua New Guineans over supposed insults to the regiment, 
and again in 1961 over the difference in pay between the Army and their 
traditional rivals in PNG, the police. Despite some hysterical reactions on 
the part of the colonial authorities, neither of these incidents was directed 
at Australian rule.15
Confrontation
By the 1960s, the Indonesian assumption of control of West Papua 
from the Dutch, long feared by Australia, meant that, for the first time, 
Australia shared a land border ‘with a country whose long term friendship 
cannot be assumed’.16 With Indonesia already having embarked upon 
13  Tristan Moss, Guarding the periphery: The Australian Army in Papua New Guinea, 1951–75 
(Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 33, doi.org/10.1017/9781108182638.
14  Ibid., 92–93.
15  For a detailed discussion of these incidents, see ibid., 42–63.
16  Defence Committee ‘Minute No. 4/1963: The Strategic Importance to Australia of New Guinea’, 
7 February 1963, NAA: A452 1972/4342. See also ‘Defence Implications of changes in West New 
Guinea’, October 1962, NAA: A452 1962/7075. Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, The official 
history of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948–1975, vol. 1, Crises and commitments: 
The politics and diplomacy of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948–1965 (North 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1992), 200–7, 230–32.
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a policy of Confrontation with Malaysia, and by extension the British 
Commonwealth, the Defence Committee feared that Indonesia might 
turn its attention towards PNG. The series of Indonesian raids in Brunei in 
December 1962, and increased activity along the border in Borneo, raised 
the possibility of similar incursions into Australian territory. Although the 
distance from Indonesian bases and the difficult terrain made such action 
less likely – and unlikely at the same scale – as against Malaysia, the Defence 
Committee nonetheless worried about Australia’s ability to respond. This 
was partly related to the overall size of the Australian armed forces at the 
time, and in 1963, the committee believed the Australian armed forces 
were too small to ‘make an effective and sustained contribution to South-
East Asia and at the same time deter Indonesia from possible activities 
inimical to our strategic interest’.17
The Menzies Government was acutely aware of the changed strategic 
situation, and the growing demands placed on the armed forces, which 
had already deployed troops to the Far East Strategic Reserve and trainers 
to Vietnam. The armed forces, and in particular the Army, had little 
flexibility to meet any crises that, as in PNG, now looked more likely.18 
In May 1963 the Menzies Government announced an increase in defence 
spending, including the purchase of additional Mirage fighters and 
transport aircraft for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), ships and an 
extension of the fixed-wing capability for the RAN, and an increase of the 
regular Army to 28,000 soldiers.19 In PNG, the Menzies Government’s 
expansion focused on creating layers of defence against Indonesia and 
other hostile forces. Australia’s ability to detect threats was improved 
through the establishment of an intelligence capability in the territory, 
which would ‘provide warning of infiltration or subversion’.20 Coastal 
security was to be provided on a permanent basis with the creation of 
a Papua New Guinean patrol boat squadron, which would be based at the 
naval base at Manus Island under the RAN. With PNG’s long coastline, 
this capability was essential in detecting Indonesian incursions and 
helping to move patrols around the country. Australia’s strike capability in 
the territory was to be improved through the upgrading of Boram airfield 
17  Defence Committee Minute, 4 February 1963, NAA: A1945/40 832/8, cited in DM Horner, 
Strategic command: General Sir John Wilton and Australia’s Asian wars (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 203.
18  Ibid.
19  Ibid., 203–5.
20  Defence Committee, ‘Minute No. 5/1963: Territory of Papua/New Guinea – Immediate Defence 
Measures’, 7 February 1963, NAA: A452 1972/4342.
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at Wewak to help make the area a suitable base on the northern coast 
from which the defence forces could operate, or stage further afield.21 
Previously, aircraft operating out of Jackson Field at Port Moresby had 
a limited loiter time over the border; now, they would be far closer.
The most significant expansion of Australia’s military capability in PNG 
was found in the PIR. Following the recommendations of Defence, Cabinet 
authorised the expansion of the PIR from its peacetime establishment 
to a full battalion, supported by an increase in pioneers, signals and 
supply troops. A larger training depot was also to be created to support 
this expansion, which would make the PIR a far more well-rounded and 
capable force. The Defence Committee saw this as but the first of a series of 
steps that it, and the Army, had long advocated. The second step included 
raising another battalion and additional support units. To support these 
two battalions, an expanded headquarters formation was to be created 
and a building program to be instituted to house new personnel and their 
dependants. In the third and final phase, a third battalion would be raised 
and existing support units expanded.22
The PIR did not have to wait long to advance to the second phase of 
its expansion. In 1964, in response to Indonesian attacks in Borneo, the 
Menzies Government authorised the use of Australian units along the 
Thai–Malaysian border, and in August Australian troops helped round 
up Indonesian infiltrators on the Malay Peninsula. Vietnam also became 
of increasing concern to the government. In response, the Menzies 
Government again announced an expansion of the armed forces, part of 
which was the introduction of national service to help meet its varied 
commitments.23 As part of these preparations, the government authorised 
the PIR to proceed to expand to three full battalions. The Army’s units 
in PNG were to achieve their full complement of around 3,500 troops 
by 1968, necessitating a sizeable increase in recruiting and training.24 
The  airfield at Nadzab, outside Lae, was also to be improved to take 
Mirage fighters.25
21  Cabinet Submission No. 603, 23 March 1963, NAA: A5619 C174; Cabinet Decision No. 791, 
8 May 1963, NAA: A5619 C174.
22  Defence Committee, ‘Minute No. 5/1963: Territory of Papua/New Guinea – Immediate Defence 
Measures’, 7 February 1963, NAA: A452 1972/4342.
23  Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and commitments, 303.
24  ‘List of past, current and proposed strengths of PIR ~1965’, n.d., NAA: A452 1966/4989.
25  ‘Prime Minister’s Statement on Defence: Full re-assessment of the needs’, The Canberra Times, 
11 November 1964.
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The PIR’s expansion occurred more quickly than the Army had planned or 
hoped for. By 1964, the PIR grew from 660 to 810 Papua New Guineans, 
along with over 100 Australian troops. The following year, another 700 
Papua New Guineans had been recruited and were in various stages of 
training.26 In 1965, PNG Command was created, which reflected the 
growing strategic importance of PNG to Australia. Where the previous 
PNG Military District had been subordinated to Northern Command, 
based in Brisbane, the Army elevated PNG to equal footing with other 
regional commands. The creation of the PNG Command also expanded 
Army capabilities in PNG, particularly in the raising of an engineer 
component, vital in undeveloped PNG. Reflecting its new size and 
importance, a brigadier, AL McDonald, was appointed PNG Command’s 
first commander.
The second battalion of the PIR (2PIR) was formed in 1965 by splitting 
the first battalion in half. While this diluted the skill base of the PIR, 
it was a step towards greatly expanding the Army’s capability in PNG. 
Given the pace of expansion, and the continuing threat from Indonesia, 
the Army operated under the assumption that the third battalion would 
be raised and planned accordingly. 2PIR was based at Wewak on the PNG 
north coast, next to the airfield at Boram, providing a northern base of 
operations. With third base planned for PNG’s second largest city, Lae, 
on the country’s east coast near the proposed fighter-capable airport at 
Nadzab, the Army could cover the breadth of PNG. The size and location 
of the PIR was not the only change made: rather than be an auxiliary 
force to Australian units, during the early 1960s, the PIR was expected to 
be able to fight alongside Australian-manned forces, at least in the PNG 
context. This was as much a product of changes in the status accorded 
Papua New Guineans under Australian rule as it was one of Australia’s 
defence needs. This shift was swift, mirroring and building on shifts 
occurring in race relations in PNG.
In its combat role, the PIR continued its earlier focus on reconnaissance 
and patrolling forces, but began to be equipped and trained to take on 
additional roles. The three PIR battalions were to be based on a more 
lightly equipped ‘tropical’ version of standard Australian infantry 
battalions. In contrast to the 1950s, this reflected the terrain and likely 
roles of the battalions, rather than the supposed capabilities of the 
26  Prime Minister’s Department Minute, 20 August 1968, NAA: A5619 C174.
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Papua New Guineans within them. The battalions consisted of four rifle 
companies, but with increased support company capabilities, particularly 
the mortars and machine guns, and also larger signals and administration 
subunits.27 Heavy equipment, such as anti-tank weapons and trucks were 
omitted from the PIR’s establishment; operating in the jungle, the PIR 
would fight with what it could carry.
Peacetime operations
Patrolling made Papua New Guinean units unique within the Australian 
Army, in that they had an ongoing operational peacetime responsibility 
alongside their wartime roles. Aside from training for an actual outbreak 
of conflict, during the early 1960s the PIR’s peacetime role was border 
surveillance, in order to deter and detect Indonesian incursions. It did 
so by mounting patrols from outstations. On the north coast, this was 
the permanent Vanimo outstation, while in the south, PNG Command 
made use of temporary bases as required. Vanimo usually accommodated 
an infantry company and supporting troops, and saw its airfield and 
barracks expanded throughout the early 1960s. It was not fortified, in 
contrast to the entrenched bases used by Australian forces in Borneo 
during Confrontation. Rather, during peacetime it provided a jumping-
off point for patrols of the northern border region; indeed, at any one 
time, a significant portion of the infantry company based there would be 
in the jungle.
The patrols mounted from Vanimo and other bases were the bread and 
butter of PNG Command. These had three goals: training for war, laying 
the groundwork for any conflict, and detecting and deterring Indonesian 
incursions. Patrolling was a substantial commitment of resources, and 
PNG Command planned each year’s training and other activities around 
them.28 Tensions with Indonesia caused a threefold increase in patrolling 
man-days, from around 9,000 in 1964 to over 30,000 in 1965, a sign of 
the importance of this activity.29 This equated to between 20 and 50 patrols 
27  Sinclair, Keeping the peace, 98.
28  Sio Maiasa, interview with Tristan Moss, 3 August 2013.
29  Northern Command, ‘Administrative Appreciation for the Expansion of the Army in Papua 
New Guinea’, 11 January 1965, NAA: J2818, 22/1/7.
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per year in most of PNG’s provinces.30 The burden of patrolling mainly 
fell on the two battalions of the PIR, although other subunits also headed 
off into the jungle. Patrolling was usually based on individual platoons; 
while whole companies would often patrol, in practice companies would 
also break into their constituent platoons, operating from a forward base, 
only concentrating when needed.
While the Defence Committee assumed that Indonesian incursions 
across the border would be unlikely, the tense situation coupled with the 
difficulty in actually finding a border in a region with poor maps and 
Dutch, Indonesian and Australian markers in different locations meant 
that clashes with Indonesian troops were an ever-present risk. In this 
sense, Australian patrols not only had the role of detecting and deterring 
Indonesian forays into PNG but might also spark a conflict by aggressive 
action. They were instructed to avoid this at all costs.31 In the event of 
Indonesian aggression towards Australian troops, patrol leaders – usually 
lieutenants – were instructed to retaliate ‘with only such force as may be 
necessary to enable him to ensure the safety of … [the] patrol’.32 Soldiers 
were ordered to use their arms only if the patrol was directly threatened 
and there was no other course of action. In 1965, for instance, upon 
hearing of Indonesian soldiers in a village on the Australian side of the 
border, the commander of 2PIR, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Ramsay, 
ordered his patrol commander by radio to delay his approach until the 
Indonesians had departed. In doing so, a potentially volatile situation was 
avoided in which, Ramsay admitted, ‘there could quite easily have been 
a firefight’.33
In providing an opportunity for realistic training, patrols were also 
fundamental in preparing the PIR for war. In many ways, patrolling 
was just like war, without the shooting. Patrols operated in the jungle 
by themselves for long periods of time, carrying all they needed between 
resupplies. The climate and the terrain were the same in which the unit 
would have to operate against Indonesia. Patrols were also an excellent 
30  ‘1967/8 PNG Comd Patrol Programme’, 18 May 1967, Papua New Guinea National Archives 
(PNGNA): 55 52/2/2; ‘Papua and New Guinea Patrol and Exercise Programme 1971/1972’, 7 April 
1971, PNGNA: 1008 52/2/2; ‘PNG Land Forces Patrol and Exercise Programme, July 1973 to June 
74’, n.d., PNGNA: 1008 52/2/2.
31  Defence Committee, Minute No. 74/1963, ‘Border Crossings Papua – New Guinea/West Irian’, 
13 December 1963, NAA: A2031, 74/1963.
32  AHQ Operational Instruction 2/63 PIR, 25 February 1963, NAA: A6059 41/441/124.
33  Sinclair, Keeping the peace, 127–28.
FIGHTING AUSTRALIA’S COLD WAR
168
means to develop and test physical fitness. In addition, patrols had 
a crucial cartographical function in the poorly mapped border region. 
Until the 1970s, when the Survey Corps completed a comprehensive 
mapping program, maps of many areas of PNG were poor. Aerial photos 
were often obscured by cloud and were less than satisfactory in picking 
out details such as tracks in the jungle. Some maps of the border region 
simply included large swathes of blank terrain, for which no topographical 
information existed. Patrols were therefore a crucial part of the Army’s 
preparations for war and reported on the location of tracks, the ‘going’, 
villages and other features.
Patrols also had an important intelligence function and laid the 
foundations for the relationship with local peoples that would be crucial 
during wartime. Military–civil relationships were key here, with Army 
patrols working closely with Administration officers, who were scattered 
in small numbers around PNG, alongside around 3,100 police.34 With 
good relationships between locals and Australian authorities, Papua New 
Guineans in crucial areas could provide information on Indonesian activity 
in the border region and on local geography. They could also be called 
on to provide fresh food and guides to patrols. Both the Army and the 
Administration took this relationship seriously lest poor relations lead to 
‘open hostility during times of peace or war’, and troops were under strict 
instructions to approach locals with respect and not to damage property.35 
Patrols were also an opportunity to promote the Army in PNG, and to 
encourage recruits. The Army would often send ‘prestige’ patrols into 
certain regions; these were more elaborate affairs that could include the 
PIR Pipe Band. One such patrol, led by Lieutenant T Holland in 1963, 
was estimated to have been seen by tens of thousands of people.36
Plans for war
If war was to break out with Indonesia in PNG, it would have done so 
along the border, and patrols from the PIR would have been the tripwire. 
These forces were not initially intended to stop the Indonesians. Lacking 
heavy weapons, and able to trade space for time, the patrols were to 
34  PNG Command, ‘Papua New Guinea Force Operational Plan 1/66’, August 1966, Australian War 
Memorial (AWM): AWM 122 68/4003.
35  ES Sharp to District Commissioner, ‘Tabunomu Complaint – PIR’, 29 May 1963, PNGNA: 55 
52/2/2.
36  Sinclair, Keeping the peace, 93.
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retire in the face of an Indonesian incursion. Only later, once it was 
determined that a hostile incursion was underway, would concerted 
action be launched. During war, PNG Command’s principal role was 
to meet and repel border incursion or, if such action was beyond its 
capacity alone, to contain any threat until assistance could be provided 
from mainland Australia.37 With the Indonesian takeover of West Papua, 
Australian plans for the defence of PNG became increasingly specific in 
focus and were meshed with the broader range of anti-confrontation plans 
being developed by Commonwealth forces (see Chapter 5, this volume). 
For PNG, the Defence Committee began developing Joint Service Plan 
Pygmalion in 1964, refining it over the next two years before the end of 
Confrontation caused it to be downgraded to a general contingency plan.
Plan Pygmalion focused on the threat of Indonesian raids across the 
border. At the height of Confrontation, PNG Command assessed that, 
at short notice, the Indonesians could deploy two companies of infantry, 
around 250 marines, and a company of police along the border area, from 
a total Indonesian force in West Irian of two infantry battalions, one 
police battalion and other support units. Intelligence officers believed that 
Indonesian forces would have two courses of action, alongside around 
1,500 indigenous troops. The first, less overt, manner in which Indonesia 
might exert pressure was through the encouragement and support of 
subversive elements in PNG.
Planners feared that trained cadres in West Papua could cross the border 
to foment disaffection among Papua New Guineans. Indonesian forces 
might go further, and cross the border to mount raids and sabotage, as 
they had attempted to do in Borneo (and as Australian forces were doing 
in Kalimantan). Their options would be somewhat limited, given the 
scale of the border region, and the logistical difficulties of moving forces 
in that terrain. Moreover, planners assumed that any Indonesian action 
would be covert and small, as the country would be unlikely to risk war 
breaking out over PNG. Limited war was considered more likely to erupt 
because of action elsewhere, particularly Borneo, but in this scenario, 
Indonesia would be hard pressed to send additional troops to West Irian. 
Nonetheless, even small covert raids had the potential to have a significant 
strategic effect. Indonesia held the initiative, as it was able to choose the 
time and place of its incursions. Combined with subversive activities, 
37  Cabinet Submission No. 118, ‘Papua/New Guinea – Military Requirements’, 8 April 1964, 
NAA: A4940 C3436.
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such actions would require the deployment of a much larger Australian 
force than the Indonesians might field. This would tie up Australian forces 
needed in Malaysia, Borneo and, from 1965, Vietnam.38
Demonstrating that the PIR was now considered capable of performing 
operations similar to Australian units, the first draft of Plan Pygmalion 
called for the deployment of two companies of the PIR along the border, 
supported by an increased RAAF and RAN presence in and around the 
territory. The Special Air Service, which at the time consisted of a single 
company, would deploy to augment the PIR’s long-range patrolling 
capability.39 The two units had trained together for the first time in 1963, 
with the PIR giving a good account of itself in an exercise against the 
special forces unit along the Kokoda Track.40 The two other companies of 
the PIR would be rotated with those resting and training in Port Moresby 
as necessary. A battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment was only to 
be sent to PNG if the situation deteriorated and reinforcements were 
necessary.41 Experience fighting Indonesians in Borneo, and the expansion 
of the PNG Command to include a second battalion in 1965, led planners 
to expand the initial deployment of Pygmalion to consist of one battalion 
on either side of the central mountain ranges. This reinforced the plan to 
raise a third battalion, as this would allow PNG Command to rotate the 
units through the border without having to rely on infantry battalions 
from Australia.42
While addressing the potential for war in PNG, Plan Pygmalion 
was written in the broader context of Commonwealth defence and 
Confrontation; the plan both complemented planning in other theatres, 
such as Borneo, and also drew lessons from previous encounters with 
Indonesian forces.43 Lieutenant General John Wilton, Chief of the General 
38  PNG Command, ‘Papua New Guinea Force Operational Plan 1/66’, August 1966, AWM: 
AWM122 68/4003.
39  MF Brogan, ‘Plan Pygmalion: Proposed conference at Port Moresby 19 – 21 July 65’, 28 June 
1965, NAA: A1946 1968/710; Department of Defence, ‘Plan Pygmalion’, 26 May 1966, NAA: A452 
1972/4342.
40  DM Horner, SAS: Phantoms of war, a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 2nd ed. (Crows 
Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002), 61.
41  Joint Service Plan ‘Pygmalion’, 9 April 1964, NAA: A452 1972/4342.
42  JPC Report No. 32/1968, ‘Future Size and Role of the Pacific Islands Regiment’, 10 May 1968, 
NAA: A8738 39; Cabinet Submission No.  118, ‘Papua/New Guinea – Military Requirements’, 
8 April 1964, NAA: A4940 C3436.
43  Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, The official history of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian 
conflicts 1948–1975, vol. 5, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian military operations in Malaya and 
Borneo 1950–1966 (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 
1996), 194.
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Staff in 1963, made a note of the applicability of lessons from Borneo to 
PNG, particularly in relation to the use of intelligence and coordination 
between the three services.44 Similarly, the importance of cooperation with 
the civilian administration was emphasised in later command and control 
arrangements developed by the Joint Planning Committee.45 Tactically, 
the operations envisaged on the border were similar, too. They were to 
take place at the company or platoon level, with troops patrolling from 
small bases close to the area of operations. Air support was to be vital, but 
the war itself was, at its core, an infantry fight. It was also, as in Borneo, 
a fight over the people. While Australian forces were to defend the border, 
in particular the ‘vulnerable points’ at which Indonesians might easily 
access Australian territory, the protection of Papua New Guineans was of 
equal importance.46
There was one final role for PNG Command. Unlike many other colonial 
forces, PNG Command had no internal security role. Prior to the Second 
World War, no military presence was considered necessary by Australian 
authorities; locally recruited police and armed European civilians had 
proved sufficient to counter any threats from Papua New Guineans. 
During the 1950s, broad fears of communist subversion – thought 
most likely to originate from agitation from European expats – worried 
authorities, but this constituted an intelligence and policing issue, rather 
than a military one. The advent of Confrontation and the threat from 
Indonesia gave the military more of an internal security role. However, 
this was only envisaged in terms of a war situation, during which specific 
government legislation would come into effect, specifically the Defence 
Regulations and the National Security Regulations, which covered threats 
such as sabotage, prohibited areas, the movement of people, and the 
control of photography and communications, including censorship.47
In 1966, the possibility of civil unrest in PNG led the government to 
explore the possibility of calling out the Army to support the police as a 
last resort. The suggestion was met with trepidation at all levels of Defence, 
due to the lack of training of PNG Command in such operations, and 
44  Wilton to Sherger, 24 October 1963, NAA: A1946 1968/710.
45  Joint Planning Committee, ‘Command and control of Operations in the Territory of Papua and 
New Guinea’, 28 February 1964, NAA: A1946 1968/710.
46  Joint Planning Committee ‘An outline plan to meet cover Indonesian activity in Papua/New 
Guinea’, 10 April 1964, NAA: A1946 1968/710; Cabinet Submission No. 603, 23 March 1963, 
NAA: A5619 C174. Compare for instance the role of Australian forces in Borneo, as described in 
Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, 253.
47  ‘Draft Plan to Safeguard Internal Security’, n.d. [1966], NAA: A452 1964/5917.
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the seriousness with which the use of the Army against civilians would 
be viewed at home and abroad.48 There was also concern among some 
members of the Army that the Administration did not entirely understand 
the implications of calling out the military, or what constituted a serious 
enough internal security threat for this to occur.49 While the Australian 
Government came extremely close to calling out the PIR in 1970 over riots 
in New Britain, troops were never used in this fashion during Australian 
rule in PNG.
Conclusion
As Australia became increasingly embroiled in Vietnam, the strategic 
importance of PNG and the threat of war breaking out there declined. 
The end of Confrontation with Indonesia in 1966 in particular heralded 
the lessening of the importance of PNG in Australia’s strategic thinking. 
Although the border region continued to be a point of concern – and 
patrolling continued – tension dissipated sufficiently for PNG to be 
downgraded from an area of ‘vital’ interest, to simply an ‘abiding’ one by 
1973.50 Increasingly, the war in Vietnam occupied Australia’s attention. 
While many were keen to do so, the troops of PNG Command were 
barred from participation in Vietnam, because New Guineans were not 
Australian citizens, but protected persons under the United Nations 
Trusteeship provisions governing Australian rule there.51 Instead, a focus 
on preparing the military for independence increasingly occupied the 
attentions of PNG Command. In the nine years before independence 
was granted in 1975, the Australian Army embarked on a program of 
education among its Papua New Guinean soldiers, designed to fashion 
them into citizen-soldiers of an independent Papua New Guinean state. 
While the independence of PNG – and the serious problems facing the 
Papua New Guinean Defence Force subsequently – have dominated the 
history of this institution, for two decades the Army’s units in PNG made 
a significant contribution to the defence of Australia.
48  CE Barnes, Cabinet Submission, ‘Papua New Guinea – Threat to Internal Security’, 4 July 1966, 
NAA: A1945 24/2/28.
49  ‘Plan to safeguard internal security in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea: Note of discussion 
in Port Moresby from 28th March to 2nd April 1966’, 5 April 1966, NAA: A1945, 24/2/28.
50  ‘Strategic basis of Australian defence policy’, June 1973 in Frühling, A history of Australian 
strategic policy, 464–75.
51  Lynch to Fox, 25 September 1968, NAA: A452 1966/4989; Ted Diro, interview with Tristan 
Moss, 31 July 2013; Jack Kukuma, interview with Tristan Moss, 3 August 2013.





The Australian way of war 
and the early Cold War
Peter J Dean
Is there an Australian way of war and, if so, how do Australia’s military 
commitments in the early Cold War period map to this concept? These 
two questions form the fundamental basis of the concluding segment 
of this work. This chapter explores the conceptual notion of a ‘way’ 
or ‘ways’ of war in relation to Australia’s strategic culture and military 
commitments in the period from 1945 until 1965. As the book has 
detailed, during this period Australia fought three conflicts – Korea, 
Malaya and Confrontation – and prepared to fight yet more in Indonesia, 
Papua New Guinea and across broader Southeast Asia. It demonstrates 
the importance of this period to Australia’s, and the region’s, security at 
a time of intense strategic competition.
This chapter will draw together these themes as well as situating the 
period of 1945–65 within the concepts of a strategic culture and a way of 
war. In particular, it will focus on exploring the genesis of British thinking 
in relation to their way of war. This is significant, not just in relation 
to Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s pioneering work on the concept, but also due to 
the evolution of this concept in British strategic thinking and its parallels 
and applicability to the Australian context.
Context is critical. The manner in which Australia sought to achieve 
security during the early Cold War was part of a broader continuum 
of the Australian ‘way(s) of war’. But like all epochs in history this was 
a period of both continuity and change. The period from 1945 to 1965 
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saw Australia’s strategic circumstances alter as the country sought to 
address its contemporary security concerns. The onset of the Cold War, 
decolonisation in Asia, the advent of nuclear weapons and the continued 
advancement of military technology all helped to reshape Australia’s 
strategic environment. At the same time, many aspects of Australia’s 
approach to conflict – and the preparations for potential conflict – 
remained the same.
In attempting to reconcile the issues of strategic continuity, the Australian 
debate on a national way of war has, in many ways, paralleled many of 
the early debates on this concept that occurred in the United Kingdom. 
In particular, the traditional notion of an Australian way of war is 
overwhelmingly shaped by a false dilemma or dichotomy – the choice 
between either a continental defence (Defence of Australia, or DoA) or an 
expeditionary approach to Australian strategy – which similarly plagued 
early discourses on the British way of war.
Strategic culture and a way of war
Like any conceptual or theoretical approach, there is a plethora of 
criticism of attempts to outline a national way, or ways, of war and much 
ink has been spilt debating the relative merits of a way of war as a frame 
of analysis. Of particular note is the use of a way of war less often as a 
frame for historical analysis of complex events and more as a political tool 
grounded in a form of policy advocacy. This criticism casts its way back 
to the field’s foundational work, Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s The British way 
in warfare.1
While Liddell Hart’s pioneering analysis dates from the 1930s, it was not 
until the 1970s that debate in international relations and strategic studies 
delved into a broader capstone concept: the idea that nation states have 
a strategic culture. Strategic culture has proven to be even more multifarious 
1  Basil H Liddell Hart, The British way in warfare (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1932). Such 
debate is not restricted to Britain but occurs for each country on which studies have been based. For 
Australia some key texts include: Michael Evans, The tyranny of dissonance: Australia’s strategic culture 
and way of war 1901–2005, Study Paper No. 306 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005), 
at: researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/sp306_tyranny_of_dissonance-michael_evans.pdf; 
David Kilcullen, ‘Australian statecraft: The challenge of aligning policy with strategic culture’, Security 
Challenges 3, no. 4 (2007): 45–65; Peter J Dean ‘The alliance, Australia’s strategic culture and way 
of war’, in Australia’s American alliance, ed. Peter J Dean, Stephan Frühling, and Brendan Taylor 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), 224–50.
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than a national way of war, and in the academy even more controversial. 
Pioneered by the then Rand analyst Jack Snyder, and investigated deeply 
by scholars such as Ken Booth, Colin Grey and Alistair Ian Johnson,2 
this concept, like a way of war, has eluded precise definition and gone 
through various iterations of construction and theoretical interpretation. 
To choose just one, somewhat contemporary, definition, Kerry Longhurst 
has proposed that a strategic culture is:
a distinct body of beliefs, attitudes and practices, regarding the use 
of force, which are held by a collective [usually a nation] and arise 
gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process.3
Scholars generally regard ‘a way of war’ as a subset of a nation’s strategic 
culture.
Conceptually, a way of war is more grounded in military history. As Tony 
Echevarria has argued, ‘we can only know a way of war historically by 
piecing together what has been done’.4 Thus the concept can be conceived 
as a ‘historical pattern or tradition reflecting how and why force has 
been used’.5
Thus the two concepts, strategic culture and a way(s) of war, are both 
useful in their own right but are better understood in terms of their 
interrelationship. As Lawrence Sondhaus has outlined:
for the political scientist, the true utility of strategic culture lies in 
how it can help us understand observed behavior in the present 
(rather than to predict future behavior), for the historian of war 
and diplomacy [a way of war] offer[s] a useful framework for 
understanding the recent as well as the more distant past.6
2  See Ken Booth and Russell Trood, Strategic cultures in the Asia-Pacific region (London: MacMillan, 
1999); Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic culture and ways of war, Cass Military Studies (London: 
Routledge, 2006); Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about strategic culture’, International Security 19, 
no. 4 (1995): 32; Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural realism: Strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese 
history (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Colin S  Gray, ‘Strategic culture as context: 
The first generation of theory strikes back’, Review of International Studies 25, no. 1 (1999): 49–69, 
doi.org/10.1017/s0260210599000492; Colin Grey, ‘Strategy and culture’, in Strategy in Asia: The 
past, present, and future of regional security, ed. Thomas G Mahnken and Dan Blumenthal, Stanford 
Security Studies (California: Stanford University Press, 2014), doi.org/10.1515/9780804792820.
3  Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the use of force: The evolution of German security policy 1990–
2003 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 17.
4  Antulio J Echevarria II, Reconsidering the American way of war: US military practice from the 
Revolution to Afghanistan (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 176.
5  Max Boot as cited in Echevarria, Reconsidering the American way of war, 19.
6  Sondhaus, Strategic culture and ways of war, 13.
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Liddell Hart and the British way of war
Liddell Hart’s original work was the conceptual birth of a ‘way of war’ in 
the academy.7 Central to Liddell Hart’s thesis was the case that strategic 
debates in the United Kingdom were best understood as a fundamental 
dilemma between continental and indirect (or navalist) approaches 
to strategy; whereby the British had to constantly balance European 
continental commitments against imperial commitments. For Liddell 
Hart, the one true approach to British strategy was the indirect approach. 
He argued that the ‘misguided’ decision during the First World War to 
purse a continental strategy over an indirect strategy was in contravention 
to the traditional British ‘way of war’.8
Liddell Hart’s argument was a direct response to the attrition-based 
warfare that characterised the Western Front from 1914 to 1918 and 
the subsequent losses suffered by Great Britain. This was a deeply 
personal experience for Liddell Hart who had served as a captain in 
the King’s Own  Yorkshire Light Infantry Regiment on the Western 
Front. Liddell Hart saw the British commitment of a large continental 
army to Europe and  the subsequent loss of life as a result of ‘shallow 
thought … deformed by slavish imitation of Continental fashions’ by the 
British Government. He worried that the movement away from a ‘navalist’ 
strategy based on the indirect approach was ‘stunted by the consequences 
of that malformation are to be found in the years 1914–1918 and have 
been felt ever since’.9
7  The use of ‘ways of war’ relates to a nation’s grand strategic approach to the use of military 
force. As such, this chapter defines a ‘way of war’ as the way and manner in which a military force is 
used by a nation state at the grand strategic level as part of its strategic culture. A way of ‘warfare’ is 
a type of military approach to operations adopted by a nation’s military services to meet the strategic 
challenges it is faced with. A ‘way of warfare’ or ‘warfighting’ is, as David Horner has noted, the ‘way 
a nation and its armed forces fights its wars’ (emphasis added). See David Horner, ‘The Australian way 
of warfighting’, paper presented to the Australian Command and Staff College, Queenscliff, 24 June 
1996. Such a view was standard in British Commonwealth doctrine and manuals: e.g. combined or 
amphibious operations are referenced to as a ‘form of warfare’.
8  Liddell Hart, The British way in warfare.
9  Ibid., 7.
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Liddell Hart and the conceptualising 
of the ‘Australian way of war’
At the centre of Liddell Hart’s analysis was the presentation of a dilemma 
between two approaches to strategy: a European continental strategy 
versus an indirect, maritime approach. A similar dichotomy has been the 
intellectual foundation from which debates on Australia’s way of war have 
also evolved.10 At the heart of the current Australian conceptualisation 
of a ‘way of war’ is a debate between those favouring an expeditionary 
approach to the use of military force in support of Australia’s major power 
allies, versus those favouring a focus on the continental defence of the 
Australian mainland. While this Australian discourse has attracted only 
a small number of commentators and academics, the basic approach is 
characterised by this bifurcation. It is led by the two most prolific writers 
and policy advocates for each camp: Michael Evans (expeditionary) and 
Hugh White (continental or DoA).
The most prodigious writer on the Australian way of war has been 
Professor Michael Evans. In Evans’s seminal work on the topic, The tyranny 
of dissonance: Australia’s strategic culture and way of war 1901–2005,11 he 
argued that the divide between expeditionary and continental approaches 
has personified Australian debates over strategy since Federation in 
1901. Evans has argued even more directly and succinctly in the public 
sphere about the Australian way of war. In 2003, at the time of Australia’s 
involvement in the controversial war against Iraq, he argued that:
Effectively then, the Australian way of war has been based on 
fusing strategy and statecraft through the agency of expeditionary 
warfare using volunteer forces in coalition operations. In all of 
these struggles, the Anzac tradition has acted as an important 
conduit for the interpretation of Australian democratic national 
values – pragmatism, fairness, egalitarianism and mateship – 
within an alliance warfare setting.12
10  This debate in Australia has been driven by Australia’s strategic circumstances, especially its 
geography, rather than a case of replicating a British strategic debate for antipodean needs.
11  Evans, The tyranny of dissonance.
12  Michael Evans, ‘Values are our frontier’, The Australian, 11 November 2003.
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Former senior defence official, and one of the nation’s leading public 
intellectuals on defence, Professor Hugh White agrees with Evans that 
the Anzac tradition has played a seminal role in the Australian way of war 
and defence policy. White noted in 2007 that Evans’s interpretation was 
one also shared by the prime minister of the day, John Howard, whereby:
our way of war is to send armed forces to support our allies in 
major land operations anywhere in the world in which our shared 
interests (often described as our ‘values’) are threatened … [and 
that this approach] is supposed to guarantee that threats closer to 
home never emerge.13
To White, this way of war is one driven by a conceptualisation of Australia’s 
alliances as a form of collective defence. White sees this approach to 
Australia’s major power alliances as a particular form of collective security, 
one reminiscent of a type of security banking credit system – whereby 
Australia pays into a security account with a major ally. This is achieved 
by Australia supporting her great and powerful friends in distant offshore 
conflicts aligned with Australia’s values in order to ‘bank’ security credits 
that Australia would be able to draw upon in conflicts or security concerns 
closer to home.14
White is, however, critical of this approach – seeing an expeditionary 
way of war as focused on the past rather than the future of Australia’s 
security needs. In addition, he further refines this approach as being 
part of a tradition centred on the Australian Army’s approach to warfare. 
This approach, he argues, is in opposition to the other tradition in 
Australian defence policy – continental defence.15 From the period of 
the mid-1970s,  the continental defence tradition was conceptualised as 
Defence of Australia (DoA), underpinned by the idea of self-reliance 
within the US alliance framework.16 White’s critique thus sits at the 
centre of the expeditionary versus continental divide that has dominated 
so many of the debates around Australian defence policy from the 1970s 
into the 2000s.
13  Hugh White, ‘Anzac, our Achilles heel?’, The Age, 24 May 2007.
14  This is not too different from the idea of past actions theory as a way of assessing military threats. 
See Daryl Press, Calculating credibility: How leaders assess military threats, Cornell Studies in Security 
Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
15  White, ‘Anzac, our Achilles heel?’.
16  Stephan Frühling, ‘Australian defence policy and the concept of self-reliance’, Australian Journal 
of International Affairs 68, no. 5 (2014): 531–47, doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2014.899310.
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The one common feature of both Evans’s and White’s work is the centrality 
of Australia’s alliance relationships to its way of war.17 The alliance basis to 
the Australian way of war is widely recognised. One of Australia’s leading 
political journalists and commentators, Paul Kelly, noted in 2002:
for half a century the Australian way of war has been obvious: it is 
a clever, cynical, calculated, modest series of contributions as part 
of US-led coalitions in which Americans bore the main burden. 
This technique reveals a junior partner skilled in utilising the great 
and powerful in its own interest while imposing firm limits upon 
its own sacrifices. It is one reason the alliance is so popular.18
Agreement on this aspect of the Australian way of war is emblematic of the 
dominance of an alliance-based approach to Australia’s strategic culture.
Australia’s strategic culture
An alliance with a great and powerful friend has been the dominant 
approach to Australian strategic culture since the period before Federation. 
However, this is not to say that an alliance-based strategic culture is 
exclusive. The best way of understanding the dynamics of a strategic 
culture, especially when accounting for both continuity and change in 
this concept, is to understand it through the lens of a series of competing 
subcultures that vie for dominance over strategic policy.19
Throughout Australian history the competing subcultures in Australian 
strategy have included great power alliance, unarmed and neutral, armed 
neutrality (often also called ‘armed and independent’), and a ‘fortress 
Australia’ approach.20 These approaches to strategy have, at various 
times, battled for influence over Australian strategic policy – indeed, 
contemporary debates over the direction of Australian strategy in response 
17  In his most recent work, White argues for ‘strategic independence’, i.e. the ending of the alliance 
with the United States and the movement to what could be termed armed neutrality. See Hugh 
White, How to defend Australia (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2019).
18  Paul Kelly, ‘No lapdog, this partner has clout’, The Australian, 28 August 2002.
19  Alan Bloomfield, ‘Time to move on: Reconceptualizing the strategic culture debate’, Contemporary 
Security Policy 33, no. 3 (2012): 437–61, doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2012.727679.
20  See Dean, ‘The alliance, Australia’s strategic culture and way of war’; and Peter J Dean, ‘Armed 
neutrality: Dependence, independence and Australian strategy’, in After American primacy: Imagining 
the future of Australia’s defence, ed. Peter J Dean, Brendan Taylor and Stephan Frühling (Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne, 2019).
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to the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States has seen 
a  resurgence of an argument advocating armed independence, led by 
Hugh White.21
However, despite the at times spirited debates over Australian strategy, the 
alliance subculture has dominated strategic policy. This dominance has 
been driven by a succession of governments, supported by policy elites, 
who have assessed Australia’s relative position in the region and the world, 
as well as the material difficulties of self-defence, and have concluded 
that an alliance with a great and powerful friend is far and away the 
least costly approach economically, as well as providing materially more 
security. Thus, the main strategic debates in Australia since Federation 
have principally evolved around the balance between engagement and 
dependence with Australia’s major alliance partners and the desired level 
of ‘self-reliance’ within the alliance (as opposed to self-sufficiency). This 
is what has largely driven the characterisation of the Australian way of 
war debate and the dichotomy between expeditionary versus continental 
defence approaches – both of which support the alliance-based strategic 
culture; a position deeply at play in the period of 1945–65 as Australia 
was engaged in Commonwealth defence efforts while also developing 
a new alliance with the United States.
Paralleling the British: The Australian 
‘dilemma’
Liddell Hart’s thesis on the British way of war remained largely 
unchallenged until the 1970s, although international relations theorist 
John Mearsheimer has suggested that it was a ‘short lived idea … lasting 
from around 1931–1933’ as it paid little interest to changes in naval power 
in the latter half of the 1930s.22 However, the popularity of Liddell Hart’s 
thesis persisted well after its initial publication. The book was reprinted 
in 1941 and again in 1976 and, although Liddell Hart never revisited the 
concept in any other publication, it survives as a model and the genesis for 
subsequent conceptual works.
21  White, How to defend Australia.
22  Mearsheimer as quoted in Sondhaus, Strategic culture and ways of war, 2.
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From the mid-1970s, Liddell Hart’s work started to attract much greater 
academic attention and soon thereafter it was subjected to major criticism 
and revision by many leading British military historians of the time. One 
of the first major criticisms came from Sir Michael Howard. In a lecture 
at University College London in 1974, Howard was unstinting in his 
forensic analysis of Liddell Hart’s work. Howard noted that Liddell Hart’s
analysis of British strategy was nothing more than a piece of 
brilliant political pamphleteering, sharply argued, selectively 
illustrated, and concerned rather to influence British public 
opinion and government policy rather than to illuminate the 
complexities of the past in any serious or scholarly way.23
Extrapolating on this line of analysis, Andrew Lambert noted in 2010 
that Liddell Hart’s thesis is ‘a dogmatic prescription’ of Julian Corbett’s 
Some principles of maritime strategy, which itself should be only seen as 
‘the opening essay of an ongoing debate’ and as a ‘basic analytical tool’.24 
David French’s 1990 monograph of a similar name, The British way 
in warfare, 1688–2000, argued that British governments had, in fact, 
concentrated on pursuing the country’s strategic interests above all else, 
alternating between maritime and continental approaches to strategy 
as the circumstances dictated. The defining characteristic, he noted, was 
the emphasis on minimising cost.25 Thus, the British way in warfare 
was neither navalist as Liddell Hart claimed, nor mixed in its approach as 
others have claimed, but ‘essentially adaptive’.26
In a similar vein to Liddell Hart’s original thesis, most commentators in 
Australia have applied the reductionist approach: posing a dilemma between 
expeditionary operations in support of distant allies versus the continental 
defence of Australia.27 The parallel between the Australian debates and the 
original controversy over Liddell Hart’s thesis is unmistakable. This is 
the key feature of both Evans’s and White’s assessments and it is core to 
23  Michael Howard, The causes of wars and other essays (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), 172.
24  Andrew Lambert, ‘The naval war course’, in The British way in warfare: Power and the international 
system, 1856–1956: Essays in honour of David French, ed. Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (Ashgate: 
Routledge, 2010), 250–51.
25  David French, The British way in warfare, 1688–2000 (London: Routledge, 1990); see also 
Neilson and Kennedy, The British way in warfare: Power and the international system, 1856–1956: 
Essays in honour of David French.
26  French, The British way in warfare, 1688–2000, 23.
27  For the discussion of British defence policy in the twentieth century and his ‘dilemma’, see Hew 
Strachan, ‘The British way in warfare revisited’, The Historical Journal 26, no. 2 (1983): 447–61.
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the ideas of other commentators in this debate such as Paul Kelly and 
John Birmingham, and academics such as Alan Bloomfield, Victor Nossal, 
Alex Burns and Ben Eltham.28 Most significantly, both Evans and White 
used their characterisation of an Australian way of war as a foundation for 
their policy advocacy.
Evans, in the early 1990s, aimed to support the Australian Army’s attempts 
to address what it saw as the limitations of the DoA policy. In the early 
2000s, Evans also saw his interpretation of the Australian way of war as 
a way to support the Australian Government’s commitments to the wars 
in the Middle East based, in part, on the continuity of this approach with 
Australia’s traditional use of military force.
White’s characterisation of an Australian way of war was used to highlight 
the expeditionary approach as outdated and relevant only to Australia’s 
past rather than its strategic future. His focus was squarely on the centrality 
of the DoA concept. This binary divide and positioning of Australia’s 
way of war as a core component of contemporary policy debates means 
that Australia’s use of this concept has been largely captured in the same 
conceptual problems that beleaguered Liddell Hart’s original work.
Moving beyond a binary approach has been the key to the modern British 
debate on their way of war. As Correlli Barnett has argued, ‘it is a mistake 
to subscribe to either [British] school [maritime or continental] in its 
full doctrinal rigidity. All depends on particular cases’.29 Brian Bond has 
noted that for the period in which Liddell Hart first outlined the concept, 
between the two world wars, continental and maritime strategies for the 
British were complementary not alternative strategies.30 To Hew Strachan 
‘the choice [for the British] between the maritime and the continental 
strategies is, in historical terms, a false one’.31
28  John Birmingham, A time for war: Australia as a military power, Quarterly Essay No.  26 
(Melbourne: Black Inc., 2005); Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal, ‘Towards an explicative 
understanding of strategic culture: The cases of Australia and Canada’, Contemporary Security Policy 
28, no. 2 (2007): 286–307, doi.org/10.1080/13523260701489859; Alex Burns and Ben Eltham, 
‘Australia’s strategic culture: Constraints and opportunities in security policymaking’, Contemporary 
Security Policy 35, no. 2 (2014): 187–210, doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.927672.
29  Correlli Barnett, Britain and her Army, 1509–1970: A military, political and social survey 
(London: Allen Lane, 1970), xviii as quoted in Strachan, ‘The British way in warfare revisited’, 455.
30  Brian Bond, British military policy between the two world wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 1.
31  Strachan, ‘The British way in warfare revisited’.
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For Michael Howard, the debate is actually about the nuances of strategy, 
and the ‘British dilemma’ should not be seen as a reductionist either/or 
strategic approach, but rather a relationship of interdependence between 
the command of the seas and the maintenance of a European balance of 
power.32 Howard’s nuanced assessment is equally applicable to Australia’s 
way of war – it should not be seen as a doctrinally rigid choice between 
the defence of Australia or expeditionary approaches to strategy.
Beyond the false dilemma
The key to understanding Australia’s way of war is to understand the 
complex set of calculations that drove the development, and constant 
revision, of Australia’s strategic policy. This means it bears much more 
in common with the British way of war based on the analysis of French, 
Howard, Barnett and Strachan rather than the original, and rather limited, 
assessment of Liddell Hart. Ultimately, Australia’s ‘way of war’ should be 
seen in terms of ways of war, in the plural sense. This is reflective of issues 
of both continuity and change in Australia’s approach to strategy, which 
– like Great Britain’s approach – has proven to be adaptive, defined by 
approaches to strategy that have been refined as circumstances dictated.
The key unifying element in the Australian example is its overriding 
preference for a strategic culture based on an alliance with a major 
power. Thus, Australia’s ways of war are driven by a combination of the 
strategic circumstances of the country and its dominant strategic culture. 
In many senses, this too parallels the British experience. A defining 
feature of each country’s ways of war is their relationship to respective 
major alliance partners. For the British, this was based around access to 
a continental-sized army in Europe to partner with its maritime power in 
order to affect the balance of power in Europe. During the First World 
War and 1939–40 this was France, thereafter it was a balance of France 
(1914–66) and the United States (1941–), then Germany (1966–) and 
the United States during the Cold War.33
32  Strachan, ‘The British way in warfare revisited’, 451.
33  Lawrence Freedman, ‘Alliance and the British way in warfare’, Review of International Studies 21, 
no. 2 (1995): 145–58.
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Australia’s ‘ways of war’, 1945–65
For Australia, material difficulties of continental defence, and the desire of 
a small to middle power to preserve the liberal international order in which 
it has prospered, has seen its major alliance partner shift from its colonial 
founder, Great Britain (1877–1942), to Great Britain and the United States 
(1942–68) and then the United States (1968–). As the introduction to this 
work notes, in contrast to popular imagination surrounding Prime Minister 
John Curtin’s 1942 call to ‘turn to America’, Australian forces spent the 
best part of the following two decades closely integrated with the British 
and wider Commonwealth. From 1951, with the signing of the Australia, 
New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty, Australian strategy 
was built on balancing Australia’s two great and powerful friends through 
a combination of Commonwealth defence, the US alliance and, for a short 
period, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
A key to understanding Australia’s ways of war has been to understand 
the capabilities, interests and intents of its ‘great and powerful friend(s)’. 
The vital element of this approach is to understand the role of Australia’s 
major alliance partners in the context of global geopolitics and, especially, 
in their strategic approach to Australia’s core areas of strategic interest: the 
South Pacific and Southeast Asia.34
Australian strategic history during 1945–65 amply demonstrates the 
need to move beyond the binary continental versus expeditionary debate. 
During this epoch, what emerges is the adaptability of Australian strategy, 
which derives a series of ways of war couched in the dominance of an 
alliance-based strategic culture.35 In this system, Australian strategic 
culture is dominated by twin needs: the desire for a long-term alliance 
with great powers, and a regional defence strategy focused on the South 
Pacific and Southeast Asia – areas that are generally very low-priority 
geographic regions for Australia’s major alliance partners.
As Stephan Frühling notes in Chapter 1, the interrelationship between 
Australia’s strategic interests and those of its major power allies is key. 
The period from 1945 to 1965 is where:
34  Peter J Dean, ‘A new strategic song? ANZUS, the 2020 Australian defence update, and redefining 
self-reliance’, War on the rocks, 12  August 2020, at: warontherocks.com/2020/08/singing-a-new-
strategic-song-anzus-the-2020-australian-defence-update-and-redefining-self-reliance/.
35  The notion of understanding a nation state’s ways of war is outlined in Matthew S Muehlbauer 
and David J Ulbrich, Ways of war: American military history from the colonial era to the twenty-first 
century (New York: Routledge, 2018), doi.org/10.4324/9781315545691.
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few certainties seemed to exist as Australia navigated its own 
particular version of the Cold War … [especially as] the centre of 
gravity of the global Cold War lay elsewhere … [and Australia’s 
immediate geographic region] was nonetheless only of third-rate 
importance for Australia’s [major power] allies.
During this period, the British Empire’s intent and capabilities waned, 
while for the US peripheral theatres in the Cold War, like Southeast Asia, 
grew in importance as 1965 approached. As Tristan Moss demonstrates 
in Chapter 8, in the South Pacific meanwhile, both major powers showed 
little interest during a period of considerable Australian strategic concern. 
What is critical is the constant tension at the intersection of Southeast 
Asia and the South Pacific for Australia – the land border between Papua 
New Guinea and Indonesia and the constant tensions and difficulties in 
ANZUS over competing Australian and US interests.
A coalition-focused way of war
This means that Australia’s ways of war during this period had two 
interrelated streams. The first is based around the use of force in coalition 
with Australia’s great and powerful friends and generally consists of 
small (relative to the great powers), niche and largely single-service force 
commitments, generally dominated by the prominence of Australian land 
power. These forces are generally embedded into the forces of the larger 
ally and integrated into the larger ally’s logistical system.
This approach has dominated Australian military history and seen the 
preponderance of Australian military power committed to the Middle East 
and Europe, but with episodic periods that focus on Asia, such as the period 
covered by this book.36 In this approach, Australia largely operates at two 
levels of war:37 strategic (decision to use force) and tactical (manoeuvres, 
engagements and battles that can be identified as a ‘way of battle’).38
36  See Douglas E Delaney, The Imperial Army project: Britain and the land forces of the dominions 
and India, 1902–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Christopher Hubbard, Australian 
and US military cooperation: Fighting common enemies (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2005).
37  USAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE), ‘Three Levels of War’, 
in Air and Space Power Mentoring Guide, vol.  1 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University 
Press, 1997), at: www.cc.gatech.edu/~tpilsch/INTA4803TP/Articles/Three%20Levels%20of%20War= 
CADRE-excerpt.pdf.
38  See Brian McAllister Linn, The echo of battle: The Army’s American way of battle (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009).
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This approach is symbolic of Australia’s engagement in conflicts of the 
colonial period, in which it raised forces to support the British Empire 
in the Maori Wars, the Sudan War, the Boxer Rebellion and the Boer 
War. It is also reflective of the use of Australian military force from 1915 
to 1918 in the Middle East and on the Western Front. This approach 
was replicated with the decision to send part of 2  Australian Imperial 
Force to the Middle East and Mediterranean between 1940 and 1943, 
the deployment of significant elements of the Royal Australian Navy to 
operations in those theatres, and the support for the British Empire Air 
Training Scheme that saw thousands of Australian airmen serve in Europe 
and the Mediterranean right through until 1945.
The same principle was applied to the Korean War, although this 
was closer to home than the conflicts in the Middle East and Europe. 
The assault on Korea came as a surprise but it was soon evident that there 
was a clarity of interests and alignment with the United States. As Tom 
Richardson highlights in Chapter 4, the ‘political climate [for] Australian 
participation in the Korean War was by no means guaranteed’, given the 
focus on Southeast Asia; however, the Australian foreign minister saw it as 
a ‘golden opportunity’ to build ‘political goodwill in Washington’ to clear 
the way for an alliance with the United States.
Thus, Australia’s commitment to Korea was driven by both the 
consideration of regional security and alliance management. The Korean 
War, with its supporting UN Security Council Resolution, also accorded 
with another of Australia’s long-term, post–Second World War approaches 
to its grand strategy: a liberal institutional approach to diplomacy 
used to support the institutions that framed the so-called ‘rules-based 
international order’.39
This approach, of using military force in support of Australia’s great 
power ally and global security concerns, continued after the period of the 
Vietnam War – namely through Australia’s commitment to the defeat of 
Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait in the UN-sanctioned operations 
of the First Gulf War, and the reprise in 2003 during which a ‘Coalition 
of the Willing’ supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 
Iraq during the Second Gulf War. The onset of the Global War on Terror 
39  Andrew O’Neil, ‘Conceptualising future threats to Australia’s security’, Australian Journal of 
Political Science 46, no. 1 (2011): 19–34, doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2010.544286.
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after September 11, 2001 also saw Australia send military forces to fight 
in Afghanistan as well as forces to support the conflict against ISIS in 
Syria and Iraq.40
A regionally focused way of war
However, the limitations of Australia’s alliance relationships, especially in 
its near region, have seen the development of a parallel approach to the 
Australian way of war built around the use of force by the Australian 
military in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. This second stream 
approach is identified by the recognition that, for the majority of Australia’s 
history, its two great and powerful friends have not shared the same levels 
of strategic interest in Australia’s immediate geographical region.
This way of war has seen a lower frequency in the use of military force; 
however, given these regions’ geographical proximity to Australia, 
the operations Australia has undertaken have arguably been of greater 
strategic importance than distant alliance deployments. This is largely due 
to these operations being undertaken in response to a perceived threat to 
the direct security of Australia and its immediate region, or in relation 
to Australia’s unique strategic interests. The use of military force in these 
operations involves Australian commitment across all levels of war – 
strategic, operational and tactical – with a heavier emphasis in the South 
Pacific on joint operations, either independently, semi-independently 
or in coalition.
A number of exceptionally important conflicts and operations in these 
regions across Australian military history have illustrated this way of war. 
Notable in this approach has been Australia’s commitment to securing the 
approaches to the continent from the north-east, in particular the island 
of New Guinea. Australia’s first major military commitment of the First 
World War, an often-overlooked operation, was the capture of German 
New Guinea in 1914 by a wholly Australian joint expeditionary operation. 
While also driven by imperial requests, the location of a German colony 
on Australia’s doorstep was a major concern to the fledgling nation at 
the outbreak of war in 1914. Thereafter the defence of Australian New 
40  These latter conflicts saw significant promotion of Australian military efforts through the 
commitment of Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force units, which at times made up 
the majority of Australia’s commitment.
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Guinea saw some of the most iconic battles of Australian military history 
fought on, above and around the island in 1942–44. Tristan Moss 
outlines in Chapter  8 the considerable commitment by the Australian 
military in the early Cold War to the defence of Australian territory in 
Papua New Guinea.
In the interwar period, Australia committed to the defence of both its 
immediate region and Southeast Asia via the Singapore strategy. With the 
advent of war with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy in 1939–40, Australia 
undertook multiple strategic approaches, including expeditionary 
deployments to the Middle East and Europe, regional deployments 
to Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, and preparations for 
home defence.
The regional approach typifies the use of Australian military force during 
the early Cold War period. Early on, Australia assumed an expeditionary 
focus to strategic planning centred on the Middle East; but by the early 
1950s, Australia left open the question of whether its forces would be 
sent to the Middle East or to Southeast Asia in the event of the Cold War 
turning hot. As Frühling notes in Chapter 1, by 1952–53 this emphasis 
had shifted to Asia and eventually Australia adopted an approach of 
seeking to have both Great Britain and the United States support the 
defence of Southeast Asia as a priority in a major global conflict.
Of course, preparation for conflict overseas was not the only thing on 
Australia’s mind at the end of the Second World War. As John Blaxland 
and David Horner note in Chapters  2 and 3, Australia’s largest-ever 
military commitment, the Pacific War, left a legacy that shaped the focus 
and direction of Australia’s defence posture, force structure and military 
culture, and prompted an internal response through the establishment of 
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) as the ‘fourth 
arm of Australia’s defence’.
Nevertheless, the ink was hardly dry on surrender documents with Japan 
before Australia was yet again involved in regional military operations. 
Australia’s first postwar commitment was to the Malayan Emergency. 
As  Thomas Richardson outlined in Chapter  6, the commitment of 
Australian forces to Malaya, followed up with Australia’s work with 
Great Britain in the formation of the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR), 
represented both Australia’s attempts to resist communist aggression in 
the region and ‘one of Australia’s longest … [regional] deployments’.
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Southeast Asia was a major region of focus for this period – driven by 
the power of geographic proximity. In Chapter 5, Tristan Moss outlines 
the extent of planning for the Cold War turning hot in Southeast Asia, 
a decade-long enterprise that focused Australia’s regional military efforts. 
Despite debates in the 1950s over the relative importance of the Middle 
East, it became increasingly apparent that Australia must focus on 
regional efforts. Inside these developments was a constant reprioritisation 
driven by regional geopolitical developments, global politics and the often 
conflicting and competing demands of Australia’s defence policy and 
posture as well as the demands of ANZAM (the Australia, New Zealand 
and Malaya alliance), the FESR and SEATO.
Two key conflicts in the region would cement Australia’s geographic focus 
and its attempts to ensure that its major power allies remained fixed on 
regional developments in Southeast Asia: Confrontation and Vietnam. 
While Vietnam is deliberately outside of the scope of this book, as Moss 
states ‘for a decade before the Vietnam War, Australia prepared to fight 
a conventional war in Southeast Asia … [and] the FESR was ANZAM’s 
contribution to SEATO … that allowed it a seat at the planning table’.
Confrontation with Indonesia, as Lachlan Grant and Michael Kelly 
outline in Chapter 7, was intricately linked to both the US alliance and 
Australia’s involvement in the war in South Vietnam. It also highlighted 
the fragility of over-reliance on great and powerful friends, as the United 
States consistently refused Australia’s attempts to get clear commitments 
over Indonesia through the ANZUS Treaty. As James Curran’s work Unholy 
fury highlights, ‘perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of the limits to 
rhetoric of shared values and common interests [in the ANZUS alliance] 
was made over the question of Indonesia’.41 Australia’s constant search 
for reassurances from the United States over Indonesia were rebuffed. 
While ambiguity within the wording of the ANZUS Treaty provided 
reassurance to the United States over possible entrapment by Australia 
in a conflict with Indonesia, it consequently stoked Australian fears of 
abandonment. Australian persistence was eventually met with a striking 
blow by President Kennedy, who noted to the Australian Minister of 
41  James Curran, Unholy fury: Whitlam and Nixon at war (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
2015), 40.
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External Affairs Garfield Barwick that ‘people have forgotten ANZUS 
and are not at the moment prepared for a situation which would involve 
the United States’.42
The US response had far-reaching strategic consequences, helping to 
drive Australian engagement with the United States in the Vietnam War, 
while hedging through
substantially increased military expenditure, raising the strength 
of the regular army, purchasing 40 additional Mirage fighters, 
a third DDG, and ordering 24 F-111 bombers  …  [to develop 
an] Australian capability to act independently of allies against 
Indonesia.43
As Grant and Kelly note, while ultimately the Australian and British 
response to Confrontation through Operation Claret ‘remains a model 
of conducting a successful low-intensity conflict while maintaining 
diplomatic relations with the opposing nation’, strategically it struck at 
the heart of Australian fears of US abandonment and thus the need for 
greater regional self-reliance.
This in turn shaped Australia’s response to Vietnam. The Menzies 
Government aimed to provide a prompt gesture of combat support for 
Vietnam to generate goodwill towards Australia in Washington and to 
keep the United States engaged in the region. In addition, the provision 
of strong Australian diplomatic support to the United States and South 
Vietnam was aimed at hopefully ‘obscur[ing] how small a military 
contribution Australia was capable of making’.44
Justified by SEATO and ANZUS, and spurred on by concerns stoked by 
the US response to Confrontation, the Australian Government committed 
advisers and later combat troops to Vietnam, premised on the idea that 
for a modest financial cost and a small commitment of forces Australia 
could draw the United States further into the defence of Southeast Asia. 
This strategy overlooked the nature of the conflict in South Vietnam, 
including the difficulties the United States would have in achieving 
a military outcome. Ultimately, the course of the war in Vietnam would 
lead to a US withdrawal from continental Southeast Asia, personified 
42  Kennedy as quoted in Curran, Unholy fury, 44.
43  Stephan Frühling, A history of Australian strategic policy since 1945 (Canberra: Defence Publishing 
Service, 2009), 21.
44  Frank Frost, Australia’s war in Vietnam (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
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by the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 and the increasing 
Vietnamisation of the war in South Vietnam. These moves undermined 
the very basis of Australia’s approach to regional security.
While Australia may have been largely focused on Southeast Asia 
in 1945–65, this did not stop the government from placing a high 
importance on  the defence of the Australian mainland and the South 
Pacific. The South Pacific presents as peripheral to the bifurcation of the 
Australian way of war; however, it is exceptionally easy to view this region 
in a different light given the level of military commitment to the area 
throughout Australia’s history. This is illustrated by major operations in 
New Guinea in the Second World War and deployments in the Cold 
War: operations Morris Dance (1987), Quick Step (2006) and Operation 
Fiji Assist (2016) in Fiji, deployments and operations in East Timor 
(1941–42, 1999, 2006), plus various deployments from the end of the 
Second World War through to today for humanitarian and disaster relief 
operations and peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations.45 The South 
Pacific has returned to focus through strengthened bilateral defence 
partnerships, the Pacific Patrol Boat Program and, from 2019, with the 
much-hyped federal government ‘Pacific Step Up’.46
Reconceptualising the Australian 
‘way of war’47
These reflections on Australia’s ways of war, concentrated on the period of 
the early Cold War, highlight the redundancy of the focus on a binary divide 
between the expeditionary and DoA schools of thinking on Australian 
strategy. Such a dualistic approach ignores the complexity and constant 
adaptability of Australia’s approach to strategic policy. Conceptually, 
many of the operations in Southeast Asia in the period from 1945 to 1965 
45 See Joanne Wallis, Pacific power? Australia’s strategy in the Pacific Islands (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2017); see also Dean, ‘The alliance, Australia’s strategic culture and way of war’, 242.
46  Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Minister for Defence, ‘Strengthening Australia’s 
commitment to the Pacific’, media release, 8 November 2018, at: www.pm.gov.au/media/strengthening-
australias-commitment-pacific.
47  This argument has been outlined by the author in two other key assessments. See Dean, 
‘The alliance, Australia’s strategic culture and way of war’; and Peter J Dean, ‘Towards an Australian 
Marine Corps? Australian land power and the battle between geography and history’, in A new strategic 
environment and roles of ground forces: NIDS international symposium (Tokyo: National Institute for 
Defense Studies, 2019).
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sit at the intersection of the expeditionary and DoA approaches, mixing 
together elements of both and forming what arguably could be labelled 
a third way of war for Australia: one focused on a regionalist approach.
In contemporary discussions of Australian strategy, some commentators 
have argued that a maritime strategy with a focus on the region is relatively 
new phenomenon: a ‘third way’ of thinking in Australian strategic 
policy, as manifested through the adoption of a maritime strategy for 
the Australian Defence Force and the revised focus of the 2009, 2013 
and 2016 defence white papers.48 But as the chapters in this book have 
outlined, the period from 1945 to 1965 makes it clear Australia has 
a much longer and richer tradition in regional operations: it has always 
been there, as a consequence of the interplay of Australia’s geopolitical 
circumstances and the fundamental tensions between Australia’s interests 
in its region and those of its great and powerful allies.
The more regionalist approach placed a premium on Australia’s middle 
power status with a pragmatic focus on the use of force not just for 
continental defence or expeditionary operations but throughout 
Australia’s ‘areas of direct military interest’ – Southeast Asia and the South 
Pacific. Such an approach does not deride expeditionary concerns about 
the global balance of power, but is more pragmatic in its view of Australia’s 
strategic weight and influence. Nor is it totally divorced from the idea of 
DoA – focusing as it does on operations closer to Australia’s geographic 
centre of gravity. At times, it has provided for a more balanced approach 
to Australia’s military structure and organisation, with an emphasis on 
capabilities that can be used throughout the region; an approach that 
was particularly influential in the late 1950s and 1960s and again during 
strategic guidance in the 1990s until the events of September 11, 2001.
These three ways of war have each held sway at different stages of 
Australian strategic history. However, what is critical to understand is that 
they were not rigidly adhered to in any one era and have been evident, in 
various forms, in all eras. What is central to understanding each of these 
48  Michael Evans, The third way: Towards an Australian maritime strategy for the twenty first century, 
Australian Army Research Paper, no.  1 (Canberra: Australian Army, 2014). While Evans correctly 
positions the difficulties for Australia in developing a maritime strategy being a result of ‘sea blindness’ 
and Australia’s reliance on the maritime supremacy of its great and powerful friends, he also attributes it 
to the ‘schism between continental and expeditionary approaches in strategic behaviour’ in Australia.
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conceptual approaches is the fundamental adaptability of Australian 
strategy, reflective of the pragmatic approach Australia takes to alliance 
management and regional and global security concerns.
Depending on dictates provided by Australia’s strategic environment, 
each of these different ways of war have taken on different roles and 
places in Australian defence thinking. The period of 1945–65 is not 
only fascinating in its own right, but also informs contemporary debates. 
Then, as now, 1954–64 was a period defined by uncertainty, changing 
alliance structures,  evolving threats, geopolitical change and great 
power competition.
Since the turn of the century, a layered approach, reflective of these three 
ways of war, has been evident in formal policy through the strategic 
objectives laid out in the 2000, 2009 and 2013 Defence white papers. 
These documents provided for a hierarchy of priorities based on DoA, 
then regionalism and finally global concerns. In the 2016 Defence white 
paper, these three strategic objectives continued to coexist but were placed 
on an equal footing.49
In response to the rise of China and the changing regional balance of 
power, Australian defence policy continues to adapt. The 2020 Defence 
Strategic Update outlined new strategic objectives: shape, deter and 
respond. In this approach, the centrality of the US alliance remains; 
however, the focus geographically is now the Indo-Pacific, defined as 
the region from the north-west Indian Ocean, through Southeast Asia 
to the South Pacific. Regionalism, it seems, is back in the ascendency 
in Australian strategic policy – just like it was in the period covered in 
this book. However, this does not totally ignore global security concerns, 
while at the heart of all Australian strategic policy documents sits the 
fundamental bedrock of the defence of Australia. The period of 1945–65 
thus holds many important lessons for contemplation, for, as Mark Twain 
noted, while history may not repeat itself, it does rhyme.
49  Commonwealth of Australia, Defence white paper 2016 (Canberra: Australian Government 
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